A HISTORY

OF THE

IRISH REBELLION

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BY

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PREFATORY NOTE

The purpose of the Authors is, first, to present an account of the Rebellion in its relation to the European War, which shall be accurate and comprehensive, and may serve, it is hoped, as a standard record of this episode in Irish and European History, and, secondly, to exhibit, not to criticise, conflicting ideals in present-day Ireland.

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CHAPTER I.

IRELAND'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The Irish Rebellion of 1916 was invested with a peculiar gravity and significance by two circumstances which distinguished it from earlier insurrections in the modern history of Ireland. The first was the German connexion. The national instinct of Ireland has been, historically, francophile, and the German name, throughout the last century, was chiefly associated in the mind of Nationalists with mercenary troops employed to combat the rising of '98. The French tradition dated back three centuries to the time of the rebellion of the great O'Neills of Tyrone. It was continued in the community of arms of Irish and French in the days of St. Ruth and Sarsfield, in the deeds of the Irish Brigade under the French flag at Fontenoy, Blenheim, and Ramillies, when Irishmen by the ten thousand died in the service of France on the battlefields of Europe, and later in Humbert's invasion of Ireland. It persisted even to 1870, when, while Great Britain preserved a frigidly correct neutrality, Irish sympathy took visible form in the despatch to France of an Ambulance Service, and of a combatant *Compagnie Irlandaise* that, but for the restrictions upon volunteering imposed

under the British neutrality laws, might have expanded into a modern Irish Brigade.

The idea of German-Irish friendship was not, however, altogether new. An attempt, though not a very extended one, to "educate" Ireland in this sense had been in progress for several years. Observers in America noted the increase of social intercourse and intermarriage among the two stocks of immigrants.* Two causes had contributed to the decline of French popularity in Ireland: first, the anti-clerical and sometimes anti-Catholic policy of the Third Republic; secondly, the *entente* with England. The *entente*, however, affected mainly those extremist Irishmen who continued to believe in physical force and wished to establish connexions with that country, whatever its name, which, in the event of a European war, would most likely be found threatening Imperial interests. At the outbreak of the war the general body of the Irish people found itself still to some extent affected by historical memories older than those of the quarrel between the Church and the Third Republic; the appeal of Fontenoy and the Irish Brigade helped considerably to promote a pro-Ally sentiment throughout the country. The Ultramontane attitude in politics is not characteristic of modern Ireland, and the considerations which told at the Vatican in favour of the

* The Parliamentary Party endeavoured after the outbreak of war to prevent their Irish-American supporters from going into alliance with the Germans of the States, and the United Irish League of America finally adhered to Mr. Redmond's policy of supporting the Allies. But, as illustrating the influence on events of the German-Irish social *rapprochment*, one may mention the withdrawal towards "neutrality" of one of Mr. Redmond's most prominent supporters in the States, the President of one of his Leagues. This man had married a German wife; he did not go over to the *Clan-na-Gael* or any of the pro-German Irish organisations, but merely withdrew from politics for the period of the war.

Central Powers carried very little weight with the most Catholic people in Europe.* It remains true, therefore, broadly speaking, that it was historically unnatural to find a body of Irishmen

* Formerly it was different. We recall how little sympathy Ireland (so far as she was vocal) extended towards Garibaldi and the Italian patriots in their struggle against the Bourbons, Austria and the Papal Power. Ultramontanism in Ireland seems to have been finally overthrown at the time of the Land League. But in any case it would be difficult to credit Ireland with a *principled* "foreign policy." The revolutionaries in the nineteenth century looked generally to France and to America as authors of the Rights of Man. But revolutionaries were a minority of the people—in '48 and in '67 as in 1916. Of the most typical of physical force Nationalists, John Mitchel, a Frenchman (the late Emile Montégut) wrote :— "He is less revolutionary than the average English shopkeeper . . . less versed in Liberal ideas than the most obstinate monarchist on the Continent. . . . He is revolutionary on the surface, in his accent and expression, but not in spirit or in principle. Nor is the obstinate attachment of the Irish to Catholicism calculated to conquer the sympathies of the Radicals. In short, neither the extreme nor the moderate sections of society set store on Ireland, and she finds them in turn indifferent or lukewarm towards her cause. (Mitchel) applauds Mazzini, the enemy of Catholicism ; likewise he would applaud an Ultramontane Bishop of Ireland blessing the standards of a Celtic insurrection. He salutes the French Republic with hope. . . . On his arrival in America he learns the news from the East, and he echoes the warlike trumpets of the Czar which resound on the Danube. In each of these events he hears the good news : England's agony." It might be argued, however, in regard to the events of 1916, that the Irish revolutionists were obsessed by the idea of Nationality, and in this respect resembled in some degree the makers of modern Germany (in so far as these conceived of the world as being divided necessarily into mutually hostile race entitities) ; which the Allies, on the other hand, asserted a principle of European solidarity of interests. Nevertheless, there is the irony of human affairs in the salutation of an autocratic Kaiser as Prince Charming by a group of revolutionists who proposed to set up a co-operative Commonwealth based (*vide* the Republican Proclamation) on adult (male and female) suffrage.

allied with Prussia in the European war which had begun with the invasion of Belgium and France.

In the next place, the moral gravity of the Rebellion was fully matched by its military gravity; for it exposed Great Britain to a disadvantage which, serious as it would have been if she had been engaged in war with any other Power, was vastly more serious when she was engaged in war with Germany. Strategic geography, especially in relation to sea power, is not a subject which the average British citizen has been trained to regard with intelligent interest. His lack of acquaintance with Ireland's history, and the fact that her foreign relations have long been merged with those of the neighbouring island, tend further to obscure his realisation of the strategic importance of Ireland. Yet the most cursory glance at Irish military history serves to show how capital is that importance, and it is emphasised by the frequency of the occasions, during the period when Great Britain enjoyed a complete immunity from invasion, on which the soldiers of foreign Powers have landed and fought on Irish soil.

The menace which an Ireland in unfriendly hands offered to the flank of Great Britain may be traced as far back as Roman times. During the period of the decline of the Roman Empire, when its hold upon Great Britain was relaxing, we constantly hear, both from native and Roman sources, of the excursions of the " Scots " (the conventional appellation of the Irish Gaels) to Britain and Gaul, which seem to have been almost as much dreaded as were those of the Danes in later days. The most formidable of these invasions were led by Niall of the Nine Hostages, the last but one of the Pagan Kings of Ireland, who on one occasion collected a great fleet and

landed in Wales, whence, though forced to retreat by the Roman General, Stilicho, he carried off immense plunder; it was in another of Niall's excursions to Britain that St. Patrick was taken captive to Ireland. It was, of course, the wane of Roman power which made these Irish invasions of Britain more frequent and daring; and it is not to be supposed that, if they had not been beset by growing difficulties nearer home, the Romans would not have made some attempt at punitive action across the Irish Sea. In a later century the Danish grip upon the main strongholds of the Irish coast contributed powerfully to the extension of the Danes' sway over the north-western counties of England. The influence upon the Danish wars in England of Brian Boru's victory at Clontarf on Good Friday, 1014, which, by virtually extinguishing the Danes' power in Ireland, deprived them of their Irish bases, has not been adequately estimated by any English historian of the period. It was, perhaps, some dawning realisation of the strategic importance of Ireland in relation to his own kingdom that, a hundred and fifty years later, secured Henry II.'s ready assent to the freebooting expedition of Richard de Clare, Earl of Pembroke—better known as Strongbow—which first started the English upon their four centuries' career of conquest in Ireland.

Certainly the British Government's constant fear, from the time of Henry VIII. onwards, of the danger to which Great Britain was exposed by hostile expeditions to Ireland explains, if it does not at all excuse, the merciless severity with which Irish rebellions were suppressed, and in part, indeed, explains its general Irish policy. It governed the people by force, and kept them down to prevent them from giving aid to an invader, with the inevitable consequence of its

harshness that any invader, no matter from what quarter, would have been welcomed and aided by the native Irish and Anglo-Irish. The vicious circle in which its policy revolved had the further result that "if a chief, encouraged by the prospect of help from abroad, rose in rebellion, it was not enough, as it would be under ordinary circumstances, to reduce him to submission, inflict reasonable punishment, and take guarantees for future good behaviour. He was executed or banished, or brought prisoner to London; and the people, who were mostly blameless, were expelled or exterminated, and the whole district turned into a desert, in order that an invader should have neither help nor foothold."*

Invasions, or attempted invasions, from overseas were nevertheless more frequent than most English people, whose education in the history of the United Kingdom is limited almost exclusively to purely English affairs, are aware. No less than three expeditions were fitted out at foreign ports in 1579-80, when the great Geraldine Rebellion broke out for the second time. The first, equipped by the Pope on the recommendation of Philip II. of Spain, and consisting of a small squadron of three ships with seven hundred Italian soldiers, never reached Ireland; for its commander, an English adventurer, by name Thomas Stukely, touching at Lisbon on his voyage, joined another expedition led by the King of Portugal. The second, led from Spain by Fitzmaurice, who was accompanied by the Pope's legate, Dr. Sanders, landed at the little harbour of Smerwick, in Kerry, where it took possession of the fort of Dunanore, perched on top of a rock jutting into the sea; this, however, was a small affair in which only eighty Spanish soldiers were engaged. The third expedition consisted of seven hundred

* Joyce, "History of Ireland," Part IV., Chap. I.

Spaniards and Italians who landed in October, 1580, from four vessels at Smerwick, and also occupied the fort of Dunanore, where, after waiting for six weeks in the hope of a rising by the neighbouring peasantry—who, however, had been too thoroughly crushed to join the invaders—the force was invested by land and sea, and slaughtered *en masse* by Lord Grey upon its surrender.

Twenty years later, during the rebellion of Hugh O'Neill, the great Earl of Tyrone, on the 23rd of September, 1601, a Spanish fleet entered the harbour of Kinsale with three thousand four hundred troops under the command of Don Juan del Aguila. The Spaniards immediately took possession of the town and of the castles of Baltimore, Castlehaven, and Dunboy. Del Aguila was besieged, but the northern earls came to his support in a famous march southwards, and the English army of investment was itself besieged in turn. Finally, by good luck more than anything else, the issue was decided in its favour in the battle of Kinsale, and del Aguila surrendered and returned to Spain, after having maintained himself in Ireland for more than three months. During the great rebellion beginning in 1641, in which Owen Roe O'Neill, nephew of the famous Earl of Tyrone, was the outstanding figure, the banished Irishmen who had risen to positions of great influence in the service of France, Spain and the Netherlands used their best efforts to secure foreign support. O'Neill himself at the outset held out hope of French help from Cardinal Richelieu, and, though no large bodies of foreign troops actually landed in Ireland, landings of officers, arms and stores from overseas were frequent.

If we leave aside for a moment these two great episodes of Irish military history which most strikingly emphasise the strategic interdepen-

dence of Great Britain and Ireland—the Cromwellian war and the war of William and James—the tale of foreign expeditions to Ireland is taken up again with the expedition of Thurot in 1759-60. At this time a French army of invasion was collected at Vannes in Brittany, which was to be conveyed by a powerful fleet anchored at Brest under Admiral Conflans, while a smaller squadron of five vessels lay at Dunkirk under Thurot, an Irishman, whose real name was O'Farrell. Conflans was intercepted and defeated by Hawke off Quiberon Bay on the night of November 14th; Thurot eluded the British patrol, and, after being driven by storms to Bergen in Norway, appeared with three ships off Carrickfergus in February. He disembarked with about a thousand men, attacked the castle and compelled it to surrender, and, being unable to secure there enough provisions for his starving forces, obtained them from Belfast under threat of burning both that town and Carrickfergus. After five days the French re-embarked, and were subsequently intercepted and engaged off the Isle of Man, when Thurot was killed and his ships captured. Finally, the Rebellion of 1798 was undertaken with the promise of foreign support. In 1796 Wolfe Tone arranged in Paris for a French invasion, and in December of that year a fleet of forty-three ships of war, with fifteen thousand troops and forty-five thousand stand of arms, sailed from Brest for Ireland under General Hoche. The fleet was separated by bad weather; sixteen ships only anchored in Bantry Bay, where, as the bad weather continued and Hoche had not come up, they cut their cables after a week and returned to France. In the following year another abortive attempt at invasion followed with the sailing from Ireland of a Dutch fleet with fifteen thousand men under Admiral de Winter—an attempt which was

utterly defeated at Camperdown. Too late to assist the rebellion in 1798, General Humbert with a French force of rather more than a thousand men landed at Killala in County Mayo, and, after dispersing a force of militia, was surrounded and surrendered at Ballinamuck in County Longford. Soon afterwards a larger French expedition, under Admiral Bompart, with nine ships and three thousand men, was engaged and defeated off Lough Swilly.

Humbert's was the last French expedition which landed in Ireland, but it was not the last which contemplated such a landing. Robert Emmet, when he arrived in Ireland in 1802 to organise the insurrection of the following year, had just returned from France, and had hopes of aid from Napoleon; it was the accidental explosion of one of his ammunition depôts which precipitated the rising in July, 1803, instead of in August, by which time he expected invasion from France. In that August Nelson wrote to Addington:—"My station to the westward of Toulon, an unusual one, has been taken upon the idea that the French fleet is bound out of the Straits, and probably to Ireland." In October he wrote:—"Their destination, is it Ireland, or the Levant? That is what I want to know." Collingwood is quoted by Mahan as being equally convinced that Napoleon's ultimate objective for Villeneuve's fleet was Ireland. Mahan maintained that as late as January, 1805, Nelson fully believed that "if the enemy left the Mediterranean, they would proceed to Ireland."

The Cromwellian war and the war of William and James, however—especially the latter—most strongly emphasise Ireland's strategic importance for Great Britain. In the first, no overseas expedition on the Royalist side reached Ireland, if we except Prince Rupert's arrival in February,

1649, in the harbour of Kinsale, with sixteen frigates. But Cromwell's strong sense of the insecurity of his position in England, while Ireland on her flank remained in Royalist hands; the extreme ferocity with which he waged the war in Ireland; and lastly, the ruthless policy of wholesale expropriation under which he offered a large proportion of the people of three provinces the alternatives of "Hell or Connacht"—all these attest his determination, justified after the German manner of "military necessity," however repulsive in its moral aspect, that the Royalists and their foreign supporters should be left no foothold in Ireland for a flank attack upon Great Britain.

In the war of William and James the succession was decided in Ireland. William took possession of the Throne of England almost without opposition, but he had to fight for Ireland, and he was not secure as King of England until he had fought for her and won her. The events of the war are too well known, even by those whose general knowledge of Irish history is most defective, to need recapitulation here. It will be more to the purpose to invoke the testimony of the writer who first defined for the English-speaking peoples the principles of sea-power—Admiral Mahan. The quotation must be prefaced by a correction of detail unimportant in its bearing on his argument, but necessary for the sake of historical accuracy. In his reference in the following passage to the Battle of the Boyne, he ignores the fact that it was not until nearly a year after that battle that the French General St. Ruth arrived in the Shannon with a fleet to take command of the Irish army; and French support continued to arrive until after the signing of the Treaty of Limerick, when Sarsfield, with a fine sense of honour which was ill repaid by the subsequent breaches of the Treaty on the English side, refused to receive a

French fleet of eighteen ships of the line and thirty transports, which sailed up the Shannon with two hundred officers, three thousand soldiers and arms, and ammunition for ten thousand men. "When," says Mahan, "the sea not only borders or surrounds, but also separates a country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only desirable but vitally necessary. . . . . The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resembles an estuary than an actual division, but history has shown the dangers from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of Louis XIV., when the French navy nearly equalled the combined British and Dutch, the gravest complications existed in Ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of the natives and the French; nevertheless the Irish Sea was rather a danger to the English—a weak point in their communications—than an advantage to the French. The latter did not venture their ships of the line in its narrow waters, and expeditions intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the South and West. At the supreme moment the great French fleet was sent to the south coast of England, where it decisively defeated the Allies, and at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's Channel against the English communications. In the midst of a hostile people, the English Army in Ireland was seriously imperilled, but was saved by the Battle of the Boyne, and the flight of James II. This movement against the enemy's communications was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous to England now as in 1690."*

The policy which, on the one hand, influenced Great Britain's enemies, whether in concert with Irish rebels or not, to attack her again and again

* Mahan, "The Influence of Sea-power upon History," Chap. I., pp. 40-41.

through her flank in Ireland, and, on the other hand, influenced successive British Governments to employ every possible means, fair or foul, to avert or minimise this constant menace, was based upon the appreciation on either side of the capital importance of Ireland's geographical situation in relation to the maritime communications of the world. "If the map be examined with an eye to traffic," says one of the most distinguished of Great Britain's few students of strategic geography, "it will be found that it consists of large areas where the possible routes are numerous and widely spread, so that if one line of communication be cut, the supplies can be directed to another, and small areas, where surrounding obstacles compel all traffic to pass along a narrow avenue, the lines of communication leading from many bases coalescing in one common defile. These small areas constitute most of the strategic positions of the world. The sea defile or strait is particularly important, because the approach of the opposite shores generally makes the position one which is not only a crossing-place of traffic, but of the two kinds of traffic, land and sea, and thus of importance to the operation of both fleets and armies. Every defile causes a joining, crossing and deflection of routes."*

The British Isles, as a geographical unit, command such a joining, crossing and deflection of routes, and, in the internal geographical economy of that unit, Ireland occupies a peculiarly dominating flank position. The command of one of the most important groupings of sea communications in the world confers on the United Kingdom an especially valuable advantage when that King-

* Vaughan Cornish, "The Strategic Geography of the British Empire." *Royal Colonial Institute Journal*, February, 1916.

dom is contesting with Germany for the control of sea communications between itself and its Dominions, and with the country (France) where its largest expeditionary force has to be reinforced and supplied. The island of Great Britain restricts the entrance to the North Sea to a strait of some eighteen nautical miles between Kent and France, and a passage of about two hundred and fifty nautical miles between Scotland and Norway. So long as these two passages were held, ships based on the harbours of Germany could not interfere with the communications between the outside world and the southern or western ports of the British Isles. The holding of the shortest line between the north of Scotland and Norway, however, did not suffice for the commercial blockade of Germany, since there lies a long stretch of Scandinavian coast to the north of it, and another patrol line was held for commercial blockade. This ran from the Orkneys to the eastern extremity of Iceland, and thence beyond the Arctic circle to the fringe of the polar ice—a distance of some seven hundred and fifty nautical miles.

Such was the strategic-geographical situation of the United Kingdom *vis-a-vis* Germany in the great war. In the paper to which reference has been made Dr. Vaughan Cornish laid emphasis upon the capital importance in this situation of the position of Ireland. That island stands to Great Britain in the same relation as Great Britain does to Germany—across the line of sea routes to all the nations. The passage between Cape Clear, in Ireland, at the western entrance to St. George's Channel, and Ushant off the coast of Brittany, is the same width, about two hundred and fifty nautical miles, as the passage between Scotland and Norway. A shorter line held from the Irish coast would block the entrance to the Bristol Channel and a yet shorter line the

southern entrance to St. George's Channel. Again, the North Channel between Fair Head, in Antrim, and the Mull of Cantyre, in Argyll, is much narrower than the Straits of Dover, having a width of only eleven nautical miles, and, if this line were held, it would block the northern entrance to all the important commercial ports of the western coast of Great Britain; for there is none in the Western Highlands of Scotland. There would remain the route round the North of Scotland apparently open for the use of ports on the south and east coasts of Great Britain; but, since the trans-oceanic ports lie further south, the proper steaming tracks would pass close to the north coast of Ireland. A hostile naval Power holding Ireland would, therefore, cut off Great Britain from all overseas communication.

There is, besides, a reverse aspect of the question of Ireland's strategic importance. The menace of the submarine tends increasingly to drive the fleets of large surface ships (on which still rests, despite the submarine, the ultimate defence of sea power) to bases further and further from each other and more and more impenetrable to underwater navigation. Such bases exist in plenty round the Irish coast; they exist nowhere else in the British Isles. Their actual or potential importance would have been better appreciated by civilians if, before the war, the project had matured of the Mid-Scotland Canal, which it was proposed to construct as a British equivalent to the Kiel Canal. The advantage of such a canal, long urged by naval experts, is that, whereas the great shipbuilding bases of the Clyde, Belfast and Barrow are well situated in respect of natural protection from a sea attack based on Continental harbours, the line of naval communication between these repair bases and rest bases on the Irish coast and the Fleet's war stations on the east coast of

Scotland is singularly bad; for the distance by the northern route is considerable, and the west coast of the Highlands, with its deep indentations and numerous off-lying islands, is, moreover, an almost perfect lair for hostile submarines. Such a canal would increase the centrality of the east coast stations, giving a shorter and safer route for the transfer of ships from the gap between the North of Scotland and the Continent to that between the Continent and the South of Ireland.

In the absence of such a visible object-lesson as the Mid-Scotland Canal would have afforded of the value for naval purposes of the Irish harbours, civilians are apt to forget what magnificent shelter for fleets is offered by the indentation of the South, West and North coasts of Ireland by long, sheltered, deep-water inlets; their advantage as harbours is obscured by the circumstance that most of them are distant from any manufacturing or trading centre, and have, therefore, no commercial use. Although the naval centre of gravity in the great war was the North Sea, the Atlantic would in no circumstances have been wholly displaced from its historic position in the strategic distribution of the British Fleet, and the Irish mooring-grounds, as has been seen above, tended to be replaced in their position of importance by the menace of the submarine. From 1891 onwards, the waters around Ireland were used for manœuvres by what were then known as the Channel Squadron and the Atlantic Squadron. In that year, Bantry Bay and Blacksod Bay were their respective bases. Bantry Bay is four miles across, and offers a safe anchorage for the largest vessels, effectively protected by Bere Island across its entrance and other islands off the coast. Blacksod Bay has possibilities as a naval base that have frequently attracted attention, though they have never yet been developed. In one year's

manœuvres, the late Sir George Tryon, in command of one fleet based on Blacksod, was known as the "Admiral of Achill." His opponent of that year had one of his bases in Lough Swilly, a magnificent natural harbour for ships of all sizes; and Berehaven in the South, with its twelve fathoms of water and its hill-sheltered haven, was the other. Sligo Bay, again, is well sheltered. Blacksod has a rival in Galway, which there has been much talk of developing both as a naval base and as a harbour for trans-Atlantic steamers. Its approaches are covered by the Aran Islands and several smaller islets nearer the harbour, and its disadvantage of exposure to heavy westerly gales could be overcome, as the similar disadvantage of Plymouth has been overcome, by the construction of breakwaters. The importance of Ireland's geographical position, in a word, is fully equalled by the natural advantages of her coast line.

The immense importance as a European factor which her flank position in relation to Great Britain and the character of her coasts confer upon Ireland was accurately assessed in a book published by a Germanised Briton in Berlin in the summer of 1916. The accompaniment of much distortion of history does not impair his argument that Ireland, as the key to the Atlantic, is the corner-stone of the British Empire, and that "without the possession of Ireland, England would never have been able to build up her immense world Empire, nor to acquire the virtual monopoly of the world's trade." *

It was not only after the outbreak of war, of course, that the strategic significance of Ireland and the possibility of turning this constant factor of weakness in Great Britain's position to the account of Germany engaged the discussion of

* Chatterton-Hill. *Ireland und seine Bedeutung für Europa.*

German writers. Copious passages from the work of Count von Reventlow and other naval and military writers could be quoted to illustrate the interest which the question aroused in the minds of German strategists. It will be more useful, however, to quote a document which is of some importance in determining the character of the rebellion of 1916.

In the summer of 1913 there was sent to General Bernhardi a copy of the *Irish Review* of July of that year, with a request that a remarkable article which it contained might be translated and widely circulated. The article was entitled, "Ireland, Germany and the Next War." It was signed "Shan Van Vocht," and is believed to have been written by Sir Roger Casement. It and General Bernhardi's comments upon it contain the first indication of what may be called an Irish *Drang nach* Germany, and the first suggestion that, in a European or Anglo-German War, Germany could count upon a certain measure of support in Ireland; and it offers some insight into the mentality of the rebels of 1916 and some explanation of their apparent belief that their alliance with Germany and a German victory would further, and not retard, the realisation of their aspirations towards the complete independence of Ireland. For these reasons the article justifies quotation at some length.

The writer in the first place examined the argument that Great Britain's defeat in a war with Germany would involve Ireland in all the penalties of that defeat. "The conclusion that Ireland must suffer all the disasters and eventual losses defeat would entail on Great Britain is based on what may be termed the fundamental maxim that has governed British dealings with Ireland throughout at least three centuries. That maxim may be given in the phrase 'Separation

is unthinkable.' . . . . The British view of the fate of Ireland in the event of British defeat may be stated as two-fold—only two contingencies are admitted. Either Ireland would remain after the war as she is to-day, tied to Great Britain, or she might be (this is not very seriously entertained) annexed by the victor. No other solution, I think, has ever been suggested. Let us discuss No. 1. This, the ordinary man-in-the-street's, view is that, as Ireland would be as much a part of and belonging to Great Britain after a war as before it, whatever the termination of that war might be, she could not fail to share the losses defeat must bring to a common realm. The partnership being indissoluble, if the credit of the house were damaged, and its properties depreciated, all members of the firm must suffer. In this view, an Ireland weaker, poorer, and less recuperative than Great Britain, would stand to lose even more from a British defeat than the predominant partner himself. Let us at once admit that this view is correct. If in the conclusion of a great war Ireland were still to remain, as she is to-day, an integral part of a defeated United Kingdom, it is plain she would suffer, and might be made to suffer, possibly even more than fell to the share of Great Britain."

The writer proceeded to consider the other contingency which the British view admitted—the annexation of Ireland by Germany—and to suggest that another alternative existed. The passage is not without a secondary value as outlining the inherent weakness of Ireland's military position. "The chief end Germany would have in view in a war with England would be to ensure her own free future on the seas. For with that assured and guaranteed by victory over England, all else that she seeks must in the end be hers. To annex existing British Colonies would be in itself

an impossible task—physically a much more impossible task than to annex Ireland. To annex Ireland would be, as a military measure, once command of the sea was gained, a comparatively easy task. No practical resistance to one German Army Corps even could be offered by any force Ireland contains or could, of herself, put into the field. No arsenal or means of manufacturing arms exists. The population has been disarmed for a century, and by bitter experience has been driven to regard the use of arms as a criminal offence. Patriotism has been treated as a felony. Volunteers and Territorials are not for Ireland. To expect that a disarmed and demoralised population, who have been sedulously batoned into a state of moral and physical dejection, should develop military virtues in face of a disciplined army, is to attribute to Irishmen the very qualities their critics unite in denying them. 'The Irishman fights well everywhere except in Ireland' has passed into commonplace; and since every effort of government has been directed to ensuring the abiding application of the sarcasm, Englishmen would find in the end the emasculating success of their rule completely justified in the physical submission of Ireland to the new force that held her down. With Great Britain cut off and the Irish Sea held by German squadrons, no power from within could maintain any effective resistance to a German occupation of Dublin and a military occupation of the island. To convert that into permanent administration could not be opposed from within, and, with Great Britain down and severed from Ireland by a victorious German Navy, it is obvious that opposition to the permanent retention of Ireland by the victor must come from without. It is equally obvious that it would come from without, and it is for this international reason that, I think, a permanent

German annexation of any part of a defeated United Kingdom need not be seriously considered. Such a complete change in the political geography of Europe as a German-owned Ireland could not but provoke universal alarm and a widespread combination to forbid its realisation. The bogey that Ireland, if not John Bull's other island, must necessarily be somebody else's other island, will not really bear inspection at close quarters."

"Shan van Vocht" continued:—"Germany would have to attain her end, the permanent disabling of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, by another and less provocative measure. An Ireland already severed by a sea held by German warships, and temporarily occupied by a German Army, might well be permanently and irrevocably severed from Great Britain, and with common assent erected into a neutralised, independent European State, under international guarantees. An independent Ireland would, of itself, be no threat or hurt to any European interest. On the contrary, to make of Ireland an Atlantic Holland, a maritime Belgium, would be an act of restoration to Europe of this the most naturally favoured of European islands that a Peace Congress should, in the end, be glad to ratify at the instance of a victorious Germany. That Germany should propose this form of dissolution of the United Kingdom in any interest but her own, or for the *beaux yeux* of Ireland, I do not for a moment assert. Her main object would be the opening of the seas and their permanent freeing from that overwhelming control Great Britain has exercised since the destruction of the French Navy, largely based, as all naval strategists must perceive, upon the unchallenged possession of Ireland.

"That Ireland is primarily a European island, inhabited by a European people who are not

English, and who have for centuries appealed to Europe and the world to aid them in ceasing to be politically controlled by England, is historic fact. And since the translation of this historic fact into practical European politics would undoubtedly affect the main object of the victorious Power, it is evident that, Great Britain once defeated, Germany would carry the Irish question to a solution in harmony with her maritime interests, and could count on the great bulk of European opinion to support the settlement those interests imposed. And if politically and economically an independent and neutral Irish State commended itself to Europe, on moral and intellectual grounds the claim could still be put higher. . . . Germany would attain her ends as the champion of National liberty and could destroy England's naval supremacy for all time by an act of irreproachable morality. The United States, however distasteful from one point of view the defeat of England might be, could do nothing to oppose a European decision that would clearly win an instant support from influential circles—Irish and German—within her own borders.

"With the approaching disappearance of the Near Eastern question (which England is hastening to the detriment of Turkey)," said the *Irish Review* writer in conclusion, "a more and more pent-in Central Europe may discover that there is a Near Western question, and that Ireland—a free Ireland—restored to Europe is the key to unlock the western ocean and open the seaways of the world. While the geographical positions of the islands to each other and to Europe have not changed, and cannot change, the political relation of the one to the other, and so the political and economical relation of both to Europe, to the world, and to the carrying trade of the world and the naval policies of the Powers, may be gravely

altered by agencies beyond the control of Great Britain. The changes wrought in the speed and capacity of steam shipping, the growth and visible trend of German naval power, and the increasing possibilities of aërial navigation, all unite to emphasise the historian Niebuhr's warning, and to indicate for Ireland a possible future of restored communion with Europe, and less and less the continued wrong of that artificial exclusion in which British policy has sought to maintain her—'an island beyond an island.'"

Commenting upon this article, which, as he said, "reckoned with a military overthrow of England in the interest of Ireland," General von Bernhardi observed:—"To-day, indeed, German policy seems to be steering full sail towards an arrangement with England, but, as the goal could not be reached without the abandonment of our whole future as a world Power, it is valuable for the *realpolitiker* to examine exhaustively both the strength and the weakness of England." Proceeding with this examination, in which he touched upon other "weaknesses" which he found in South Africa, Egypt and elsewhere, General von Bernhardi said in regard to Ireland that "it is not without interest to know that, if it ever comes to a war with England, Germany will have allies in the enemy's camp itself, who in the given circumstances are resolved to bargain, and, in any case, will constitute a grave anxiety for England, and perhaps tie fast a portion of the English troops;" and he concluded with the remark that this was no time for Germany to pursue "a policy of renunciation."* For these comments General von Bernhardi was severely rebuked in the officially inspired Berlin correspondence of the *Koelnische Zeitung*, which declared that he was far too outspoken, and, with some crudity, laid it down as the "fundamental principle of all pro-

**Berliner Post*, September 18th, 1913.

fitable treatment of questions of foreign policy not to say all that one thinks without considering how it may be exploited.''

Despite this naïve statement, the German Press for the year before the war continued to provide ample evidence that Germany, bearing in mind the possibility of war and the strategic importance of Ireland, followed the development of events in Ireland with the closest vigilance and interest. Her Press despatched numerous correspondents to Ireland, and observed with unconcealed satisfaction the revival of the physical force doctrine in the establishment of the Ulster Volunteers. There is every reason to suppose that the Irish situation was amongst the strongest factors on which she counted to ensure the observance of British neutrality in the war. King George himself had said that the danger of civil war was present to all responsible and sober-minded people, and it is believed that Baron von Kühlmann, Councillor of the German Embassy in London, who was more trusted by his Government than the Ambassador himself, reported to Berlin that effective action could not be taken by a Ministry in such straits as that of Mr. Asquith in July-August, 1914.

Foiled in this expectation that the revival of the physical force movement in one of its aspects in Ireland would keep Great Britain neutral, the German Government, in pursuit of a consistent and integral element in its comprehensive plan of campaign, waited its opportunity, and used its best efforts, to turn the movement in Ireland in another aspect to Germany's account and Great Britain's damage in the prosecution of the war. To understand how its opportunity arose, and how its efforts succeeded, it is necessary to glance at the political history of Ireland since the introduction of the Home Rule Bill of 1912.

CHAPTER II.

IRELAND BEFORE THE WAR.

Mr. Arthur Griffith, the theorist of *Sinn Fein*, thus described the third Home Rule Bill:—

"The definition of the third Home Rule Bill as a charter of Irish liberty is subject to the following corrections:—The authority of the proposed Parliament does not extend to the armed man or to the tax-gatherer. It is checked by the tidal waters and bounded by the British Treasury. It cannot counter the settled purpose of the Cabinet in London. It may make laws, but it cannot command the power to enforce them. It may fill its purse, but it cannot have its purse in its keeping.

"If this be Liberty, the lexicographers have deceived us. . . . The measure is no arrangement between nations. It recognises no Irish nation. It might equally apply to the latest British Settlement on a South Sea Island. It satisfies no claim of the Irish nation whose roots are in Tara, or the Irish Nationalism, which Molyneux first made articulate. . . .

"The Bill does not alter the *status* of Irishmen by an inch. They remain under its provisions as impotent to affect British Imperial policy as they are at present. England continues to hold the Irish purse by collecting our revenues, paying them into her Treasury, or vetoeing their disbursement. . . . I do not fear the device as an Irish Nationalist. The ideals of Nationalism are not to bought and sold. If the Bill be amended to give Ireland real control of her soil and taxes, and power of initiative in her legisla-

tion, I shall welcome its passage as a measure for the improvement of conditions in Ireland, and a step clearing the way to a final settlement between two nations."

These passages, taken from an article in the *Irish Review* of May, 1912, are interesting historically. The rebellion of 1916 has been popularly but not quite accurately attributed to the *Sinn Fein* movement. We see that in 1912 Mr. Griffith, who certainly personified *Sinn Fein*, had no thought of the employment of physical force or the establishment of a Republic, although he condemned Redmondite Home Rule, on grounds common also to many Unionists, as a sham. Physical force was never in the *Sinn Fein* programme. Some of the police witnesses at the Rebellion Commission of 1916 suggested that the movement, at first literary and economic in its chief aspects, afterwards about 1912 had political connexions with the *Clan-na-Gael* and the Irish-American revolutionists. The truth is that in 1912 the Society was a very small one, having lost what influence it once possessed—at least as an active agent in Irish public life, though not as a moral force. What had happened, in short, was this:—Between 1907 (when the movement did really threaten Mr. Redmond's ascendency) and 1912 many *Sinn Feiners* returned to their belief in the policy of the Parliamentary Party, whilst others, drifting towards neo-Fenianism, were marked down by the police as suspects, when they had long since ceased to pay their subscriptions to the Society. One member of the Irish Party, Sir Thomas Esmonde, had proclaimed himself a *Sinn Feiner* for a short space of time. Alderman Kelly, an admirable citizen, had led for years a small *Sinn Fein* group in the Dublin Corporation. Other consistent supporters of Mr. Griffith's original programme were Mr. Edward Martyn, a Galway

landlord and a well-known amateur of the arts, and Mr. John Sweetman of Kells, an old Parnellite and the head of a historic Catholic family.

Theoretically, the movement was free of any hatred for England; but Mr. Arthur Griffith, as the following extracts show (*Irish Review*, Aug., 1911), did not admit that the concrete and current conceptions of Irish Nationality and British Imperialism could be reconciled:—

"I suggest the Irishman who is proud to boast himself a citizen of the British Empire will discover his long lost brother when he finds the Scotchman who is proud to boast himself a citizen of the English Empire. . . . The title 'British Empire' is a denial of Ireland. There is still a British Empire, not a Brito-Hibernian Empire. . . . Irishmen who accept the idea of Imperialism as true and who preach it to their countrymen as if it were a new found gospel, waste their energy so long as the Imperialism they preach concretes itself in the British Empire. Nationalist Ireland will not hearken, and Nationalist Ireland will be right, as it always is when it follows its instinct. It knows that the acceptance of the British Empire is the acceptance of the English ascendency. It will not accept that ascendency, for its instinct warns it that to do so is death. . . .

"Until those in Ireland who cherish the Imperial idea translate it by Hiberno-British instead of by British Empire they will find no audience outside of the men who have consistently identified the Empire with Irish National suppression. When they so translate it they will find Nationalist Ireland willing and ready to discuss their views."

The original objects of *Sinn Fein* had in them much that was calculated to attract the more

thoughtful type of Irishman; the idea, for instance, that Ireland should cultivate her own resources, and look for salvation from within, rather than depend upon Parliamentary intrigue and the chances and changes of English party life. It is worth noting, too, that Irish Unionists generally have held that, if Home Rule must come, the larger the powers of the Irish Parliament the better. A Legislature restricted as to its powers of taxation, living upon grants from the Imperial Government, seemed to them likely to become an institution for the distribution of patronage to the hacks of party politics. Nor was the *Sinn Fein* solution incompatible with a Federal scheme such as would appeal most equally to the Imperial sentiment of Irish Unionists and the Nationalist sentiment of the Home Ruler. On the other hand, in a Federal scheme into which Gladstonian Home Rule, *i.e.*, a Dublin Parliament with strictly limited powers, would fit, Ireland would not be a nation acting on equal terms with Canada, Australia, South Africa; she would enter the scheme as a subordinate unit of the United Kingdom, and be reduced to the position occupied by Quebec in Canada, or Victoria in Australia. "If the subject," wrote Mr. Balfour in his pamphlet on *Nationality and Home Rule*, be approached from the side of Irish Nationality, which is the line of approach suggested by history . . . the absurdities of Home Rule lie on the surface of the measure. The limitations imposed . . . are such as were never desired by England in the case of the American Colonies before the War of Independence; nor would they ever be tolerated by any one of the self-governing dominions. How then can they be permanently accepted by those whose policy is professedly based on the indefeasible claims of Irish Nationality?"

But if the aims of *Sinn Fein* were not, by necessity, Separatist, many of its recommendations were designed to damage immediate English interests. Thus Ireland was to burn everything that came from England except coal, and she should not contribute any recruits to the British army. On the other hand, the clause of the *Sinn Fein* programme which advised a withdrawal of Irish M.P.s from Westminster might have been interpreted, according to one's point of view, as either pro- or anti-English; and there was nothing "seditious" in the proposal to cultivate the Irish language and literature.

The year 1908 had marked the entrance of a new factor into Irish Nationalism. This was labour under Mr. Larkin's leadership. The appeal of *Sinn Fein* had been, on the whole, first, to a small company of writers and scholars, secondly, to the smaller *bourgeoisie* of the cities. Mr. Larkin appealed to the dispossessed. He held out hopes of an immediate amelioration in the lot of the poor; his Nationalism, like the Parnellite movement towards Home Rule in the eighties, had behind it the driving force of economic misery. But *Sinn Fein* Nationalism was *doctrinaire;* it could not acquire the character of agitation. The material lure was in the distant future, not a possibility of the present; it concerned the nation rather than the individual—one can conceive of an Ireland which would be as a National unit economically strong, with the present population trebled, let us say, yet in which the lot of the worker might be no better than it is at present. Nor were Mr. Griffith's protective doctrines compatible with the Radical dogmas of the labour men. Again, whereas *Sinn Fein* traced the Dublin slums to some thievery on the part of the British Government, Mr. Larkin charged Irish employers and ward politicians with

chief responsibility for the city's disgrace. To Mr. Larkin's "intellectual" sympathisers there was in the *Sinn Fein* and kindred Gaelic societies a trace of smugness and self-satisfaction, or of hysteria; the type reminded them of the Imperialist across the Channel with his watchwords, duty and self-discipline, or of the *Daily Mail* reader who ever expected German Uhlans to turn up some morning with the milk. "The Irish-Irelander is convinced that there is some particular virtue in the mere fact of belonging to a race, apart altogether from its development. Sociology secures scant attention from people whose minds are concentrated upon grammar, bag-pipes and kilts. The wearing of Irish clothes and the use of the Irish language seem to be vastly more important than the individuals for whom these benefits are intended. Whatever social evils affect the Irish people are understood to be simply by-products of an alien *régime*. The social and industrial problems which engage the minds of modern thinkers weigh little with Gaelic idealists."*

The Dublin slums should have been a fertile ground for breeding the propaganda of revolutionary industrialism. But it is doubtful if Mr. Larkin drew his real strength, during the great strike of 1913, from the very poor. Certainly, three years later the slums were frankly hostile to the plans of those insurrectionary bodies among which was included the Citizen Army, inheriting from the events of 1913. The women of the slums, many of them the wives of soldiers, were enraged by the Republican proclamation and attacked the rebel leaders before the Post Office with bottles and a most violent language. The men who, after the failure of the strike, remained faithful to Larkin and his organisation at Liberty Hall, were

* "The Jingoism of the Gael." By E. A. Boyd, *Irish Review*, April 11, 1913.

not the worst paid workers of the city; nor was the Citizen Army an ill-fed and dejected body. The genuine Larkinite was a man with a streak of adventure in him, emotionally a strong Nationalist, of lively mind, a newspaper reader, eager for education.

Mr. Larkin, an Irishman who had lived much in England and acquired some habits of English speech, as first professed an Internationalism. Personality rather than brain was his chief asset. But he had picked up some theories of the Class War and of Guild Socialism; he was interested in ideas; his mind was alive, if a little confused. It does not seem that he was ever an anti-patriot, nor did he, like the true Syndicalist, regard violence as an end in itself. He had a mission he said, to stir up divine discontent; but that was a rhetorical flourish which any reformer might have employed. Theoretically Mr. Larkin was a pacificist, a believer in the brotherhood of man, the progress of civilisation—a Messianist, in short. His quarrel with the English trade unions, and the peculiar devotion he enjoyed in Ireland were, however, powerful influences inducing him to invest the labour movement in Dublin with a definitely Nationalist character. "Internationalism," he explained in an early issue of the *Irish Worker*, "means Internationalism and not *one* Nationalism. We, of the Irish workers, are out to claim the earth for the world's workers, and our portion as Irishmen is Ireland. So hands off, all predatory persons, no matter under what name or disguise. We are determined to weld together the common people of the North, the South, the East and the West."

One of his principal supporters, James Connolly, the revolutionary leader of 1916, developed with considerable skill in a book entitled *Labour in Irish History* the thesis that the only true re-

positories of the Irish Nationalist tradition were the working men of Ireland. To him all such "professional" patriots as Swift, Grattan, Flood, Redmond were bourgeois representatives who had failed to recognise that the real issue lay between Irish proletarians, inheritors of the Clan system, and the landlords and capitalists of whatever race and religion. But the really National leaders of the Past were Wolfe Tone, William Thompson, an early Socialist pioneer, Fintan Lalor, John Mitchel, Michael Davitt; of the Present, labour leaders such as Larkin with whom were allied (though they might know it not) the prophets of the co-operative movement and the Gaelic Revival. " As the Gaelic language, scorned by the possessing classes, sought and found its last fortress in the hearts and homes of the ' lower orders,' to issue from them in our own time to . . . a greater and more enduring place in civilisation than of old, so in the words of Thomas Francis Meagher, the same ' wretched cabins have been the holy shrine in which the traditions and the hopes of Ireland have been treasured and transmitted.' " Larkin's chief associates, besides Connolly, were four members of the Trades' Council, Messrs. Daly, Partridge, O'Brien and Thomas Lawlor. He had no aid from any members of the Redmondite party, whose official attitude towards the great strike was one of strict neutrality. The employers' leader (as it happened) was Mr. W. M. Murphy, formerly a Nationalist Member of Parliament, but now through his newspaper, the *Irish Independent*, one of the bitterest critics of Mr. Redmond's policy. But old party politics entered but little into the dispute, and ordinary lines of division were observed. The Hibernians, a sectarian " friendly society " organised by Mr. Devlin in the interests of the " Party," constituted a violent opposition

to the strike, and the most distinguished apologist of Larkinism was Mr. George Russell, the Irish poet, whose letters to the *Times* on conditions in Dublin created a deep impression on English opinion. Captain White, D.S.O., an Ulster Irishman, and the son of the defender of Ladysmith, carried out the drilling of the Citizen Army. What the newspapers call a wave of unrest was certainly passing over the land, and the only champions of law and order left seemed to be Mr. Redmond's party, inheritors of the Land League! Mr. Larkin, accused of inciting to violence, said: "If it is right and legal for the men of Ulster to arm, why should it not be right and legal for the men of Dublin to arm and protect themselves?" The allusion was to the Covenanters who had been committing illegalities for twelve months past, without, however, doing any damage to life or to property in the province of Ulster, which was now, as it remained during every subsequent crisis, the most peaceful part of Ireland.

We return to September 1912, the date of the celebrated Ulster Covenant. This document, which was signed by 218,000 men, had been drawn up by a Committee of five, which included Lord Londonderry, Sir Edward Carson and Captain Craig. It pledged the signatories to use "all means that may be found necessary to resist the present conspiracy" of Home Rule. The words "present conspiracy" were significant. Thus, for instance, had Mr. Bonar Law, aided by Sir Edward Carson, secured office, and then carried some other scheme for handing over the local government of Ireland to Irishmen, "the Covenant would not bind any longer, for the present 'conspiracy' would be gone."*

The religious character with which the proceed-

* "Reign of Sir Edward Carson." By the Hon. George Peel, pp. 69, 70.

ings of " Ulster Day " were invested struck many observers as impressive, and a *Times* correspondent afterwards applied to them the phrase an " offensive and defensive alliance with Divinity." The Liberals and the Nationalists did not yet take the movement very seriously, but one member of the Government accused Sir Edward of preaching anarchy. Sir Edward replied:—

" He says that my doctrines and the course I am taking leads to anarchy. Does he not think I know that? Does he think that, after coming to my time of life and passing through the various offices and responsibilities I have accepted, I did this like a baby without knowing the consequences. . . . All this chopping of logic is so much nonsense. We are prepared, if we fail, to take the consequences. The whole of the matter is to me one of the gravest responsibilities I have ever had in my life. I am no thoughtless lad, trying to inflame bigoted passions. I loathe them. I know what I am dealing with."

In February, 1913, a special Ulster Council of Four Hundred met in Belfast to ratify and confirm the " further steps " taken by the Special Commission (of Five), and approve of the draft resolutions of the Ulster Provisional Government, and to appoint the members of the Special Commission to act as the Executive thereunder.

During the year efforts were made to arm the Volunteers with superior rifles and machine guns. The *Times* estimate (December 9, 1913) was that between 30,000 and 40,000 rifles and 20,000 pistols had been sent to Ireland. The strength of the force in men was usually said to be between 100,000 and 150,000. Military arrangements were very elaborate. A General Staff, or Advisory Board, had been appointed for the Volunteer Force with headquarters at the Old Town Hall, Belfast.

This staff was in close and constant communication with the various units of the Volunteer Force in the Province, and all communications could, if necessary, be conveyed through the Ulster Despatch Riding and Signalling Corps, so that the agency of the Post Office could be dispensed with for the dissemination of important and private messages between the General Staff and the various units of the Force (*Times*, Aug. 27th, 1913.) Mr. Walter Long averred that this army would soon be in its personnel, in its training, and its equipment equal to the best army that England could put into the field. No less an authority than Colonel Repington, the *Times* military correspondent, presently agreed with Mr. Long.

The Nationalist reply to the operations in Ulster appeared on November 25th, 1913. It was a Manifesto calling upon Irishmen to "maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland." "A plan had been deliberately adopted by one of the great English political parties, advocated by the leaders of that party and by its numerous organs in the Press, and brought systematically to bear on English public opinion, to make the display of military force and the menace of armed violence the determining factor in the future relations between this country and Great Britain." Therefore, if Irishmen "fail to take such measures as will effectually reject this policy, we become politically the worst degraded population in Europe, and no longer worthy of the name of nation." Such was the occasion, "not altogether unfortunate" which had brought about the inception of the Irish Volunteer movement. "But the Volunteers, once they have been enrolled, will form a permanent element in the National life under a National Government."

The promoters of the inaugural meeting of Volunteers in Dublin were Mr. John MacNeill,

Professor of Old Irish History at the National University, and Mr. Laurence Kettle, a Dublin solicitor and the brother of the late Lieut. T. M. Kettle, a former member of the Irish Party in the House of Commons. Neither Mr. MacNeill nor Mr. Kettle had hitherto taken part in politics. But both men were known as strong Nationalists of the Constitutional sort. Nor did Colonel Moore, who at once put his military experience at the disposal of the organisation, bear the character of a revolutionist. A brother of Mr. George Moore, the novelist, he had served with distinction in the South African War. But some of those who had associated themselves with the foundation of the Volunteers, and notably Sir Roger Casement, were suspect in the eyes of the orthodox Nationalist. Colonel Moore has described the composition of the original committee:—

"On my first entrance I found about twenty-five members present; nearly all of them were young men, some merely boys of twenty; some seemingly less. None of them knew anything of military affairs, but they had hired halls for drilling and obtained the free services of excellent men to instruct them. Except Mr. John MacNeill, and Mr. Pearse and Mr. MacDonagh, I had never seen or heard of any of them before, and it took me two or three days to size them up and separate the groups. There were about two extremists, and four or five boys under their domination; these latter men were mild and quiet and by no means unreasonable. Five or six *Sinn Feiners* were in a separate group; they might be described as extreme Home Rulers; they did not approve of the methods of the Parliamentary Party, but were not revolutionists. . . . There were a few like MacNeill, Pearse, MacDonagh, Plunkett, and O'Rahilly, who belonged to no special politi-

cal party; they were idealists. The remainder of the Committee were moderate men, inclined to follow the Parliamentary Party. . . . It will be interesting to note how some of the *Sinn Fein* party and some of the Idealists gradually became Extremists, and merged with the Fenians.''*

The hostility of Mr. Redmond and the Parliamentary leaders to the new movement has been variously interpreted. It was probably in part due to jealousy. The Irish Party had always disliked independent action in Irish politics, and it had not been consulted in regard to the new departure, which now turned out to be very popular. Further, the Party feared that the organisation might develop along extreme lines. Certain passages in the Manifesto, as, for instance, that the occasion (*i.e.*, the arming of the Ulster Volunteers) was '' not altogether unfortunate '' together with the announcement that the Volunteers, once they had been enrolled, would form ''a permanent element in the National life under a National Government,'' were disquieting. Mr. Redmond had accepted the Home Rule Bill as a final settlement, and the Bill expressly removed the right of maintaining armed forces from the powers of an Irish Parliament.

It is important to remember that the Irish Party at the time based its hopes entirely on the alliance with English Liberalism, and wished to act according to the most strict constitutional forms. Here, indeed, the strength of its position in respect of '' Ulster '' and the Conservative party, which were definitely committed to warlike preparation, seemed to lie. Mr. Devlin urged the Government to pursue its way unperturbed by menaces from Belfast. The worst that could happen, he calculated, was rioting in Ulster on

* *Freeman's Journal*, May 30, 1916.

the day that Home Rule passed into law. An attack by Covenanters might be made on the peaceable and unarmed Catholics of the province. That would disgust Englishmen and break up the alliance between the English Conservatives and the Carsonites. And, indeed, Sir Edward Carson, for all his plans of a Provisional Government and passive resistance, would have found himself awkwardly placed if the Home Rule Bill had quietly reached the Statute Book, no matter how great had been the determination of the Covenanters behind him. It seems, therefore, that the Irish Party displayed, from its own point of view, good judgment in depreciating the Nationalist Volunteers, whose appearance revolutionised the situation. But provocation had been offered even to the most pacificist of Home Rulers by speeches like that of Mr. F. E. Smith, then the English Attorney-General, comparing Nationalists with Covenanters, and asking with a sneer were the former willing to fight for Home Rule.

The Government now issued a proclamation prohibiting the importation of arms into Ireland. The Covenanters professed their indifference to the prohibition, boasting that they were already well equipped and would have no difficulty of procuring further arms if necessary. The Nationalists were in a different case; and it certainly gave them cause for suspicion that the Government should have allowed the Covenanters a year in which to equip themselves, whilst at once putting an obstacle in the way of Southern Volunteer armament. Drilling, however, became very popular in the South of Ireland, and the Irish Party in Parliament reached the conclusion that they would have to accept the Volunteer movement as an accomplished fact. Consequently, the next event was a demand on the part of Mr. Redmond that "tried and true," or recognised National-

ists—*i.e.*, well-known supporters of the Party—should acquire a majority on the Committee. He proposed himself to nominate twenty-five substantial men; if the nominations were rejected, he would regard the Volunteers as a body of factionists hostile to the Party. Unionist newspapers in Dublin watched the situation with mingled feelings, but seemed on the whole sympathetic towards the threatened Committee. They drew attention to the generous All-for-Ireland spirit in which the original Manifesto had been composed and argued that, if the organisation came under the control of the Irish Parliamentary leaders, it would at once acquire a sectarian and party character. Finally, however, Mr. John MacNeill and his friends accepted Mr. Redmond's *ultimatum* with what grace they could.

Without Nationalist Volunteers there had been no Act prohibiting the importation of arms into Ireland; without that Act there had been no opportunity for the Covenanters in Ulster to show how great and menacing was their strength. The gun-running at Larne and other parts of the North must be described as an event of first-rate importance. How many arms the Covenanters secured by their defiance of the Act mattered little. The success of the *coup* consisted in the fact that it was effected in perfect security without any serious collision with the authorities; one Customs official, it is true, died of heart failure; there was no other casualty. Mr. Asquith characteristically described the gun-running as a grave and unprecedented outrage. Some troops were moved up to the North of Ireland; and Mr. Churchill despatched two gun-boats to Belfast Lough. Nothing further happened; and the ringleaders of the enterprise were left unpunished. The causes of this were two: first, the evident disinclination of the Army to be used against Ulster; secondly, the fact that

Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon, being now themselves mixed up in illegal associations in the South of Ireland, opposed reprisals. If the Nationalist leaders had insisted upon punishment for the Ulstermen they would have left themselves open to the charge—and it would certainly have been brought by the critics of their own side—of conspiring against the existence of the Nationalist Volunteers.

From this most complicated state of things one fact emerged, namely, that Sir Edward Carson was master of the situation. Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon had been out-manœuvred. The Irish Volunteers, indeed, expressed the greatest admiration for the daring and cleverness of the law-breakers of Ulster. They had always said that they did not wish any section of Irishmen to be coerced by English soldiers. At the same time the action of the Military, Lord Roberts' comings and goings at the War Office, the so-called "Curragh Revolt," the frank delight of the English upper classes in the Ulster *coup*, while favouring the theory that Ireland could expect no fair play from those who really ruled in England—the dice being loaded against her in every instance—destroyed the hopes that Ulster Unionism would develop along anti-English lines. Casement, in his statement at the trial for high treason two years later, referred to this period, holding that proof had then been given that English military power was in the last resort the enemy of Irish Nationality. But he denied that the Irish Volunteers had any party aims. "Neither I nor any of the leaders of the Irish Volunteers who were founded in Dublin in November 1913, had any quarrel with the Ulster Volunteers, as such, who were born a year earlier. Our movement was not directed against them, but against the men who misused and misdirected the courage, the sincerity

and local patriotism of the men of the North of Ireland."

The *Sinn Feiners* may have dreamed with Casement that Nationalist Ireland might of a sudden, by some magnanimous gesture, detach Ulster from her English allies; but to everyone else, the Irish Party included, the exclusion of Ulster, or a part of Ulster, from the Home Rule Bill was now a practical certainty. In the gun-running episode Sir Edward Carson had brought the position to the test, and it stood firm. Neither Sir Edward Carson nor any of the responsible leaders of the Ulster movement—"wily old birds" as they termed themselves—ever seriously contemplated resistance to the forces of the Crown. Sometimes their talk verged on conditional sedition. "If we are deserted by Great Britain," cried the Secretary of the Ulster Council, "I would rather be governed by Germany than by Patrick Ford and Company." Captain Craig, M.P., testified to the spreading abroad of a spirit that would prefer Germany and the German Emperor to the Ancient Order of Hibernians; but the most remarkable utterance on these lines was that of Mr. Chambers, the member for South Belfast (May 24th 1913): "'If Home Rule came," said Mr. Chambers, "would not Ireland then clamour for independence complete and thorough from Great Britain? What side would Ulster take then? He bound no man by his opinions. They owed to England loyalty and gratitude; but if England cast them off then he reserved the right as a betrayed man to say, 'I shall no longer sing "God Save the King!" England, I will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your hour cometh.'" There were undoubtedly some fanatics of Orangeism—among whom no one would include the politician just quoted—who would have turned "rebel" and come to hate England if the Home

Rule Bill had been brought into operation over Ulster. That was one of the reasons why Sir Edward Carson, a devoted Briton if ever there was one, put his brain at the service of the province.

What Sir Edward and the responsible leaders had counted upon from the first was the natural reluctance of British officers and men to fire upon a people whose "only crime," as the saying went, was that they were loyalists; *i.e.*, desired to keep as closely as possible to the British connexion. When the populace received with effusive joy the troops drafted into Ulster—when the crew of the gunboats in Belfast Lough had invitations to tea from the very culprits whom they had come to overawe—then all was over but the shouting. The Nationalists had been worsted at the game. England had no longer any thought of putting pressure on the Ulstermen. There were a few Liberals who wished to raise the issue, Army *versus* People. But what "People?" The Unionists, the larger party in England, were on the side of the Army and rejoiced over the bloodless crisis, the success of Sir Edward Carson's tactics, for they held that the partition of Ireland would be a statutory denial of the National claim. The majority of the Liberal Party and the Cabinet did not, to put it mildly, care enough for Irish Nationality to provoke on its behalf the sentiment of civil war in their own country.

In June, 1914, the Irish Volunteers issued a Manifesto urging the immediate withdrawal of the Proclamation prohibiting the import of arms into Ireland. The action of the Government had placed in the way of Irishmen favourable to National autonomy obstacles which "admittedly are inoperative in the case of those opposed to Irish self-Government." "The right of a free people to carry arms in defence of their freedom" was "an elementary part of political liberty."

"The denial of that right" was "a denial of political liberty and consistent only with a despotic form of government." The concluding passage of the Manifesto, which was signed by Mr. John MacNeill and Mr. L. J. Kettle, showed that more genial relations had been established with Mr. Redmond:—

"We are glad to recognise (it ran) that the time has come when the members of the Irish Parliamentary Party, with Mr. John Redmond at its head, have been able, owing to the development of the Irish Volunteer Organisation on sound and well-defined National lines, to associate themselves by public declaration with a work which the nation has spontaneously taken in hands. Their accession is all the more welcome since, from the outset of the Volunteer movement, we have made it our constant aim to bring about a whole and sincere unity of the Irish people on the grounds of National freedom. In that spirit, too, we look forward to the day when the minority of our fellow-countrymen, still apparently separated from us in affection, will be joined hand-in-hand with the majority, in a union within which the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland will be sacred to all and will be a trust to be defended by the sword and lives of all Irishmen."

At Westminster, however, party feeling grew very bitter, and the Government's suggested compromise was rejected scornfully by Sir Edward Carson. The terms offered were a *referendum* of the Ulster counties. The counties which voted by a majority against Home Rule were to be allowed to be excluded from the scope of the Act for six years. It would have meant the temporary loss to the Home Rule Government of the four counties

of Antrim, Down, Londonderry and Armagh. In July the King intervened and called together a conference of parties at Buckingham Palace. The wording of the invitation was very frank; evidently those in high places had begun to view the Irish situation with the utmost alarm. What happened at the conference has never been disclosed. We only know that it ended in faction. It has been assumed, however, that the King in his address to the delegates drew their attention to the threatening war clouds in Europe. The decision rested with the three Nationalist leaders, Mr. Redmond, Mr. John Dillon and Mr. Devlin. They were now ready to make greater concessions than those embodied in the proposals recently rejected by Sir Edward Carson. The "time limit" provision was to be omitted. Probably the conference broke down over the question of the Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone which, although inhabited by a Nationalist majority, were regarded by Ulster Protestants as an inalienable heritage.

In the meantime the Nationalists of Ireland were preparing a *coup* by which they should show that in resource and daring they equalled the Ulster gun-runners. Early in the forenoon of July 26th a large yacht sailed into Howth Harbour. On her arrival a force of about 850 Volunteers took possession of the pier and began to unload the rifles that formed the yacht's cargo. With these they marched off to Dublin. News of the operation was telephoned to Dublin, and a force of Metropolitan Police with 200 soldiers were sent to intercept the Volunteers. They met them at Marino Crescent. The Volunteers refused to surrender the guns, and a slight conflict occurred, in which a lance-corporal of the Scottish Borderers was wounded, and some Volunteers had their heads injured by blows of clubbed rifles. Seeing the direct road barred, the Volunteers took

to the fields and made their way into town by circuitous routes. It was when the soldiers were on their return march at 6.30 that the shooting affray at Bachelor's Walk took place. Some of the soldiers fired on a hostile crowd, killing three men and injuring many others.

CHAPTER III.

IRELAND DURING THE WAR

Those exciting events of Sunday the 26th of July, 1914, will be associated in Irish history with the name of Bachelor's Walk. One waited for the sequel; but none came, if we except Mr. Birrell's repudiation of his subordinates at Dublin Castle, and the confining to barracks of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the regiment which had opposed the march of the Nationalist Volunteers. The Irish crisis, of which all the newspapers had been writing for a year and a half, seemed suddenly to have come to an end, and the English *Times* itself, which for months past had been publishing daily "grave warnings" on the "imminence" of "dreadful" civil war, suddenly became silent as regards Irish affairs. It was, of course, natural that the coming war in Europe should put Ireland in a back place as a newspaper topic; and yet, would not civil war have been doubly "dreadful" had it taken place in the midst of European war? Perhaps civil war had ceased to be "imminent?" But why? England's difficulty is said to be Ireland's opportunity, and anti-English feeling had seriously strengthened by the affair at Bachelor's Walk.

In Dublin the victims of the unhappy riot were given a popular funeral, and the Scottish Borderers had to keep to their barracks. The Ulster gun-runners had gone unpunished; and in the House of Commons Mr. Redmond and his colleagues bitterly contrasted the licence allowed to Unionists in the North, particularly on the occasion of the "grave and unprecedented out-

rage" at Larne, although, as we have seen, it afterwards transpired that the Irish members had been themselves opposed to the punishment of the Ulstermen.

The outbreak of the European war relieved the Government of its pressing Irish difficulties. Sir Edward Grey described Ireland as "the one bright spot," in a famous speech, and Mr. Redmond seized the emotional moment to make a speech in which he assured Englishmen of the unconditional loyalty of his countrymen during the European crisis. Sir Edward Carson was equally devoted; but Mr. Redmond made the greater impression. To some people who remembered the attitude of the Irish Party during the Boer War, Mr. Redmond's speech was a wonderful surprise. But Boer farmers were never likely to overthrow the Empire. For Mr. Redmond and the large majority of his colleagues at Westminster, civilization and culture meant British civilization and British culture, and there should have been no doubts in the English mind as to what their attitude would be on the appearance of the German threat. The Liberal Ministers with whom Mr. Redmond was in contact had no doubts, although, of course, the question remained whether the Party at Westminster would be able to carry with it the whole opinion of Nationalist Ireland. Sir Edward Carson's support of the war was a matter of course; but here, too, there was just a slight fear in the English mind that the leader might be repudiated by his followers. It vanished quickly.

The public bodies of the South passed resolutions of confidence in Mr. Redmond, and in the North a visit of Sir Edward Carson to Belfast affirmed the unity of the Protestants of Ulster. Only in Dublin was there a discordant voice. The weekly Dublin newspapers—the clerical *Leader; Sinn Fein*, the organ of the *Sinn Fein* movement; the

Irish Volunteer, and the Larkinite *Irish Worker*—adopted an equivocal attitude towards the new situation; the revolutionary *Irish Freedom*, which Sean MacDearmada edited, was frankly pro-German. Interest had, however, shifted to Westminster, where Mr. Redmond was engaged in negotiations over the Home Rule Bill. Finally, he succeeded in persuading the Government to place the measure on the Statute Book, but on the undertaking that it should not operate during the war.

In his speech on the eve of the war, Mr. Redmond had called upon the Ulster and National Volunteers to combine for the defence of Ireland against Germany; and though this pious aspiration was never likely to be fulfilled, the expression of it greatly pleased the more moderate Unionists of the South. The National Volunteers in Leinster, Munster and Connacht rose to the height of their popularity. "Men like Lord Powerscourt, Lord Fingal, the Marquis of Conyngham, Captain Bryan Cooper, Lord Arran and numberless others came to our help and became officers of the Irish Volunteers. We had already far surpassed the Ulster Volunteers in numbers, and now also we were ahead of them in the rank and position of our officers. We had succeeded in welding together all parties in at least three out of the four provinces, and we had achieved this result without money or patronage, but merely by the patriotism of our people, the moderation of our ends, and the wisdom of our actions."* "When the war broke out," wrote an Irishman in London, Mr. Robert Lynd, "the first thought that entered my head was that here was a miraculous chance offered to Ireland to repeat the happy events that led up to the establishment of Grattan's Parliament in the

* Colonel Moore's evidence at Royal Commission.

eighteenth century. Once more invasion had become a possibility, though a far-off one."

The Ulster party, however, determined to retain its independence, and refused to share in the emotion of a United Ireland. There was no choice before Mr. Redmond; he had to descend to realities, and to make what he could out of the actual situation. But Home Rule on the Statute Book, the Act suspended, the certainty of an Amending Bill—this, in the light of his too optimistic prophecies, did not seem a very glorious achievement. "You may remove your troops from Ireland," he had told the Government in a rhetorical moment. The troops had not been removed. A division among the Volunteers was now inevitable. So long as Mr. Redmond confined himself to vague phrases about "Home Defence," the appearance of unity could be maintained. "Pro-Germanism" in Ireland was at this time an unimportant sentiment. But, besides, Mr. Redmond did earnestly desire that his countrymen should play a great part in the war; and when the British military authorities told him "We do not want a force for Home Defence, we want men to fight in France," he accepted the decision and crossed the Channel to take up his new *rôle* of recruiting sergeant in Ireland. Already Sir Edward Carson and the Ulster leaders were organising with success a recruiting movement among the Ulster Volunteers, and Mr. Redmond, whose belief in the propriety of the war was not less strong than Sir Edward's, had to overtake this activity of his rivals. "The attitude of Sir Edward and the Covenanters had made," said Mr. Asquith and other Ministers, the "coercion of Ulster unthinkable." The feeling of Belfast towards the Irish Party was now more contemptuous than angry; Mr. Redmond's success in bringing the Home Rule Bill on to the Statute Book seemed to be the result

of a petty intrigue; but the Covenanters had no need to protest in any serious fashion, for they knew that their position was stronger than that of the Home Rulers, being guaranteed by both British parties, as the Nationalist critics of Mr. Redmond's Parliamentary triumph were quick to point out.

On the 25th September, 1914, the Dublin newspapers published on their back pages a "Manifesto of the Irish Volunteers," dated the 9th September. It was signed by Mr. MacNeill, Chairman of the Provisional Committee; by The O'Rahilly, Treasurer of the Provisional Committee; by Messrs. Thomas MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett, P. H. Pearse, Bulmer Hobson, Eamon Ceannt, Sean MacDearmada and Mellowes. The purport of the document was to reaffirm the Manifesto proposed and adopted at the original meeting of the Volunteers in 1913. Mr. MacNeill and his friends described how, just before the war began, Mr. Redmond had put forward a claim to send 25 nominees to the Provisional Committee of the Volunteers:—

"It is clear that this proposal to throw the country into turmoil and to destroy the chances of a Home Rule measure in the near future must have been forced upon Mr. Redmond. Already, ignoring the Irish Volunteers as a factor in the National position, he had consented to a dismemberment of Ireland which could be made permanent by the same agencies that forced him to accept it as temporary. He was now prepared to risk another disruption and the wreck of the Cause entrusted to him."

The Committee had accepted the claim of Mr. Redmond to appoint nominees, but they would not accept the recruiting programme which he had just disclosed in a speech delivered on the previous

Sunday in the South of Ireland. Mr. Redmond was no longer entitled, the Manifesto concluded, "to any part in the administration and guidance of the Irish Volunteer Organization." And those who had hitherto been admitted to act on the Provisional Committee by virtue of his nomination would henceforth cease to belong to that body. In accordance with the Manifesto, a section of the Volunteers repudiated Mr. Redmond's leadership. The great majority, however, still adhered to him. These became known as "National" Volunteers, as distinguished from the followers of the Committee, the Irish Volunteers.

Sir Roger Casement, who was now in America (he had been in Ireland a few weeks before the outbreak of the war), signified his adhesion to the Provisional Committee, and in a letter published in *Sinn Fein* declared that Ireland had "no quarrel with Germany." He remained in New York during August, slowly forming in his mind the plan of a visit to Berlin, and discussing the "new situation" with Irish-American leaders, some of whom tried to dissuade him from the rash project. Meanwhile his friends in Dublin proceeded with some caution. In effect, of course, their actions were prejudicial to recruiting, and in that degree pro-German. Most of the young men in Ireland were enrolled as Volunteers; and if Mr. MacNeill had carried with him the larger part of the force the subsequent Irish contribution to the British Army would have been very seriously reduced. Still, the wording of the Manifesto of September is worthy of note, for it suggests that there was a moderate as well as an extremist party on the Committee, and that the moderates had at first the upper hand, or at least the chief voice. It may be urged, however, that the Committee would in any case hardly have disclosed its full aims and opinions. Most probably Mr. MacNeill and his

colleagues waited on events; some of them, probably, being ready, if occasion occurred, to establish communication with England's enemies. One member of the Committee openly advocated the German alliance in his paper, *Irish Freedom*.

Colonel Moore, who supported Mr. Redmond's policy, afterwards described the situation as he saw it at this time from the inside. "When at last the (Home Rule) Bill was signed, the enthusiasm was gone, and the fact that it was not to be put into force till after the War, with the threat of an undefined Amending Bill, left the uncertainty as great as ever. . . . Nothing but the enormous influence of Mr. Redmond and the leaders of the Irish Party prevented a universal determined agitation against recruiting." Colonel Moore's solution was the extension of the Territorial Act to Ireland, under which both the Ulster and the Nationalist Volunteers might enlist. Three months before the war he had discussed the subject on these lines with the British War Secretary (Col. Seely). Early in the war an officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland proposed a scheme by which all the Volunteers in Ireland, Unionist and Nationalist, should receive military training. He calculated that if the British troops were removed (as Mr. Redmond had suggested) there would be room for 20,000 men in barracks at one time, and these should, after a two months' training, be passed on to the standing camps, their places in barracks being taken by a new levy of 20,000 volunteers. It is important to note that the most prominent men on the Volunteer Committee—not Mr. Redmond's nominees only, but also Mr. MacNeill and some of his friends—agreed to these proposals, and Mr. MacNeill accompanied Col. Moore to the Royal Hospital to hear them discussed. Lord Kitchener, however, would not

take action in the sense suggested. "I want to lay stress on the fact," said Col. Moore, in his evidence before the Rebellion Commission, "that the leaders of the Irish Volunteers, and among them participators in the late Rebellion, were at that time willing to join in the defence of the Empire, but were refused by the Government." Unionists also thought that the Government erred during this critical period, but in the opposite way. Sir Morgan O'Connell, a Kerry landlord, asserted before the Commission that "when the war started, the vast majority of Irishmen were in sympathy with England." With this statement Colonel Moore and the Nationalist critics of the Government agreed. But the mistake of the Government, according to the Unionists, lay not in the hanging up of the Home Rule Bill or in a refusal to flatter the Volunteers, but in the failure to suppress the early signs of the anti-recruiting movement and to attack the *Sinn Fein* Press.

Ireland now possessed three Volunteer organisations: Ulster, National (Redmondite), and Irish. All were illegal, but circumstances obliged the Government to agree with Sir Edward Carson's *dictum*: There are illegalities that are not crimes. The Ulster and National Volunteers, though hostile party organisations, were at one in their views about the war, and Ireland's duty in the war; but the position of Mr. MacNeill's force was more ambiguous. The Government would not proceed against this body on the ground of law; but it might threaten to apply the Defence of the Realm Act against a public danger. We quote again from the Manifesto of September. Mr. Redmond (it said) had announced for the Irish Volunteers "a policy and programme utterly at variance with their own published and accepted aims and pledges, but with which his nominees were of course identified. He had declared it to be

the duty of the Irish Volunteers to take foreign service under a Government which was not Irish. He had made this announcement without consulting the Provisional Committee, the Volunteers themselves, or the people of Ireland. . . .'' Ireland could not '' with honour or safety take part in foreign quarrels other than through the free action of a National Government of her own.'' The Committee re-affirmed its opposition to any diminution of the measure of Irish self-government now on the Statute Book, and repudiated any undertaking, by whomsoever given, to consent to the legislative dismemberment of the country. This document was signed by twenty names. They represented a large majority of the original Committee apart from Mr. Redmond's nominees. A large number, but not all, of the signatories took part in the Rebellion of April 1916, or were sentenced in connection therewith.

Mr. Redmond had his critics on the Unionist side who objected that some of his speeches did not sufficiently identify Ireland with the war. At Wexford the Parliamentary leader indignantly repudiated the charge that the Home Rule Bill had reached the Statute Book as a result of a bargain with the Government in regard to Irish recruiting. He also averred that the number of available recruits in Ireland in proportion to population was much smaller than in Great Britain, and he complained that the War Office gave preferential treatment to the Ulster Volunteers. Early in October, 1914, on the anniversary of Parnell's death, three bodies of armed men turned out in Dublin—the Hibernians, Mr. Larkin's Citizen Army, and the Irish Volunteers. Each held a separate meeting, and during the subsequent parades, the Citizen Army and the Hibernians came into collision. Rifle and revolver shots were exchanged. During

November the authorities began to contemplate an attack on the weekly press of the city, and early next month the printers of *Sinn Fein*, the *Worker* and other journals that had opposed recruiting had their attention drawn to certain clauses in the Defence of the Realm Act. As a result, *Sinn Fein* and the *Worker* ceased to appear. It was about this time that James Larkin betook himself to America—unwillingly, it is supposed. The *Irish Volunteer* continued publication; but it was now edited by Mr. MacNeill, who refrained from showing any direct hostility to the recruiting movement. Presently Mr. Griffith, who had been editor of the suppressed *Sinn Fein*, resumed operations in a paper called *Nationality;* the *Worker* reappeared under James Connolly's editorship as the *Irish Worker;* these, with two new journals, the *Spark* and *Honesty*, composed what was roughly described as the *Sinn Fein* Press. The Irish Government turned its attention to other matters, such as the employment of disaffected persons in the Post Office and elsewhere; Monteith, of the Ordnance Survey, an ex-soldier and a captain in the Irish Volunteers, was suddenly ordered to leave Dublin within 24 hours. After a short visit to America, Monteith made his way to Germany, where he joined Sir Roger Casement; he subsequently accompanied the ill-fated expedition to Ireland in April, 1916.

Lord Aberdeen's departure from Ireland in January, 1915, was a triumph, on the one hand for the Unionists, on the other for *Sinn Fein*. There had been some political friction between the Unionists and the Home Rulers of the Irish Red Cross organisation. The policy of the Viceroy and his wife had been directed towards securing the favour of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the "moderate" Home Rulers; and Lady Aberdeen sent a private letter to the editor of the

Freeman's Journal, in which, after speaking of the "consummation of our common hopes" (an allusion to the Irish Party's attitude towards the war), she referred to "a bit of a plot" on the part of the Unionist women to capture the Red Cross organisation in Dublin. The letter came by some means or other into the hands of Mr. Arthur Griffith, who reproduced it in *facsimile* in his newspaper. After that, Lord Aberdeen had to go. He was replaced by Lord Wimborne, from whose *régime* the Unionists expected better things; that is, non-interference in politics and strong action against the *Sinn Feiners*. Lord and Lady Aberdeen toured the United States on behalf of Irish charities; they hoped, incidentally, to combat the anti-English propaganda of the *Clan-na-Gael*.

The Irish Party still felt confident of its position in the country; but the hope of winning over the Ulster Protestants by soft words had almost been abandoned. At the Belfast Review of the National Volunteers Mr. Dillon resorted to a threat. "If," he said, "our enemies in the future attempt to rob Ireland of the fruits of her sacrifices, the deeds of her soldiers on the fields of Europe will stand behind her as a mighty argument which will make our cause, I believe, successful. . . . We will never consent—and I say it in the face of the Nationalists of Belfast, who may yet have to make good my words—to divide this island or this nation." Mr. Redmond chose his words more carefully, while complaining that the War Office in its dealings with Ireland had favoured the Covenanters but distrusted the Nationalists. Thus, the Ulster Division of the new Army was composed wholly of Carsonite Volunteers and their sympathisers, and it was in fact a homogeneous political body. Several of the men who had been engaged in "the grave and

unprecedented outrage" at Larne now occupied comfortable war situations. On the other hand, owing to the suspicion of Nationalist Ireland entertained at the War Office, an "Irish Division" for the new Army was only now in process of formation. There may have been some substance in the complaint; but it was a confession, perhaps an involuntary one, of personal failure. Had Mr. Redmond been a truly representative leader he could have had his "Irish Division" without delay. But in fact he had not asked for it. What Nationalists had hoped in the early months of the war was that Mr. Redmond's support of the Empire would reconcile Ulster Protestants to the idea of Home Rule. It had singularly failed to effect this change. "Ulstermen," wrote the *Belfast Newsletter*, "having fought to deliver Belgium from the Prussian aggressor, will not tamely submit to the subjugation of their province." The Commander of the Ulster Volunteers avowed that his men, now "thoroughly trained and with vast experience of war," would have no difficulty in relegating Home Rule to the devil.

The formation of the Coalition Government in May 1915, added to Mr. Redmond's difficulties. Both Sir Edward Carson and himself were offered seats in the new Cabinet. Mr. Redmond refused the offer, and accompanied his refusal with an order for the reorganisation of the Party machine in all the Nationalist constitutencies. It was a reassertion of the old Parnellite traditions which forbade a member of the Irish Party to accept positions in or under the Government. Why the Party should have summoned up the shade of Parnell at this moment is a mystery; for, in Mr. Redmond's own account of things, the whole face of Anglo-Irish politics had been changed first by the war and secondly by the Home Rule Act. Parnell's policy of independent opposition had

long ago been abandoned for an alliance with the British Radicals. There is no doubt, however, that the Party was seriously perturbed by the attitude of the Government, and not only because the change meant that Irish Unionists could now put in claims for those positions that are the rewards of party services. The *Freeman's Journal* wrote:—"For it is not at all impossible that, under the shadow of the Coalition, those whose intrigues may have brought it about may attempt to carry into execution designs with which millions of Englishmen and Scotchmen are as much in disagreement as they are agreed on the prosecution of the war to an effective and secure finish." The allusion, of course, was to conscription. The *Freeman* continued: "The crown of the scandal is the appointment of Sir Edward Carson. The appointment is a party outrage. He did not hobnob with German philosophers; but he lunched with the Kaiser; and he was aware of the visits of the German Embassy to Ulster. Baron Kuhlmann attended at Belfast to review 'the troops;' the troops that Colonel Repington, the slanderer of Kitchener, assured Europe were fit to meet the most seasoned troops of Continental armies." His followers, generally, thought that Mr. Redmond had done wisely in standing out of the Government. There was a proposal to appoint a Unionist lawyer and politician as the new Lord Chancellor; the Party was sufficiently strong to defeat it. To the revolutionary Nationalists, *Sinn Feiners*, and Irish Volunteers, these questions of patronage and administrative changes did not matter much. They were ready, however, to exploit the growing fear of conscription to the profit of their organisation. It was about this time that the pacificist, Mr. Sheehy Skeffington, leader of a party of one in Ireland, was arrested and imprisoned for making a speech against recruiting.

Mr. Skeffington went on hunger-strike, and had to be released; he afterwards visited America on a lecture tour.

The objection in Ireland to conscription was by no means confined to the pro-German or anti-English elements or to those Nationalists who preached neutrality. It was foolish to pretend that the average Irishman felt as keenly about the war as the Englishmen, and Mr. Redmond would have lost the confidence of his own people if compulsory service had been introduced into Ireland. On the representations of Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon, Ireland was "excluded" first from the Registration Bill and secondly from the Military Service Bill. There were people who asked why the distinction should be made, seeing that Ireland, on the account of her own representatives, was as eager as any part of the United Kingdom to see the war through to a successful issue. No answer to the pertinent enquiry was forthcoming, but among those who realised that the Volunteers were in earnest in threatening to resist compulsion by force were Mr. Dillon himself and the Under Secretary, Sir Mathew Nathan. Lord Wimborne, on the other hand, wanted to arrest the "suspect" leaders, and thought that the extension of conscription to Ireland would provide an excellent justification for this course.

Many Irishmen, strongly inclined towards the Allied cause and hitherto numbered among Mr. Redmond's supporters, began to think that the equivocal situation should be ended. The remedy suggested in *New Ireland* was the immediate operation of Home Rule, coupled with a frank assertion of Ireland's claim, as a poor and depopulated country, to special treatment in the matter of taxation and recruitment. By the wording of the Suspensory Act of September, 1914, the operation of Home Rule was postponed for the period of a

year. When September, 1915, arrived, the Government sought and obtained an Order in Council for a further postponement of Home Rule till March, 1916. The protests of *New Ireland* met with no success. The Dublin Corporation, which had intended to pass a resolution in favour of immediate Home Rule, changed its mind on the representation of the Irish Party. When March, 1916, arrived, another postponement for another six months was effected. Mr. Redmond's supporters, arguing against the writers in *New Ireland* who pressed that steps should be taken towards the establishment of an Irish Parliament, urged that it would be an act of madness, from the practical point of view, to make so great a constitutional change in war time. Not many months were to pass, however, before Great Britain commissioned one of her principal statesmen to set up at once, and at any cost, some sort of an Irish Legislature. Here one may anticipate a little. In his speech at the Ulster Nationalist Convention of June 1916, called together to consider Mr. Lloyd George's proposal for immediate Home Rule on the basis of the exclusion of six Ulster counties, Mr. Redmond, in urging the delegates to accept this compromise, expressed the opinion that the "Irish Cause" had been prejudiced by the Rebellion of Easter Week, though not so seriously as at one time seemed probable. He had expected that the Rebellion would provoke in England an immediate demand for the repeal of the Home Rule Act. Up to the Rebellion, everything, according to Mr. Redmond, had been going well. The war had to be fought to a finish, but it seemed to him possible that Ulster, after the war, would not require Mr. Asquith to redeem his promise of an Amending Bill. But the whole situation had been swept away by the Rebellion. Now there was no

alternative to the acceptance of Mr. Lloyd George's proposals but the indefinite continuation of martial law.

The results of the recruiting propaganda gave some indication of the state of opinion in the country. In the early months of 1915 the figures went very high. In August, General Friend, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, stated that 80,000 men—the infantry contribution alone—had joined the Army from Ireland since the beginning of the war; and of these recruits 44,000 were Roman Catholics, and, presumably, therefore, Nationalists. The figures given by Mr. Redmond were lower, and one of the speeches of the Irish Parliamentary leader contained the startling announcement that another 80,000 men had been rejected on medical grounds at the Irish recruiting offices. After the exemption of Ireland from the National Registration Bill, Lord Wimborne was put in charge of a special recruiting effort. He called for 10,000 men during the month of November, and a steady flow of a thousand a week thereafter. He nearly got the 10,000; but the "steady flow" did not follow. Further figures of Irish recruiting were published on December 15th, 1915. They read as follows:—Leinster, 27,458; Ulster, 48,760; Munster, 14,190; Connacht, 3,589. Perhaps one-fourth of the Ulstermen were Hibernians and Roman Catholics. The number of men between the ages of 19 and 41 in the four provinces was estimated at 563,115.

The change that occurred in the latter half of 1915 may be attributed to many causes. First among them, no doubt, was the increasing vigour of the *Sinn Fein* propaganda. But also there grew up a feeling—and it existed even among Nationalists who called themselves pro-Ally—that Ireland had a limited interest in the war. Thirdly, as in England, so in Ireland, the appeal

of adventure had been by this time pretty fully exploited; economic pressure, too, had done its work. And, finally, the argument about Home Rule on the Statute Book had, after the advent of the Coalition Government, lost its power of inducing Irishmen to join the Army. "If there is to be a third postponement in the coming March," wrote *New Ireland*, "the country will be utterly exasperated, and the Irish Party will have become discredited beyond hope of recovery. The official Nationalist policy has degenerated into one long humiliating effort to impress upon the English public mind that Irishmen have ceased to think of Irish interests and care for nothing but the victory of the Empire; and the only triumphs that policy can secure are the occasional patronising references in the English Tory Press to the miraculous transformation of Ireland's attitude. If either history or the present psychology of nations have any bearing upon the present day, no wilder gamble was ever played with the future destinies of Ireland." Nothing now was going well, whatever point of view one took, unless it were that of those determined upon revolution at all costs or that of those at all costs determined upon the defeat of Home Rule. A note of panic had appeared even in the speeches of the optimistic Mr. Redmond. That the discontent among Nationalists was not confined to the Irish Volunteers and their sympathisers was shown by the attitude of the loyalist *Independent*, a widely circulated newspaper that reached quarters untouched by *Sinn Fein*, towards the new war taxation. The financial clauses of the Home Rule Act had been based on the allegation of Irish insolvency, in consequence of which the Imperial Parliament derived the right to control all but a few minor powers over Irish taxation. With the increase of taxation since the outbreak of the

war Ireland was now paying for Irish expenditure to the full, and in addition £5,000,000 annually as an Imperial contribution, although it had been argued during the debates on the Home Rule Bill, both by the Unionists and Liberals, that Ireland was then taxed to the utmost, and the only possible road to solvency in a self-governed Ireland would be by way of economies in administration. Moreover, the proportion of taxable income now taken from Ireland was more than twice that taken from Great Britain; nor did the money go, as it went in England, to the stimulation of war industries. The Budget of the spring of 1916, while it did not discriminate against Ireland, failed to recognise Ireland's special case; the £5,000,000 of Imperial contribution was almost doubled, and the *Independent* raised a bitter cry against Mr. Redmond's neglect to make a protest. Resolutions against the new Budget were passed by many public boards throughout Ireland, and the Dublin Mansion House was the scene of a large denunciatory assembly.

These events tended to an increased membership of the Irish Volunteers, and many Nationalists who had gone with Mr. Redmond at the time of the split, and were quite opposed to anything in the nature of seditious propaganda, began to look upon Mr. MacNeill's organisation with a more sympathetic eye. The agitating question now—that is, during the early months of 1916—was whether the initiative in the Volunteer movement still remained with Mr. MacNeill or had not passed into the hands of revolutionists. In March the rumour was that Mr. MacNeill's will had prevailed. The Volunteers were still a "defensive" force, that is to say, there would be no fighting except in the event of an attempt being made to deprive them of arms, or the introduction of conscription into Ireland. The Irish Party at this

time could probably have taken some of the wind out of the revolutionists' sails if they had attacked the Budget and withdrawn their support from the Government. Mr. Redmond, however, decided against any compromise of this nature, and he denounced the " overtaxation " and " Home Rule in March " movements with vigour. He recognised that an undertaking with the disaffected elements could only be reached at the cost of discrediting himself in the eyes of English public opinion; it would be said that Ireland was not giving the war a whole-hearted support. Moreover, the menace to his own position in Ireland seemed to be slight owing to the fundamental differences in the point of view of the critics. Mr. W. M. Murphy of the *Independent* joining in the protests of Liberty Hall against the " overtaxation of Ireland " was a spectacle for laughter rather than for tears.

It may be doubted whether there was in this situation adequate material for a serious Irish rebellion. Probably there was not, if the situation had remained unaffected by any outside influence. But it was a situation peculiarly susceptible of response to external stimulus and support. Such external stimulus and support proved the determining factor in the subsequent development of events, and it is to them that we must look for the proximate causes of the Rebellion. We may deal very briefly, therefore, with the superficial aspect of the developing situation in Ireland itself at this stage.

As the early spring of 1916 advanced it became clear that the will of the more extreme section of the Volunteers' leaders was gradually prevailing over that of the more moderate, and the proceedings of the Volunteers received from the Irish Executive an increasing attention, particulars of which are detailed in a later chapter. It was

evidently not these measures of the Executive, however, but the changing character of the control of the Volunteer organisation, which produced on the part of that organisation a more bellicose attitude. Towards the end of March 1916 the Council of the Volunteers issued a Manifesto which was printed in the Dublin newspapers, and was in the following terms :—

" With regard to the recent proceedings of the Government towards the Irish Volunteers, the Council of the Irish Volunteers, which met on the 26th inst., wish to warn the public that the general tendency of the Government's action is to force a highly dangerous situation. The Government is well aware that the possession of arms is essential to the Irish Volunteer organisation, and the Volunteers cannot submit to being disarmed either in numbers or detail without surrendering and abandoning the position they have held at all times since their first formation. The Volunteer organisation also cannot maintain its efficiency without organisers. The raiding for arms and attempted disarming of men, therefore, in the natural course of things can only be met by resistance and bloodshed. None of the Irish Volunteers recognise, or will ever recognise, the right of the Government to disarm them or to imprison their officers and men in any fashion. The Council also draws attention to the repeated instances in which the Government's arbitrary action has been associated with the movements of hostile crowds, which are led to believe that they act under Government approval. In this Council's belief, this feature of the case is based on a deliberate policy of creating factious hostility between sections of the Irish people. Nothing need be hoped from remonstrance with the Government, but we appeal to the Irish people to look

closely into the facts in every instance and keep a watch on the conduct and policy of the authorities, and to fix the responsibility for any grave consequence that may arise."

This Manifesto followed upon an ugly affray between Volunteers and police at Tullamore in King's County. A hostile stone-throwing crowd gathered outside the local Volunteer Hall. The police failed to disperse the crowd, and the Volunteers in reply to the attack fired shots from the windows into the air, whereupon the police forced an entrance into the hall and attempted to disarm the occupants; in the scuffle that followed one of their number was seriously wounded. In April, though the Irish Executive had not yet determined to attack the Volunteers, having as yet no absolute proof that they proposed rebellion, the advanced wing of the Volunteer leaders, doubtless thinking that the time was now ripe for bringing their followers into a belligerent frame of mind, took a further provocative step. On April 19th, four days before the outbreak of the Rebellion, Alderman Kelly, a member of the original *Sinn Fein* party, but certainly no revolutionary, read out at a meeting of the Dublin Corporation a document sent to him which was described as being " addressed to and on the files of " Dublin Castle, and containing the sketch of an elaborate military plan for the arrest of the Volunteer leaders and the seizure of various premises in Dublin.* Copies of this document, which was at once branded by the authorities as an entire fabrication, were printed at and circulated from Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the Citizen Army, with the evident object of inducing the members of that body and of the Irish Volunteers

* See Appendix A., Report of the Royal Commission on the Rebellion.

to believe that the Irish Executive contemplated their immediate disarmament, and so produce in them a temper favourable to participation in that rebellion for which the leaders' plans were now all but ripe.

We may note here, before we proceed to deal with the personalities of these leaders and the development of events outside Ireland which had been instrumental in bringing them to the point of armed rebellion, a feature of some importance in connection with the forged document. Among the premises which it was alleged in it that the authorities contemplated isolating was the Roman Catholic Archbishop's House. This suggestion appeared to aim at arousing sectarian animosity. If this was the object of the author of the document, he failed completely in his purpose. A religious element did not enter in any way into the Rebellion of 1916, as it had entered conspicuously into rebellions of the past. The rebels of 1916 did not hesitate to seize a convent which occupied a position of some tactical importance, nor did they scruple to send about his business any ecclesiastic who came to them with unpalatable advice. Beyond this incident of the forged document before the outbreak, no echo was heard in the Rebellion of the old sectarian feuds.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS

The leaders of the revolutionary movement of 1914-16 were men for the most part unknown outside of Ireland. Even in Ireland itself the names of Pearse, MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett, de Valera and Ceannt were only names, if that, to many Nationalists and to most Unionists. With the exception of James Connolly none of them was a figure in what is called public life. Only Roger Casement had renown in the world, and even he did not aspire to a political career. There may have been a Mazzini in the group, but a Cavour, even in miniature, was sadly lacking, although Casement's idea of leading Ireland to nationhood by way of an independent excursion into European politics reminds one a little of Cavour's programme for Italy during the Crimean War. Pearse was a schoolmaster—not, it is true, an ordinary schoolmaster—and his best thought had been devoted to educational problems. Thomas MacDonagh was a competent man of letters. Ceannt and Joseph Plunkett were amateurs of the arts. Learned men, not in the Gaelic League alone, held Eoin (John) MacNeill in high estimation. But best known to the average newspaper reader were Madame Marcievicz and Major MacBride, the one because her versatility had brought her into contact with all sides of Irish life, the other because of his exploits during the Boer War and his marriage to one of the most celebrated women of her time.

The movement has been called idealist, and in one sense the term is singularly appropriate; for

these men were not of the type that in any country acquires power, or indeed desires it. Technically, in matters of politics, Pearse and his friends would have been even less efficient than the actual oligarchy of professional democrats which controlled the constitutional Home Rule movement. The Irish Parliamentary agitation had at least produced men who were fitted for demagogic dictatorship. "What is called the *Sinn Fein* movement is simply the temporary cohesion of isolated cranks in various parts of the country, and it would be impossible to say exactly what their principles are, or what their object is. In fact, they have no policy and no leader and do not amount to a row of pins as far as the future of Ireland is concerned." Thus Mr. John Redmond on the 31st July, 1915. The contempt, needless to say, was mutual.

Would Pearse and his comrades, in the event of success, have been content to be "unacknowledged legislators," after the fashion of the poets? Or would they have wished to take part in the rough and tumble of Irish life? One cannot imagine them the leaders of a dominant and organised party in the State. The whole *motif* of the rebellion was peculiarly Irish, and even un-European; we seek almost vainly for analogies from abroad which might help us to understand: the real standard of judgment is in Irish history. A Madame Marcievicz or a Major MacBride were perhaps universal types, who, wherever they lived, would have been turbulent members of society as it is at present constituted. Connolly, too, one can "place;" he was a Radical-Socialist whose conversation would have been understood abroad; an ideologue maybe, but not a dreamer; he had executive ability and in any country would have been a leader among agitated men.

The closest analogy in Irish history is the Young

Ireland movement of '48. The Rebellion of '98 was inspired by French democratic ideas, though it soon acquired the character of a civil war of races and sects. But in '48 as in '16 the Irish rebels were sentimentally isolated. "In the year 1848, when every throne in Europe rocked, and every race was disturbed, *Ireland had her own little rebellion: it was easily suppressed.* This revolutionary attempt passed, so to speak, unperceived. No one troubled about the fate of Ireland or had a tear of pity for her prisoners, one of whom was descended from the ancient Kings of Munster. The Catholics themselves, *the only Party in Europe which at any time has shown sympathy for Ireland*, were unmoved. Must we attribute this indifference to the state of confusion into which Europe was then plunged?" The passage is taken from an article, which we have already mentioned, by the late Emile Montégut on John Mitchel, the Young Ireland leader, an article which was published sixty years ago in the *Revue des Deux Mondes.* Montégut, later in the same essay, says of Ireland: "She is entirely isolated in our Occident; in all that exists nothing resembles her, nowhere does she find a reflection of herself."

One of the witnesses before the Royal Commission described the leaders of '16 as a "literary lot"; here is another point in common with the men of '48—Thomas Davis, John Mitchel, and Gavan Duffy. There is certainly no book of the '16 movement that equals as an individual utterance Mitchel's *Jail Journal*, which, however, was written after the collapse of the '48 rising—'16 may yet produce its Mitchel. The Young Irelanders as a rule used poetry as a weapon of patriotic propaganda; they had a greater gift for political and popular verse than either Pearse or MacDonagh. These last had felt the effect of the

Irish literary revival which had turned to the folk spirit for impulse, and has reacted against all that savours of the rhetoric of patriotism. The poets of '16 sought maybe to "emancipate the National mind by means of individual utterance," or to "interpret the soul of the people;" but they did not make the mistake of confusing national agitation with Nationalist propaganda. Propaganda, as MacDonagh himself said, has rarely produced a fine poem. A great hymn, whether of religion or patriotism, is rarely other than the cry of a poet calling to God or his country as if he alone experienced the emotion. The writer during the last twenty years who came nearest to expressing Irish patriotic emotion in great verse was Lionel Johnson, an Englishman and a recluse:—

A dream! A dream! an ancient dream!
Yet ere peace come to Innisfail,
Some weapons on some field must gleam,
Some burning glory fire the Gael.

That field may lie beneath the sun,
Fair for the treading of an host:
That field in realms of thought be won,
And armed hands do their uttermost.

Some way, to faithful Innisfail,
Shall come the majesty and awe
Of martial truth that must prevail
To lay on all the eternal law.*

* Mr. W. B. Yeats in his essay on "Poetry and Tradition," speaking of his collaboration with Lionel Johnson in the 'nineties, says:—"We sought to make a more subtle rhythm . . . but always to remember certain ardent ideas and high attitudes of mind which move the nation itself. . . . I do not think either of us saw that, as belief in the possibility of armed insurrection withered, the old romantic nationalism would wither too, and that the young would become less ready to find pleasure in whatever they believed

Patrick Pearse was born in 1878; his father was of English origin, his mother an Irishwoman. Brought up in Ireland, he came quite early under the influence of the Gaelic revival. No sooner had he learned the language than he began to employ it as a literary medium. Some of his early books were not, however, free from the faults due to a failure to distinguish between the aptitude of two languages as different in their genius as English and Irish. Later on, he acquired—as one of his friends, himself a student of many tongues, says—such mastery over his acquired Gaelic that "the racy older native speakers might be heard rejoicing over the rich new combinations he would suddenly fling out in a speech as his passion caught fire from an idea." His last work, a little book of twelve Irish poems, was his best. "It is the mature birth of an intense mind brooding overmuch on life," says the same critic, "but especially over Ireland, a little book, of only twelve poems; but, I veritably

to be literature." Certain hastily-informed persons (we may add here) have sought to connect the Anglo-Irish literary movement with the impulse of rebellion. In fact the leaders of that movement had in recent years detached themselves altogether from the Nationalist agitation, the utilitarian character of which Mr. Yeats was fond of deploring, as in his famous verses:—

> Was it for this the wild geese spread
> Their grey wings over every tide,
> For this that all that blood was shed,
> For this Edward Fitzgerald died,
> And Robert Emmet and Wolfe Tone?
> All that delirium of the brave.
> Romantic Ireland's dead and gone,
> It's with O'Leary in the grave.

The Gaelic Revival, however, to which most of the leaders of '16 contributed, kept alive the thought of an independent Ireland, and with the outbreak of war over the world, the belief in violence had a new lease of life.

think, every one of the twelve, each in its kind of classic quality." As an orator, he did not disdain the use of English, and, with his passion of romantic Nationalism, could sway a certain type of audience which way he would, though there were not wanting critics who found his platform style and method too deliberate and too "literary." It is generally believed that the famous Republican proclamation of Easter Monday was the composition of his pen.

Pearse had adopted the profession of a barrister, but he did not practise, preferring to devote himself to the academical experiment of an Irish-speaking school. The home of this experiment was St. Enda's, a fine old house and park at Rathfarnham, near Dublin. "St. Enda's," wrote Pearse's political opponent, but his friend, Mr. Shane Leslie, "began as a pastoral idyll and finished as a fiery epic under the burning ruins of the Dublin Post Office." The school, subsidised by Gaelic enthusiasts, was not conducted on business lines, and was often on the verge of a more commonplace disaster, being only saved by the devotion which Pearse inspired amongst his colleagues of the enterprise. He had, we are told, a "dark" side. He was a man of brooding imagination, with a strong introspective tendency; and it seems that the idea that the Irish cause demanded a blood sacrifice haunted him in later years. One might compare and contrast him with the stern Fenian moralist, John O'Leary, no fanatic certainly, who also joined, without hope of success, in a revolutionary movement. "If you never ask me to enrol anyone else," O'Leary said to his Fenian friends, "I will join, it will be very good for the morals of the country." Pearse was ready to assume greater responsibilities. "Six years ago," writes Mr. Leslie, "he told me

that he one day intended to lead the St. Enda boys into rebellion."

He took an enthusiastic part in the foundation of the Volunteers in 1913, and was a signatory to the report of the Committee repudiating Mr. Redmond's authority in the autumn of 1914. It was in the autumn of 1914 that he came into conflict with Dr. Mahaffy, another, but a more orthodox, educationalist—an incident which very likely gave rise to the story told at the time of the Rebellion, that Pearse intended, in the event of success, to replace Dr. Mahaffy in the position of Provost of Trinity College. The Gaelic Society of Trinity College proposed to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Thomas Davis, the Young Ireland poet, and to that end invited Mr. Pearse, Mr. W. B. Yeats and the late Lieut. Kettle, as representing the various currents of Irish intellectual life, to address them. Dr. Mahaffy, on hearing of the matter, threatened to condemn the society for inviting "that man Pearse" to the College. It was said afterwards that the Society, having been reduced by various circumstances to a membership of one, wished to be suppressed; nevertheless, Dr. Mahaffy's *ultimatum* was respected and the meeting in honour of Davis had to be held, under other auspices than that of the Gaelic Society,* in the Antient Concert Rooms.

Pearse's best book (the volume of original Irish

* The meeting in the Antient Concert Rooms becomes rather memorable in the light of after events. Mr. Yeats, Lieut. Kettle and Mr. Pearse were all present. "They should never object," said Mr. Yeats, "to listen to a scholar on his own subject, even though they greatly objected to his politics. He knew only vaguely what Mr. Pearse had written about politics, but if it was some sort of anti-Englishism he was as vehemently opposed to the politics of Mr. Pearse as to the Unionism of Dr. Mahaffy; but he would like to hear Mr. Pearse on Davis."

poems) was published in 1914, with the title, *Suantraidhe agus Goltraidhe* (Songs of Sleep and Sorrow). Even in the English translations many of the poems have great charm. There is one of them which is certain to be remembered for its prophetic quality. It is entitled "Ideal;" Thomas MacDonagh in his book "Literature in Ireland" renders it as follows:—

Naked I saw thee,
O beauty of beauty!
And I blinded my eyes
For fear I should flinch.

I heard thy music,
O melody of melody!
And I shut my ears
For fear I should fail.

I kissed thy lips,
O sweetness of sweetness!
And I hardened my heart
For fear of my ruin.

I blinded my eyes,
And my ears I shut,
I hardened my heart,
And my love I quenched.

I turned my back
On the dream I had shaped,
And to this road before me
My face I turned.

I set my face
To the road here before me,
To the work that I see,
To the death that I shall get.

Yet another of the poems expresses preoccupation with the thought of death:

Long to me your coming,
Old herald of God,
O friend of friends,
To put me from my pain!

The editors of the various Gaelic and semi-Gaelic reviews of Dublin had in Pearse a valued contributor. He had planned an Anthology of "all that had been most nobly said in verse by Irish-speaking men and women from the beginning to our own time," and many chapters of the suggested work appeared in the *Irish Review*. He also edited a little paper of his own, *An Macaomh*, at St. Enda's for the discussion of educational ideals. Pearse, naturally, believed in a Nationalist upbringing for Irish children; he wanted to inspire his pupils with the deeds of Ireland's heroes from Cuchulain to Emmet. Also he wanted to harden the character and encourage out-of-door life. But discipline, whether in the aristocratic English or the militarist German sense, he seems to have rejected. "Teachers and pupils, each school a little self-governing community, should be free to plan their own schemes of work and play, the function of the central educational authority being merely to suggest, to help, and, as far as need be, to co-ordinate." *

Pearse's aims in education were set forth in a short paper which he contributed to one of the last numbers of the *Irish Review*. "A school in fact," he wrote, "according to the conception of our wise ancestors, was less a place than a person: a teacher with a little group of pupils clustering around him. Its place might be poor, nay, it might have no local habitation at all,

* *Irish Review*, March, 1911.

it might be peripatetic—where the Master went, the disciples followed. One may think of our Lord and His friends, as a sort of school; was He not the Master, and were not they the disciples? That gracious conception was not only the conception of the old Gael, Pagan and Christian, but it was the conception of Europe all through the Middle Ages. . . . The modern child is coming to regard his teacher as an official paid by the State to render him certain services; services which it is his interest to avail himself of, since, by so doing, he will increase his earning capacity later on; but services the rendering and acceptance of which no more imply a sacred relationship than do the rendering and accepting of the services of a dentist and chiropodist. . . . Against this trend I would oppose the ideal of those who shaped the Gaelic polity nearly two thousand years ago. . . The old Irish system, Pagan and Christian, possessed in pre-eminent degree the thing most needful in education; an adequate inspiration. Columcille suggested what that inspiration was when he said:—'If I die it shall be from the excess of love that I bear the Gael.' A love and a service so excessive as to annihilate all thought of self, a recognition that one must give all, must be willing always to make the ultimate sacrifice—this is the inspiration alike of the story of Cuchulain and of the story of Columcille, the inspiration that made the one a hero and the other a saint."

Eoin (John) MacNeill, who took no part in the actual Rebellion, was sentenced by Court-martial to penal servitude for life. He had been President of the Volunteer organisation; and it was by his name that the order forbidding the Easter parades and manœuvres was signed. The exact significance of that order is discussed in a later chapter. It is known for certain that at

the Volunteer Committee meeting of Saturday and Sunday, April 22nd and 23rd, MacNeill exerted all his influence against the project of a rising on the following Monday. In the Bulletin issued by Pearse on April 28th, when he began to realise the hopelessness of his position, we find the following allusion to MacNeill's opposition:—

"I am satisfied that we have saved Ireland's honour. I am satisfied that we should have accomplished more, that we should have accomplished the task of enthroning as well as proclaiming the Irish Republic as a Sovereign State, had our arrangements for a simultaneous rising of the whole country, with a combined plan as sound as the Dublin plan has proved to be, been allowed to go through on Easter Sunday. Of the fatal countermanding order which prevented those plans from being carried out, I shall not speak further. Both Eoin MacNeill and we have acted in the best interests of Ireland." *

Certainly MacNeill had never been ranked among the revolutionists. When he took charge of the Volunteer movement, he was a man of about fifty who had hitherto led a life of comparative retirement. In opinion always an advanced Nationalist, keenly interested in the struggle for Home Rule, he had believed, or professed to believe, up to the date of the foundation of the Volunteers, in the efficacy of constitutional action. He looked for-

* "MacNeill regarded the possession of arms by Irishmen as a national safeguard. He contended . . . that when the war was concluded a body of Volunteers intact would represent a counterblast to the statesmanship which connived at an armed Ulster, and would secure the country from being cheated. P. H. Pearse, on the other hand, regarded the possession of arms by Irishmen as a means of making a protest in blood. He considered that a nation which demands independence as its right must make a protest in blood . . ." Mr. A. Newman, in the *Irishman*, September 16, 1916.

ward to an Ireland in the enjoyment of complete legislative independence, an Ireland, too, that should be Irish in culture; and even those who called these ideals impracticable found in MacNeill a man with whom discussion was possible. He had not, that is to say, the touch of fanaticism in his nature. He had faith in persuasion and argument, and he brought even into propaganda something of that keen critical faculty and dislike of exaggeration which distinguished him from many "patriotic" writers. He left the North of Ireland as a young man and came to Dublin, where he obtained a good position in the Law Courts. His Irish studies had already commenced and he was a valuable member of the little Gaelic Union over which Dr. Douglas Hyde presided. In 1893 he was a comrade of Dr. Douglas Hyde, David Comyn, Father O'Growney, and O'Neill Russell in the foundation of the Gaelic League, which had for its objects the preservation of Irish as a National language, the extension of its use as a spoken language, the study of the old Irish literature, and the cultivation of a modern literature. MacNeill presently became Vice-President of the League. In 1908 he left the Law Courts and obtained the professorship of Old and Mediæval Irish History in the National University. He was a great worker, and his "output" of articles on linguistic and historical subjects seems to have been scarcely affected by his association with Gaelic League work and propaganda, or, later, by his leadership of the Volunteers.

Between 1892 and 1902 he contributed to and edited the *Gaelic Journal*. He worked also for the *Ulster Journal of Archæology*, for *Eriu*, and for the *Zeitschrift für Keltische Philologie*. His subjects were usually remote and difficult points of Celtic philology. In 1907 he became a member of the Royal Irish Academy; but his name was

expunged from the rolls after the result of the trial by court-martial. (It is interesting to observe that this learned body took no action in the case of Dr. Kuno Meyer, the German-Irish scholar who conducted an anti-British propaganda in the States during the war.) Mr. MacNeill contributed to the proceedings of the Academy several important treatises:—"On the Distribution, History, Grammar and Import of the Irish Ogham Inscriptions;" "An Irish Historical Tract," "Early Irish Population Groups," "Clare Island Survey—Place Names and Family Names." He published more recently a critical edition of the "Poems of Flavin Mainstrech," and a study of the Scottish historian, George Buchanan (1582), and he collaborated with Professor R. Macalister in a new edition of the "Lebor Gabala," or "Book of Invasions." A publication of his, "Chapters of Hebridean History, Part I.: The Norse Kingdom of the Hebrides," appeared after his imprisonment in the *Scottish Review*. He had maintained amid terrible responsibilities his studies to the end.

If he was not a scholar of genius, he was a leading Celtologist who could consort on equal terms with men like Dr. Meyer and Dr. Bergin; and there were some fields of Irish learning which he had explored more thoroughly than any of his contemporaries. "It is essential," he once wrote, "that students of Irish history should know where the ground is sure and where it is untrustworthy. National pride instinctively seeks to carry history as far back as possible, yet to take doubtful things for facts is a poor thing to be proud of. For the study of our own history let us pride ourselves on accurate knowledge before all things else."

His action, or rather his inaction, during the events of Easter week is likely to remain for a

long while a topic of discussion. This action is contrasted with that of The O'Rahilly, who agreed with him in opposing the Rebellion, but once the fire had been started, took his chances with the others. But MacNeill's position was different in that as leader of the Volunteer movement he had a responsibility for the young life of the rank and file. "If it had not been for the action of Mr. John MacNeill," said Mr. Dillon in the House of Commons on May 11th, "you would be fighting still, and the Rebellion would have been twice as formidable. . . . He broke the back of the Rebellion on the very eve of it, and he kept back a very large body of men from joining." Having gone so far in opposition to the plans of Pearse and Connolly, his personal presence at the Post Office in Easter week became unthinkable. We should remember, too, that MacNeill in his writings in the *Irish Volunteer*, even in the coldly violent speech which he delivered at the Mansion House protest meeting against deportations, described the aims of his followers and himself as defensive—they would fight only if attacked. But nothing is more delicate than the distinction between "offence" and "defence." For instance, if MacNeill promoted the Casement escapade, or indeed had cognizance of it—even supposing, for argument's sake, that Casement's purpose was merely to supply the Volunteers with arms, not to start a rebellion—then he was associated with an act of policy which (as he must have known) would, if discovered, force the Government's hand, oblige the Government, however unwillingly, to "attack." On the other hand, to many of his colleagues the deportations were an aggressive act—perhaps to MacNeill himself, who spoke at the Mansion House meeting of "choosing our own time," "refusing to be rushed," etc. The gist of the

matter lies here: Mr. MacNeill, if he proposed to maintain in Ireland during the war an armed force, hostile to, or independent of, British war objects, without attacking or being attacked by the Government, sought to achieve the impossible. Inevitably there must have been "cause shewn" (from the Volunteers' point of view) for rebellion, as (from the Government's point of view) for suppression.

Roger Casement was born in 1864 in the North of Ireland. He belonged to an Irish landlord family, French by extraction, and was nurtured in the old atmosphere of Protestant ascendency. Of his youth very little has been made known; nor, curiously enough, is there any account extant of the influences that turned him into so ardent a champion of the Irish National idea. His temperament must, however, always have been in collision with the orthodoxies of his Orange surroundings; it does not follow that, when first he entered the British Consular Service, he was a Separatist by conviction, or a rebel against English rule. In embracing a career abroad he followed the example of almost all the more ambitious or adventurous young men of his class in Ireland. He was with Stanley in Africa. At the age of 28 he worked in the Niger Coast Protectorate; three years later he became British Consul in the Portuguese province of Lorenzo Marques. In 1898 he was appointed Consul to the Portuguese possessions in West Africa, and, during the South African War (Consul at Delagoa Bay) he did special service work in Cape Town, receiving at the conclusion of hostilities a British South African medal. Subsequently, he served in the French Congo. He penetrated into the Belgian Congo and associated himself with the agitation against the atrocities upon the natives in that country; in June 1905 he became

Consul to the State of San Paulo. He was promoted Consul-General and transferred to Rio de Janeiro in 1908; in 1911 he was knighted and received the Coronation medal. He had already been engaged for some years in investigating the conditions of the rubber industry in the Amazon Valley, the report on which he sent to Sir Edward Grey in January 1911. It showed that for the twelve years, 1900 to 1911, the Putumayo output of 4,000 tons of rubber cost 30,000 lives, and that the only reason in some cases why crops failed later was because of the shortage of labour caused by the brutalities; the enterprise was conducted from headquarters in London and employed both British capital and British labour—"under British auspices," said Casement in his Report, though, of course, the primary responsibility lay with the Peruvian Government which had given free play to the rubber merchants.

His connection with active Irish propaganda dated from 1900 or thereabouts, when first he raised his voice in favour of the new cultural ideas of the Gaelic League. After that date he always spent his leave in Ireland, forming many friendships among the literary Nationalists. He made no secret of the fact that his Irish political opinions were most "advanced;" he believed that Ireland was in the fullest sense a nation, and, as such, entitled, if she so desired, to complete separation from England. Also, he had a characteristic aversion from the Parliamentary manœuvres to which the Constitutional movement had been reduced. That is not to say that he belonged to the small group of extremists which would have rejected with scorn even a full measure of Home Rule; nor did his view of the situation commit him in any way to revolutionary propaganda. His position was really that of the original *Sinn*

Feiners. Imperialism never caught his fancy; nor did he regard Ireland as the one failure of British history. Whether he ought not in these circumstances to have withdrawn from the Consular service is a nice point for the moralist. Casement may have argued that his work for the natives was still undone; that he could not complete it in his private capacity; that whatever of sedition there might be in his Irish politics he could still fulfil his duties of Consul with loyalty. There may also have been in his mind the thought that the more notable his achievement abroad the more weight his views in Ireland would carry both among his compatriots and among foreigners.

It was in 1911, apparently, that he first began to think of the "next war," and of how Ireland might exploit it. That same year he received his knighthood, an event which caused him some scruples of conscience—his courtier-like letter of acceptance notwithstanding. (It appears that he never even opened the parcel which contained the insignia of his orders.) He was now very often in Ireland, though he did not actually retire from the Consular service until 1913. Among the friendships he made was one with Dr. Kuno Meyer, the great Celtic scholar, who made so surprising an appearance a few years later in the *rôle* of a German-Irish agitator in the States. Dr. Meyer, in spite of his liking for Irish life and his devotion to the old Irish past, had looked with rather a scornful eye on the Nationalist agitations of the day. It appears, however, that Casement created a deep impression on the German doctor; and it was on Casement's suggestion, we may guess, that Dr. Kuno Meyer (with Dr. Schiemann, a scholar much in the Kaiser's confidence) published a letter informing the Covenanters of

Belfast that they need count on no German sympathy. It was not Germany's way, said Dr. Meyer, to interfere in the domestic concerns of another people; but on general grounds Germany—Dr. Meyer spoke for the "intellectuals"—would repudiate the whole philosophy of Carsonism. In 1912 there was published anonymously, but almost certainly from Casement's pen, in the *Irish Review* the article which we quote at length in our first chapter, setting out the idea that one result of the "next war" should be the constitution of Ireland as an independent nation under the guarantee of the European Powers and the States of America. One may compare his idea with schemes for Poland advocated in England during the war by German Poles. The article created some interest in Germany, though not in official circles, which at the time aimed at procuring English neutrality in the event of a European conflagration. The question of the Queenstown Harbour call* in the same year showed clearly how little of actuality yet resided in Casement's scheme—if scheme it could be called: suggestions rather. Casement's "double" in Irish history is surely that "Walter" who was Secretary of Frederic of Hohenstaufen, and ever spoke to his Imperial Master of that wonderful island far off that was all "great shadowy rocks and silent strands," and awaited the coming of the Deliverer. This Walter went, on behalf of the German (or Holy Roman) Emperor, to revisit Ireland, where he was watched by the orders of the English King, Henry III., and his doings and sayings "privately noted." †

* See Chapter V.

† Casement, like most of the leaders of '16, had considerable literary talent. Of his published poems only one is "political." This is a sonnet that appeared in "Dana," an "Irish Magazine of independent thought," 1904. "To

An eye-witness who was in Ulster at the time of the "Curragh crisis" furnishes the following unpublished reminiscences:—"Roger Casement, who stayed with Mr. F. J. Biggar, the well-known Irish antiquary, used to be in and out of the Grand Central Hotel a great deal. There were congregated together journalists of all nationalities, eager to reach an understanding of the paradoxical situation that had arisen as a consequence of the Larne gun-running. Casement confined his attentions chiefly to the representatives of the English Liberal newspapers—among whom Mr. H. W. Nevinson of the *Manchester Guardian*, his friend and fellow-worker among the African negroes, stood pre-eminent. But he also liked to talk to the quite bewildered correspondents of the French and German Press who had come to Ireland expecting to find Ulster in arms against the Empire, and now saw it bestrewn with Union Jacks in honour of the visit of Mr. Churchill's gun-boat. Casement made friends especially with the very able representative of one of the principal German newspapers, the *Berliner Tageblat*, who had come post haste to Ireland to report the progress of the 'Revolution.' This gentleman had already interviewed the principal Unionists and Nationalists of the city; he spoke of them with mockery in his voice, as though the situation were purely *opera bouffe;* he saw, or thought

a Lady Who Wondered why all Irish Poetry was Rebel," is the title:—

"Who could commemorate in lasting song,
The triumph of the mighty o'er the weak?
Nor could the pens that through the ages seek
To dress the balance of sword-handed wrong
Forsake the vanquished few to aid the strong.
In this eternal cause no voice can speak,
The haughty victor in half-tones or meek.
Nor to that blast blow not a note too long."

he saw, what the Unionists were at, that is, promoting a huge 'bluff' in the hope of escaping 'Home Rule;' though why anyone should make so much fuss about 'Home Rule' (unlike the natives he had studied the Bill), he was unable to conceive. Equally the Nationalists had failed to explain to him why they wanted this 'Home Rule' so badly. It all seemed to him a much ado about nothing; both parties were quite un-serious, limited and sectarian at bottom. Then he met Casement, who exposed to him his view of Ireland's need of self-government. It was at a luncheon party in the Grand Central Hotel. Casement argued that British statesmen had opposed, and would continue to oppose, the industrial development of Ireland, citing among many other instances, if I remember rightly, the refusal of the Cunard Steamship Company to continue Queenstown as a port of call. Ulster, he said, had, like the rest of Ireland, suffered from the Union; and if the Protestant population of the province were still Unionists, that was because their religious fears had been exploited by unscrupulous Imperialists who wanted to keep Ireland divided for all time. The 'Home Rule' that would give Ireland a chance of free development would, of course, have to be a measure much wider in scope than that which was now in dispute. Nevertheless Casement expressed a hope that the Bill before Parliament would become law, and he asserted that if the Liberal Government chose only to act courageously, the native opposition of the Ulster minority need cause no real anxieties. There were not two Irish nations, but only one; the Ulsterman was, in point of fact, probably more Celtic than the Southern.

"The German journalist had, naturally, no means of knowing how far Casement's information corresponded with the facts. But here at

least was an Irishman who could explain what he wanted, and give the motive of his action. This man, he said, speaks a language that I can understand. Casement did not include Sir Edward Carson among the 'unscrupulous Imperialists,' for he was very anxious to have an interview with the Ulster leader, then at Craigavon, Captain Craig's place near Belfast, which had been turned into a Volunteer camp, and was guarded by armed sentries. I do not think that Casement and Sir Edward met; the German journalist was, however, allowed, as a special privilege, to pass through the gates of Craigavon. He returned, laughing, to his hotel. Asked by the representatives of the English Liberal Press (to whom passage into Craigavon was denied) what news he brought back, 'Only this,' he said, 'Carson and Craig will not fight.' Then he sat down to compose a humorous article about Ulster; we thought his hilarity bad taste, seeing that he had been so courteously received by Captain Craig and Sir Edward Carson. It is worth while to recall the incident; only the other day I read in the *Morning Post* an appreciation of Sir Edward by a too fervent admirer, which suggested that the Ulster leader had, during this critical period of international politics, taken upon himself the responsibility of deceiving German journalists as to the real state of things in Ireland. It was alleged that they left his presence fully convinced that when 'the day' came Ulster would rise and stab England in the back. This German at least had no such illusion.* Someone spoke during

* According to Miss Alice Milligan, the Irish poetess, there is a folk tradition in the North of Ireland, which says that the whole Ulster business was a put-up job between Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Winston Churchill. The object was to fool the Germans. They knew that Germany contemplated an attack on

luncheon time of the alleged pro-German sympathies of the Ulster Orangemen and their desire to welcome ' another William ' as a saviour of the Irish Protestants. The journalist, who represented a non-militarist and Radical paper, laughed and said that the Kaiser had already ' enough Irelands ' on hand. In effect, I do not believe that, even in cases where the wish might have been father to the thought, German enquirers into the Ulster situation can have believed that Ulster would rebel on the declaration of war between England and Germany.

" This is to digress from Casement, who, having completed his eloquent description of the Irish claim, strode out of the coffee room, his back held very straight, and looking as though there were —to adapt Eckerman's phrase about Wellington's Highlanders—no Original Sin in the world, or Fall of Man. I had met him only once before; it was at Ballymoney, Co. Antrim, at a meeting of Ulster Liberals. Almost all the speakers were Protestant ' intellectuals ' of the Nationalist movement; the list included Casement, Captain White, D.S.O. (of Liberty Hall fame); Mrs. J. R. Green, the historian, Casement's dear friend; and Mr. Alec Wilson of Belfast. The little hall was comfortably filled with grizzled farmers who seriously applauded every point made by the speakers. Casement made a good literary speech, in which he urged upon his audience the necessity of Irish unity. He appeared tired and ill, however, and I remember that he sat afterwards resting his head on his hands, and quite silently,

Europe, but she would wait until Ulster was " ready." Ulster, Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Churchill had decided, would never be " ready." Therefore, European peace would have been preserved if it had not been for the silly Nationalists who fought the police at Dollymount. A German waiter, who mistook Dollymount for Dollysbrae, telegraphed to the Kaiser that civil war had begun.

before the fire in his hotel. He had a touch of the chronic ailment he had contracted in the tropics.''

Thomas J. Clarke, with Thomas MacDonagh and Pearse, was in the first batch of the executed leaders. He revived associations with the neo-Fenianism of the late seventies and early eighties. As a youth he had been sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude, which he served, in connexion with the dynamite outrages. He was now still under sixty. Coming out of prison he resumed his membership of the secret society known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the very existence of which most people had forgotten in recent years.* Though a mild and kindly temperament in private life, Clarke retained during a long period of quiescence the firm conviction that one more rebellion must take place in Ireland. He was a great authority on Irish-American matters, and closely in the confidence of the *Clan-na-Gael*, which was no doubt informed through him of the progress of the Volunteers and the possibilities of "forcing the pace" of the movement. He kept a newsagency and tobacco shop at the top of the street which was to suffer most from the military operations during the rising, and in his will left three thousand pounds to the dependants of the fallen Volunteers.

Thomas MacDonagh was born at Cloughjordan in Co. Cavan in 1878. He worked as a tutor in English literature and Mathematics at University College, Dublin, and was a colleague of Pearse in many educational projects. Though always

* Accounts have been published from time to time purporting to describe the present constitution and methods of this Fenian secret society. The authors have preferred to reject this very doubtful information, and to admit frankly that little or nothing, beyond the fact of its existence, is authoritatively known about the Irish Republican Brotherhood. It appears to have been languishing when the Volunteer movement revived it.

strongly National in feeling, he was not among those who had long contemplated the resort to arms, and his influence, even while the issue was being knit between the Volunteers and the constituted authorities, was on the side of moderation. He thought it madness (these words were reported as his to the Government in the winter of 1915-16) to fight without German aid. He had thrown himself, however, with an accustomed heartiness into the profession of arms, and the self-confidence that is reflected in his writings came out strongly in his association with the Volunteers. "Now," he said, when the reservists were called up at the commencement of the war, "some intelligence will be directed upon the work." He read military manuals with great care, and talked quite freely to casual acquaintances of the possibilities of street fighting. In fact, he was one of the most successful of the Commandants during the Rebellion, only breaking down when surrender became inevitable. His alleged last speech contains a curious passage in which he rejects with scorn the claim that himself and his comrades represented the people—that "inert mass;" an utterance to which during the great war there has been no parallel.

His friends speak of the cheerfulness, indeed, the exuberance, of his spirits; he took the lead in all conversations, and would talk, they say, the very chair off its legs. Ambitious in everything he undertook, he put great energy into his literary career. Unlike some of his colleagues of the Gaelic Revival, he showed a keen interest in all movements of letters, whether in England or on the Continent, and opposed, in his critical work, that obscurantist tendency which is often the bane of local patriotism. He was a poet, he would have said himself, of the Irish mode; he wrote in English, but his appeal, both in subject-matter

and in form, was to an Irish audience; in his last book, "Literature in Ireland," he presented an interesting case for the existence of a separate Anglo-Irish literature—*i.e.*, a literature which is other than a variety in the growth of English literature. As a man of letters, then, MacDonagh claimed to be in the company of Mr. W. B. Yeats, Mr. George Russell, Mr. James Stephens, and the late J. M. Synge. He had not the individual quality—the real need for self-expression—of any of these writers; and his work was often marred by a habit of grandiloquence. But when he died, many, even of those who were not influenced by the manner of his death, found that he had been, on occasion, a true poet. There is power both of thought and expression in the concluding stanzas of "Death in the Woods":—

How long! Ah Death, what art thou, a thing of calm or of storms?
Or twain—their peace to them, to me thy valiant alarms?
Gladly to leave them—this corpse in their churchyard to lay at rest,
If my wind-swept spirit could fare on the hurricane's kingly quest.

And sure 'tis the fools of knowledge who feign that the winds of the world
Are but troubles of little calm in the greater calm enfurled;
I know them from symbols of glory, and echoes of one voice dread,
Sounding where spacious tempests house the great-hearted dead.

His translations were often singularly felicitous.

The " Yellow Bittern " in his last book is a delightful poem which illustrates with real ingenuity the unstressed movements and the assonances of Gaelic verse. His version of the song, " Táid na réalta 'na seasamh ar an aer," will also be remembered:—

Three things through love I see,
Sorrow and Sin and Death—
And my mind reminding me
That this doom I breathe with my breath.

But sweeter than violin or lute
Is my love, and she left me behind;
I wish that all music were mute
And I to all beauty were blind.*

" It is impossible," observed a writer in the London *Nation* of MacDonagh's *Literature in Ireland*, " not to be influenced by the knowledge that the writer was one of the fifteen Irishmen executed for proclaiming an Irish Republic on Easter Monday. One knows, too, that before he died he declared that he was happy to die for Ireland. One cannot but be deeply interested in anything that will throw light on the character of a man of letters on whom so tragic a doom has fallen. What did this Ireland that he died for

* A literal version of this beautiful Gaelic song was published by P. H. Pearse in the *Irish Review*.

Three things I see through love,
Sin, and death, and gain;
And my mind tells me day by day
That my soul she has wasted with care.
My sharp grief that I ever gave her love,
'Twere better that I never had seen her,
O Maiden, my heart you have hurt,
May you get forgiveness from God.

mean for him? Was he fired by the ancient love of the lost Cause? Was he victim of the Celtic melancholy or the Celtic hope? It is clear from the present book that he was a prophet of faith, not of madness. He insists that the note of the new literature—at least the new literature in Irish—is a 'note of pride, of self-reliance, almost of arrogance.' 'I am a Gael,' wrote MacDonagh, . . . 'my race has refused to yield even to defeat, and emerges strong to-day, full of hope and of love, with new strength in its arms to work its new destiny, with a new song on its lips, and the words of a new language still calling from age to age; which is the ancient language.'"

On Thursday morning, May 4th, four more men were shot, William Pearse, Joseph Plunkett, Edward Daly and Michael O'Hanrahan. William Pearse was a younger brother of P. H. Pearse, and a sculptor. He used to build chariots of the old heroic age for pageants at St. Enda's. His execution caused some surprise, for, although he had taken part in the Rebellion, being a devoted adherent of his brother, he was not known as a leader of the movement. Joseph Plunkett had been a signatory of the Republican Proclamation. He belonged to a well-known and well-to-do Catholic family in Dublin, many members of which held very different political views to his own. His father and mother, the (Papal) Count and Countess Plunkett, who had been sympathetic towards the Volunteers, were subsequently deported. Count Plunkett was a member of many learned societies, and Director of the National Museum in Dublin. Joseph Plunkett had for a time been editor of the admirable *Irish Review*, and showed a fine literary judgment in his choice of contributors. The columns of the magazine were open to all good writers irrespective of political opinion. He was also the author of a

book of poems, *The Circle of the Sword*. His friends outside of the Volunteer movement did not think of him seriously as a man of action; but it is now said that he showed, while on the Committee, as much vigour, decision, and practical ability as any of his colleagues. Whilst under sentence of death, he married Miss Grace Gifford, a talented artist, and a sister of Thomas MacDonagh's widow. One of his brothers was sentenced to a long term .of penal servitude. Edward Daly, on the other hand, was obviously the soldier type. Twenty-four years of age, and an officer in the first battalion of the Irish Volunteers, he had command of the Four Courts where, according to the testimony of certain prisoners there, one of them a Major in the British Army, an excellent discipline was maintained in the rebel ranks. Michael O'Hanrahan was a journalist, and the author of some racy tales of Irish life; he had latterly been employed as a clerk in the Volunteer organisation.

Major John MacBride, the eighth of the rebels to face a firing squad, was executed on May 6th. He belonged to a well-known family of Westport, Co. Mayo, and was brought up in an atmosphere of revolt. His paternal relatives were the Gallaghers and the Gills, who were eventually driven from Ireland because of their association with physical force movements. MacBride was in Johannesburg when the Boer War began. He formed there a brigade of 500 Irishmen, and led them against the English in the first struggle around Ladysmith, winning his title of Major. He was popular with his soldiers, and, after the British granted an amnesty to the Boers, MacBride was enabled to escape to France; when things had quietened he returned to Dublin. He married Miss Maude Gonne, the beautiful

Nationalist heroine of the 'nineties, who had been a fellow-worker in the Boer cause; but within two years Mrs. MacBride secured a separation. They had during their short married life made a short tour of the United States together. MacBride had been a journalist before the Boer War. On his return to Dublin he held a small position under the Dublin Corporation—"this unusual water-bailiff," so one newspaper correspondent described him. His military training and fitness as a commanding officer were appreciated by the *Clan-na-Gael;* but, though occasionally he made "strong" speeches, not much had been heard of him in Ireland within recent years. He was the old-fashioned type of patriot who loved fighting for its own sake. On hearing at his suburban residence of the outbreak, he shouldered his musket and made his way into the city. He took failure philosophically, and, unrepenting, faced his end, not attempting to deny that his responsibility for what had occurred equalled that of the open leaders. "His bearing was most soldierly," wrote "A Wayfarer" in the *Nation*. . . .

Eamonn Ceannt (Edward Kent), Cornelius Colbert, Michael Mallin and J. J. Heuston were executed on May 8th. The first-named—a signatory to the Proclamation—was a man of about thirty, of whom the highest opinions had been entertained in the intellectual circles of the Gaelic League. He was a good writer of Irish, and a delightful performer on the bagpipes. His employment was in the City Treasurer's office. Colbert was a boy from Clare—unknown, like Michael Mallin and J. J. Heuston. A more popular name than any of these four was that of The O'Rahilly. Here, it seems, was a genuine *Sinn Feiner*. The O'Rahilly, long before the Volunteers were heard

of, had been one of Mr. Griffith's keenest collaborators, and it is, perhaps, significant in this connexion that The O'Rahilly, like Mr. Bulmer Hobson—another former advocate of *Sinn Fein*—should have opposed the decision of the Committee to take the aggressive. The vote went against his views; but The O'Rahilly determined to risk all with his comrades. This circumstance, together with the stories that have been told of his generosity to the prisoners in the Post Office, is likely to confer upon him a fortunate memory. He was killed during the fighting—the only member of the Committee who did not survive the battle. The O'Rahilly was a well-travelled man, with American connexions, who had something of the air of the soldier of fortune; he had independent means, was a writer of occasional articles in the *Sinn Fein* Press, and had acquired a conversational knowledge of Irish.

James Connolly and Sean MacDearmada were the two last of the signatories of the Republican Proclamation to be executed. Sentence upon them was carried out on May 12th. In the case of Connolly the delay, which was due to wounds received during the fighting, gave his friends in England an opportunity for raising a small agitation for reprieve. This agitation had, however, little chance of success, owing to the fact that Connolly had taken so important a part—perhaps the most important part—in the revolutionary conspiracy. Nevertheless, considerable feeling was aroused outside of Ireland by Connolly's death, and Captain White, an old worker at Liberty Hall, proceeded to Wales, and attempted to cause by way of a reprisal a strike among the miners. Sean MacDearmada had no influence of this kind. A native of Limerick, and one of the founders of the Volunteer movement, his associations were purely with Nationalist propaganda. Never did

he make a secret of his revolutionary opinions; always at moments of crisis in the history of the Volunteers, he led the opposition to compromise. It was in his paper, *Irish Freedom*, that the project of a German-Irish alliance first received open expression. He had suffered imprisonment before the outbreak of the Rebellion. This young man was marked down in any case for early death; he was consumptive, and in the latter years of his life could only walk with the aid of a stick. He united a singular sweetness of disposition with his violent and incautious enthusiasm, and was much beloved among his intimates.

Connolly, the son of a Cork artisan, was about fifty years of age. Much of his life had been spent in Scotland; it was there that he first identified himself with the Socialist movement; his abilities were recognised by Mr. Keir Hardie and the Independent Labour group, and for a while he acted as a lecturer on Socialism in England and Scotland. The Transport Workers' movement brought him back to Ireland, his headquarters being situated in Belfast.

His family was northern in origin, and he always looked the Ulster type; his speech, appearance, and character were rather foreign to Dublin, let alone Cork. By birth a Catholic, he is said to have lost his faith during his sojourn among English labour men; on his return to Ireland he often came into conflict on secular matters with the Church of his fathers. Opinion credited "Liberty Hall" with anti-Catholicism; and certainly, neither James Larkin nor James Connolly ever hesitated to hit back when attacked by ecclesiastical dignitaries. Connolly's book, *Labour in Irish History*, alluded to the Papacy as "still providing with accustomed skill and persistence a scheme which looks upon Catholic Ireland simply as a tool to be used for the spiritual re-conquest

of England to Catholicity"; but in nothing that he said or wrote is there any criticism of Catholic dogma, let alone a touch of anti-Christianism; and he died a believer. "Our politics from home," cried O'Connell, "our religion from Rome." That much of anti-clericalism has always been in Nationalist movements, whether "extreme" or constitutional (glance at the history of the Irish Parliamentary Party's relations with the Hierarchy during the last thirty years); and if Connolly, when baulked by a Bishop, used more violent language than (say) Mr. Devlin in similar circumstances, that was because he had a habit of more violent language. On the other hand, among the Irish Bishops and Priests themselves, ultramontanism—it is a significant thing—is seldom predominant. Assuredly it is a fact of first-rate significance that all the men of the revolution of 1916, Connolly and Casement included, should have died Catholics.

The book, *Labour in Irish History*, was Connolly's *magnum opus*. Published in 1910, not long after his return to Ireland, it shows how ready he was to modify the Internationalism that he had learned from books in favour of the Irish-Ireland idea. In *Labour in Irish History* Connolly made a free use of the name of Karl Marx; but it is doubtful if he really adhered to, or even understood, the Socialism of that Master. Connolly was a reformer, though a very violent and impatient one, and a Christian democrat.*

* The Irish Parliamentary Party appeals to the general ethical principles upon which the "bourgeois" liberal movements of the nineteenth century were founded. An analogy to the dispute between Syndicalists and Socialists here suggests itself. "The Syndicalists reject the system of democratic representation (indirect action). . . . They desire to substitute for it the 'more combative tactics of the revolutionary army of liberty, middle class tactics founded upon the tried ability of the leaders. Syndicalism is hostile to the 'de-

The Marx theory, like modern Syndicalism, supposes internationalism, even anti-patriotism. *Labour in Irish History* is, however, an interesting endeavour to exploit Marxian conception of the class war to the profit of Irish Nationalism, or—one might put it reversely—Irish Nationalism to the profit of Marxian conception of the class war. Connolly argued that England was the exponent in Ireland of the feudal-capitalist

mocratic ' policy of the Socialist party, for the Syndicalists hold that ' democracy ' affords a mere caricature of the fundamental principles of the labour movement, and they declare that from the ' democratic ' soil no fruit can spring but that of oligarchy " (Michel's " Political Parties "). The events of 1916 in Ireland appear from this aspect like a civil war, an assault upon the oligarchy that drew its power from popular suffrage, but made " a caricature of the fundamental principles " of Irish Nationalism. We are reminded of Sorel's idea of the catastrophic revolution; that " attitude of spirit which was born in ancient Greece among poor and warlike tribes whose immense aristocratic pride was fostered by poets who sang of triumphant expeditions and victorious battles soon to come. " The democracy of Parliamentary socialism has," says Sorel, " for objective the disappearance of class sentiments. . . . But a great change will come upon the world the day on which the proletariat shall have conquered, what formerly the ' bourgeois ' conquered, the sentiment that it is capable of thinking according to its own conditions of life. The myth of the general strike has a motor value; we must not analyse it too closely, nor in the event of victory compare accomplished facts with the representations of the future that had been made before action." Compare one of the leaders of 1916 on " battle for Ireland." " It is not merely the love of country felt by the fatter nations. . . . It is not merely the love of the sod of Ireland. . . . It is not merely the love of liberty, or of the rights of man. . . . It springs not merely from economic grievance, or from grievance against the administration of alien law. . . . It is the knowledge that there still lives in this country, in this race, a 'holy cause.' " Irish Nationalism here takes on the character of one of those myths or mental constructions which " we must not analyse too closely;" the passage to it must not be conceived as otherwise than violent and catastrophic, must never be resolved into a sum of historical details.

system. "The seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in Ireland," he wrote, "were, indeed, the *Via Dolorosa* of the Irish race. In them the Irish Gael sunk out of sight, and in his place the middle class politicians, capitalists and ecclesiastics laboured to produce a hybrid Irishman, assimilating a foreign social system, a foreign speech and a foreign character." The downfall of "England" (or English influence) in Ireland, *i.e.*, the triumph of Irish Nationality, could, therefore, only be accomplished by the triumph of such a democratic movement as would have for its end the assertion of the "old Gaelic principle" of Common Ownership :—

"As we have again and again pointed out, the Irish question is a social question—the whole age-long fight of the Irish people against their oppressors resolves itself in the last analysis into a fight for the mastery of the means of life, the sources of production in Ireland. Who would own or control the land? The people or the invaders; and, if the invaders, which set of them—the most recent swarm of land thieves or the sons of the thieves of a former generation?"

Connolly did not make it quite clear whether or not he wished to attribute a moral superiority to the Gaels among the races of Europe. After all, the Gaels themselves came to Ireland as conquerors in the first instance, and were a small minority in the country, though no doubt recognising among themselves the principles of equality; they were a branch of the Aryan-German race which later on, after the Roman downfall, re-established through feudalism an aristocratic society in Western Europe. The argument from race quickly breaks down; it is as if some English labour leader were suddenly to de-

clare that only the *bas fonds* of English society, whose descent he could trace from the ancient Britons, were the incorruptible inheritors of English patriotism. There is no nationality without conquest and mixture. Nor, indeed, would the triumph of the proletariat in the "Class War" necessarily lead to the flat democracy in which no "great men" of action would appear and of which Connolly apparently dreamed. A later work of Connolly, *the Reconquest of Ireland*, which is in part a compendium of the shocking statistics of Irish labour conditions, contains allusions to the idea for Ireland of "a Co-operative Commonwealth," and nowhere attacks the question of the "Class War." A writer in *New Ireland* sums up his aims as "greater organisation of the workers, checking the present capitalistic tyranny and encouraging the Co-operative movement"—a statement which hardly accounts for his adherence to the Rebellion of 1916—but when he attempted the impossible (this same writer continues) it was as a Nationalist, not as a Labour leader.

Seven persons, besides John MacNeill, were sentenced to penal servitude for life after the commutation of the death penalty. They included, besides the celebrated Madame Marcieviez, founder of the Irish Boy Scouts, a labour member of the Dublin Corporation, a draper's assistant, a brother of the executed O'Hanrahan, and Edward de Valera. The last-named was a teacher of Irish and of mathematics, who, judging from the tributes to his bearing that appeared from the pens of acquaintances unconnected with the Rebellion, seems to have been the very type of the scholar with the sword. "You have but one life to live and one death to die," said de Valera to his followers. "See that you do both like men." Pearse Beasley, who was a Commander in the Four Courts and re-

ceived sentence of three years penal servitude, was another Irish scholar and a writer. Desmond Fitzgerald (ten years) was a highly-educated man who had lived a good deal in England. Partridge (ten years) and J. J. Walsh (ten years) were members respectively of the Dublin and Cork Corporations.

We may notice, in conclusion of this chapter, the striking absence among the leaders of farmers and of Protestants. Farmers, as John O'Leary, the Fenian, noted, had never much fancy for taking risks. But Protestants had been at the head of most previous outbreaks in Ireland. In 1916 there was Casement only, and his Protestantism was a doubtful quantity; George Irvine, however, the teacher in a Diocesan Church School, must have been something of a figure in the Rebellion, for he was sentenced to ten years' penal servitude.

CHAPTER V.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

RESUMING our narrative of the events which led up to the outbreak, we find that with the definite rupture of the Irish Volunteers from the National Volunteers and the emergence of the former as an individual force, a new factor, destined to prove of capital importance in the development of the situation in Ireland, came into play. This new factor was the active support of the Irish Volunteers by the extreme Irish-American organisations in the United States. It had three results. In the first place, it supplied the Irish Volunteers on a fairly liberal scale with funds for propagandist work, for the payment of organisers, for the purchase of equipment and arms. In the next place, as the implicit price of continued support it urged the Volunteers into violent courses upon which their leaders would otherwise have embarked less readily and with a less definite intention of attempting to secure immediate results. Finally, it provided a *nexus* between the Irish Volunteers upon the one hand and the German Government upon the other.

Before the breach between the Volunteers representing the constitutional party in Nationalist Ireland and those who, after it, were the avowed representatives of the physical force doctrine, the Volunteer movement in Ireland had enjoyed, of course, a certain measure of support from the Irish-American organisations. During the year, from towards the end of 1913 until the summer of 1914, while the Volunteers had no official relation to the Nationalist Parliamentary Party, consider-

able sums were coming from America and being paid into various banks in Dublin, chiefly in the name of John MacNeill, President of the Volunteers' General Council and Executive Committee. But during this period the support of the movement by violent and extreme Irish-American organisations such as the *Clan-na-Gael* was lukewarm and tentative. The position of the Volunteer leaders was in some respects uncertain and obscure. They were certainly no friends of the leaders of the constitutional party. On the other hand, they were not open enemies of that party. Their professed aim in organising the Volunteers was to strengthen the hands of the Nationalist Parliamentary Party in securing the constitutional triumph of the Home Rule policy, and, in particular, in opposing the partition of Ireland involved in the suggested compromise by which the province of Ulster, or part of it, was to be excluded from the operation of the Home Rule Scheme. Some at least of the Volunteer leaders were known to be men of such aspirations as the Home Rule Bill would certainly not satisfy. But those were days in Ireland when the condition of the country's politics was so anomalous and unprecedented that, in the case of almost all political parties alike, it was supremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, to draw any absolute line of division between loyalty and disloyalty, or to determine at what point discontent with the existing situation implied sedition. In this situation, with its almost infinite and generally imperceptible and indeterminate gradations of sentiment in Ireland, the extremist organisations in the United States for the most part held their hands and adopted a policy, in President Wilson's classical phrase, of "watchful waiting."

But the effect of the war upon the situation in Ireland resolved their doubts and discovered their

opportunity. For the first time there now began to emerge a clean-cut division between the forces of constitutionalism and the forces of violence. The extremists in the United States watched with intense interest the development of the situation in Ireland which followed upon Mr. John Redmond's declaration in the House of Commons of Ireland's solidarity with the Empire in the war. They witnessed the efforts of the majority of the original leaders of the Volunteers to thwart by every means in their power the prosecution of the policy which he enunciated upon that historic occasion. They saw the issue, on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit to Dublin on September 5th, 1914, of the manifesto attacking Mr. Redmond, declaring that "Ireland could not with honour or safety take part in foreign quarrels, other than through the action of an Irish Parliament," and repudiating "the claim of any man to offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Ireland and Irishmen while no National Government which could speak and act for the people of Ireland is allowed to exist." They saw Mr. Redmond's reply to this challenge in the letter in which, on September 6th, he announced that owing to the publication of the manifesto by a minority* he had taken steps to request the majority of the Provisional Committee to meet and re-organise the governing body of the Volunteers. They saw the Convention of the minority, on October 25th, adopt the following declaration of policy:—

(1) To maintain the right and duty of the Irish nation to provide for its own defence by means of a permanent armed and trained Volunteer force.

(2) To unite the people of Ireland on the basis of Irish nationality and of common interests, to maintain the integrity of the nation, and to resist

* It was a majority of the original members.

any measures tending to bring about or perpetuate disunion or the partition of the country.

(3) To resist any attempts to force the men of Ireland into military service until a National Government is empowered by the Irish people themselves to deal with it.

(4) To secure the abolition of the system of governing Ireland from Dublin Castle, and the establishment of a National Government in its place.

The extremist organisations in the United States, witnessing these developments, at once appreciated their implication and significance. For the first time there had emerged in Ireland a party which openly dissociated itself from all the constitutional parties. It had as its cardinal article of faith the assertion of the right to maintain a permanent armed and trained Volunteer force, despite the fact that in the Home Rule Bill itself all questions of defence were to be expressly excluded from the authority of the Irish Parliament. Its policy of resistance to the military service of Irishmen under the Crown involved not only opposition to conscription, should its enforcement in Ireland be attempted, but also the frustration of voluntary recruiting efforts. That policy of Irish neutrality in the war which the Irish Volunteers asserted was bound from their very nature, in the circumstances in which they came into separate existence under the emotional stress which the outbreak of the war produced in Ireland, to be transformed into a policy of active hostility to the British Government. The extremist Irish-American organisations in the United States decided in any case that, if they supported the new movement with all the energy at their command, they could secure not only this result, but more—the definite association of the Irish Volunteers and the German Government,

and a working alliance between the military instrument of sedition which had made its appearance in Ireland and the armed forces of the enemy.

Their decision to lend the movement their active support was largely influenced by the efforts of Casement, who had played a considerable part in the original formation of the Volunteers in the autumn of 1913, and whose absence from the country was stated in the Manifesto issued in September 1914 to be the sole reason which prevented his being a signatory. Casement, at the outbreak of the war, was in the United States. Earlier in the year he had been in Germany, whither he is believed to have gone to arrange for the purchase of arms for the Volunteers. Casement, however, was on very intimate relations with persons in high authority in Germany. Apart from the personal friendships which he had formed during his career in the British Diplomatic Service, he had also certain business connections with German firms. Since his retirement from the Diplomatic Service, and his return to the development of his earlier passionate interest in the affairs of Ireland, one of the projects which had engaged his attention was the establishment of more independent steamship communication between Ireland on the one hand and the Continent of Europe and America on the other. When, during the year before the war, the Cunard Company, following the example of the White Star Line, decided to abandon the use of Queenstown as a port of call for mails and passengers, and thus leave Ireland without any direct communication with the outside world by the chief steamship services, Casement at once entered into negotiations with the Hamburg-Amerika Line for the inauguration by

that company of a service which would make the Queenstown call. He described in glowing terms how the visits of German ships *en route* for America would serve to link up Ireland—hitherto "an island beyond an island"—with the Continent. He hoped that, even if this project did not mature, the negotiations could be used as a lever in compelling the Cunard Company to reconsider its intentions with regard to Queenstown. The negotiations, in the end, did not secure even this secondary result, and Casement convinced himself that the project had been rendered abortive by the pressure which the Cunard Company had been able to induce the British Government to apply. The incident, therefore, not only increased his bitterness against England on the score of what he regarded as another injustice to Ireland and another example of British selfishness, but also brought him into close relations with Herr Ballin, the head of the Hamburg-Amerika Line and a personal friend and confidant of the German Emperor.

In these circumstances he constituted, when the outbreak of war and the development of events in Ireland found him in the United States, an admirable intermediary with the Irish-American extremists between the revolutionary party in Ireland and the German Government. He had been identified with the establishment of the Volunteer movement in Ireland; he was on intimate terms, and in frequent communication, with its leaders; he realised—no man better—the potentialities of the movement which might be realised while Great Britain and Germany were in a state of war. He was a familiar figure to the Irish-American organisations through the negotiations in which he had earlier sounded them on the question of their support of the Volunteers. He was known to the German Embassy officials

as a person who stood high in the regard of prominent Germans, notably Herr Ballin, in the confidence of the Kaiser and his Government, and these officials had improved their acquaintance with him while they watched with benevolent interest his negotiations with the Irish-American organisations before the outbreak of war. Casement, therefore, was singularly well suited and equipped, in the new situation created by the war, to enter into further negotiations in the United States with the object of securing the support of Irish-American extremist organisations for the seditious party in Ireland on the one hand, and of invoking the alliance of Germany on the other. He had little difficulty in either direction. The development of events in Ireland had now satisfied the Irish-American organisations that the movement in Ireland justified their strongest possible support. Germany's agents in Washington equally had no hesitation in recommending their Government to support an enterprise which promised at the worst considerable embarrassment for the British Government in Ireland, and, at the best, the creation of that situation, the favourite theme of German naval and military writers, in which Great Britain, engaged in the active defence of her strategic flank upon the Atlantic to the west, would be exposed to opportunity for a decisive thrust across the North Sea under her weakened guard to the east.

From this point onwards, therefore, in the late autumn of 1914, all the resources of the Irish-American extremist organisations in the United States were mobilised with the backing of Germany in support of the seditious movement in Ireland, whose leaders, by virtue of the plenary powers with which they invested Casement, entered into definite relations with Germany and so transformed their movement, which hitherto,

while always anti-British, had not been deliberately and actively aggressive in its somewhat nebulous aims, into a conspiracy with the King's enemies against the security of the Realm. A grandiose scheme of German-Irish propaganda was promptly initiated in the United States under auspices of the *Clan-na-Gael*. That secret society, which was languishing until the outbreak of war, although the first foundation of the Volunteer movement in Southern Ireland has given it an opportunity of recovering something of its decaying prestige, threw itself into the campaign with all the energy which the necessity of re-establishing itself in the good graces of Germany—from whom in part, and in part from members' subscriptions, its funds are drawn—imposed upon it.

The campaign reached its culmination, after much preliminary work conducted through the newspapers, by meetings, and by the wholesale distribution of literature, in August 1915, when the *Clan-na-Gael* received a large grant from Germany on the understanding that the Executive at the same time collected vigorously from its members. A "Defence of Ireland Fund" was started, and a collecting card distributed. The propaganda—encouraged as its authors were by the complaisance of the Washington Government and by the contemptuous refusal of the British Government, in spite of the urgent representation of pro-Ally American newspapers, to take any steps through its Embassy to counteract the influence of the agitation—had by this time become impudently open in its designs. The phraseology of the card distributed on behalf of the "Defence of Ireland Fund" left not the smallest doubt that the object of the Fund was to support an Irish rebellion. The collection achieved a not inconsiderable success, though very much less than its

authors hoped. In March of 1916 when the Irish Race Convention was held in New York, matters were so far advanced that in the final appeal for funds the following words were used:—"Not only must the organisation be made in great numbers, but in material resources it must be put in a position to grapple successfully with the great problem which it has been called into existence to solve, by giving to Ireland the help which she so badly needs in this hour of her great danger and of her opportunity."

Meanwhile, in December 1914, Casement, having laid everything in train in the United States, left New York for Germany, where his presence was desired for the purpose of placing his knowledge of the situation at the disposal of the German Government and of keeping it in closer and more continuous contact and communication with the development of events in Ireland than was possible through the circuitous channel of Washington. In Germany, moreover, Casement proposed to put into practice a project which revealed, for all his extensive and authentic knowledge of Irish conditions, a gross misconception of certain aspects of the mass psychology of Irishmen and of the individual Irish temperament. This project was the formation, from the Irish prisoners of war in the internment camps of Germany, of an "Irish Brigade" which should revive, under the flag of Prussia, the glories of the Brigade which in an earlier century had fought on the same fields of Flanders under the colours of France.

Among the British prisoners captured during the retreat from Mons and in the battle of Ypres-Armentières were a considerable number of Irish soldiers. Between these and other prisoners there was at first no differentiation; but in December, 1914, the Irish prisoners were removed from the

various camps and collected together into a large camp at Limberg. They were so collected for the purpose of listening to lectures and addresses from Casement, who moved about the camp freely, sometimes conversing with the men individually. He introduced himself to them as the organiser of the Irish Volunteers. He stated that he was forming an Irish Brigade, and invited all the Irish prisoners in Germany to join it. He urged that everything was to be gained for Ireland by a German victory. Now was the time to strike a blow for Ireland. Those who joined the Irish Brigade would be sent to Berlin; they would become the guests of the Imperial German Government, and, in the event of Germany's winning a battle at sea, he would land the Brigade in Ireland and defend the country against the English enemy. In the event of Germany's losing the war, either he or the German Government would give every man of the Brigade a bonus of from ten to twenty pounds and a free passage to the United States. Copies of the *Gaelic American* and of two books, "The Crime against Ireland" and "The King, the Kaiser and Ireland," were circulated in the camp. Forms were handed to the prisoners, containing a number of questions, one of which ran:—"Are you willing to fight for your own country, with a view to securing the National freedom of Ireland? With the moral and material assistance of the German Government an Irish Brigade is being formed." A pamphlet was circulated among the prisoners: "Irishmen, here is a chance for you to fight for Ireland. You have fought for England, your country's hereditary enemy. You have fought for Belgium, though it was no more to you than the Fiji Islands. Are you willing to fight for your own country, with a view to securing the National freedom of Ireland? The object of the Irish Brigade shall be to fight

solely in the cause of Ireland, and in no circumsances shall it be directed to the interests of Germany." The pamphlet went on to declare that the Brigade would fight under the Irish flag alone, with a distinctive Irish uniform, and Irish officers. It was further stated that the Irish in America were raising money for the Brigade. The pamphlet concluded " Remember Bachelor's Walk. God Save Ireland."

In a word, every possible means were used to seduce the Irish soldiers from their oath of allegiance and induce them to exchange the miseries of existence in the internment camps for the comfort of life in the Irish Brigade. Subtle appeals were made to their sentiment as Irish Nationalists, to their natural desire as captives to become free men, to their instinctive revolt against the discomfort, the squalor, and the indignity of the prisoner's lot. When other means failed, when persuasion had proved fruitless, coercion was employed instead. With the resort to coercion Casement, it is supposed, was not associated; and he stated at his trial that the rations were reduced among the other prisoners at exactly the same time and to the same extent. Very bad accounts of the subsequent condition of the Irish soldiers appeared, however, in the Press. The test must have been a cruel one; and yet out of two thousand five hundred men, only fifty-two joined the Irish Brigade. Recruiting was continued until February, 1915, when Casement and his friends realised that their efforts were hopeless, and the Irish prisoners were dispersed from Limberg to the camps from which they had been concentrated.

Casement's failure in this enterprise produced a certain coolness and suspicion in his relations with the German Government. It suggested to the Germans that, if his judgment was so completely

at fault in this department of the plan of campaign upon which he had embarked with such assurance, that judgment might equally lead them astray in other aspects of their Irish association. From this point the German Government moved more cautiously and less surely in its attempt to turn the situation in Ireland into profitable account in its prosecution of the war. Casement, however, remained in Germany, and continued to constitute the focus of communication between Berlin, Washington and Dublin.

CHAPTER VI.

ORGANISATION

Once assured of the active support of Germany and the Irish-American extremists, and consequently of ample funds, the rebellious movement in Ireland made, in its military aspect, swift and considerable strides. At the date of the split in the Volunteer organisation in the autumn of 1914, not more than eleven thousand men adhered to the advanced section of the original Provisional Committee. As a military force they were, at this time, altogether negligible. They were untrained and almost entirely unequipped. During 1915, however, the situation completely changed. The funds fom America—whose method of receipt in Ireland the police were unable to trace after the split—were largely expended not only in the maintenance of seditious newspapers and the circulation of seditious leaflets, but also in the employment of organisers whose function it was to travel the country and win people to join the Irish Volunteers, and become in their turn organisers in this direction. Side by side with the propagandist work, conducted through newspapers intended to intensify the feelings and add to the numbers of persons who were anti-British and opposed to recruiting—newspapers which had a hand-to-hand circulation, and could obviously draw a very small measure of support and revenue either from sales or from advertisements—the work of military organisation proceeded actively. Eight organisers were employed at a salary of £150 a year, and in addition the leaders paid from time to time personal visits to the districts where the movement

had made good progress. The organisers, travelling the country, accepted invitations from sympathisers in the various counties, or, in districts where the Irish Volunteers had at present few adherents, explored the situation on their own account. Meetings, conducted on the lines of Army recruiting meetings, were held, and the objects of the Volunteers were explained. These meetings, organised everywhere throughout the three Southern Provinces, and in some parts of Ulster, even when they secured few recruits for the Volunteers, had the negative result of bringing recruiting for the Army virtually to a standstill. A subtle atmosphere of disaffection spread through the country and, where it did not issue in active support for the Volunteers, at least disarmed opposition to the work of the organisers. At the meetings persons were enrolled, and the establishment of the branch was reported to the headquarters in Dublin, which kept in close and continuous communication with it. The members were drilled by the organiser, and were urged to extend the movement among their friends. Women's societies were formed, and members were trained for first-aid work.

James Connolly's Citizen Army, with its headquarters in Dublin, was an organisation at the outset wholly independent of, and indeed hostile to, the Irish Volunteers. The ideals of the two bodies were fundamentally alien and opposed. On the one hand, the Irish Volunteers stood for the doctrine of nationality in its most extreme expression. On the other hand, the Citizen Army stood for those doctrines of international Syndicalism which James Larkin had for the first time introduced into the unreceptive soil of Ireland. The principles upon which the one body was established were wholly political; the principles upon which the other was established were

largely social. There was thus a certain antithesis between the two organisations, though, as we have seen in our study of Connolly, it was an antithesis by no means complete. They had, however, this point in common—that both represented the forces of revolutionary change as opposed to the forces of order, the one objecting to the existing system on the score of politics, the other objecting to the existing system on the score of economics. The forces of revolution, however divided in their aims and ideals among themselves, were not so strong that, if they could find any basis of common action, they could afford to neglect the advantages of acting in harmony and not in discord. Upon this basis of a community of purpose which consisted in opposition to the settled order of things, therefore, the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army founded a working alliance. They were brought together by the fact that the leaders of the Irish Republican Brotherhood—the revolutionary secret society which had persisted since the Fenian days—were known both to the leaders of the Irish Volunteers and the leaders of the Citizen Army, notably James Connolly and the Countess Marcievicz. When an identity of interest and purpose was established between the Irish Republican Brotherhood and *Sinn Fein*, the leaders of the former represented to the labour leaders that the prospects of overthrowing the existing *régime* would be improved by a fusion of the military instruments of revolutionary ideas represented by the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army.

Thus there was introduced the novel feature in Irish rebellions of an element not purely national, but largely international, and in some respects opposed to the doctrines which the prime movers in this rebellion, in common with all earlier rebellions, asserted. The unexpected alliance

between extreme Nationalism and labour internationalism—an alliance as surprising as the alliance between *Sinn Fein* and Germany—brought comparatively small profit to the revolutionary movement in point of numbers; for the Citizen Army had no effective existence outside Dublin, and in the capital its adherents were numbered by hundreds while those of the Irish Volunteers were numbered by thousands. It exerted, however, a very considerable influence in point of personality. While the two organisations were kept distinct, though they interchanged instructors and arms, the supreme direction of the rebel movement now became completely united, and in the rebel councils the dynamic personality of Connolly acquired a dominant influence, urging his colleagues into violent courses, and supplying a powerful moral impulse to the whole movement.

In the ranks of the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army were to be found a small, but very valuable, proportion of old soldiers, some of them Irish-Americans who had seen service in the United States Army. These toured the country, improving the elementary instruction given to the branches by the organisers and imparting their knowledge to those members who had proved themselves most competent and received the most advanced training before the rupture from the National Volunteers, when the percentage of old soldiers and other skilled instructors in the Volunteer ranks had been considerable. These men thus trained carried on the work of instruction and drilling in the branches. The subordinate officers were in the majority of cases men of some education and alert mind, who gave close attention to their duties, studied infantry training manuals, and rapidly became competent commanders. Excellent military articles, moreover, were contributed every week to the journal of the organisa-

tion, the *Irish Volunteer*, giving instructions as to street and hedge fighting and the digging of trenches. The most conspicuous defect in the military organisation of the Volunteers was the lack of efficient staff work, but in this department the resources of Germany were called in aid, and voluminous *memoranda* on the higher direction of affairs reached the headquarters through various channels from Washington and Berlin.

By the end of nearly eighteen months' hard and constant work, from the date of the separate foundation of the Irish Volunteers in the autumn of 1914 to the date of the outbreak of the Rebellion in the spring of 1916, the work of military organisation was very complete and the members of the association were well trained. They practised rifle shooting, largely at miniature ranges, assiduously. Efficiency in this regard was stimulated by the competitions conducted by the *Irish Volunteer*, which offered rifles as prizes for marksmanship. Officers' training schools were established, and drilling was carried on without intermission. As the year 1915 advanced, manœuvres were frequently and openly held by the Volunteers in the country. In October of that year the Citizen Army rehearsed at night in Dublin operations in which the capture of Dublin Castle was the most conspicuous feature. The two revolutionary bodies disposed, in the spring of 1916, of a military force which in point of numbers, organisation, and training, was efficient and formidable.

The chief weakness of this force—the weakness which for a considerable time influenced the Irish Government most strongly in its decision not to proceed to extreme measures against the seditious organisation—consisted in the deficiency of its armament. At the time of the split in the Volunteers they were, as a whole, very inadequately supplied with arms, and the advanced section

which seceded from the main body was the worst equipped in this respect. Up to the outbreak of the war wide facilities existed for the procuring and carrying of arms in Ireland. In 1906, when the Liberal Government came into power, the Peace Preservation Act, commonly known as the Arms Act, was repealed. At that time the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary recorded a strong protest against the abandonment of the measure. In his report upon its lapse he suggested the extension of the Pistols Act of 1903 to Ireland, as its restrictions, though small, would be some safeguard against the purchase of revolvers for improper purposes. The report pointed out that the lapse of the Peace Preservation Act would result in the general formation of rifle clubs, and suggested a closer supervision of the vendors of arms and explosives, that some direct obligation should be placed upon them to see that the persons to whom they sold explosives were duly certificated, and that they should be required to register their sales. Some time after the outbreak of the war the precautions embodied in these recommendations were made obligatory, when they were brought within the scope of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.

The application of more extensive precautions, or even the rigid enforcement of these precautions, were made very difficult, if not impossible, for the military and police authorities, by the legacy which persisted after the outbreak of war of the Government's general policy towards Ireland before it. The hands of the authorities were tied by the attitude of the Government which had given tacit consent to the revival of the physical force doctrine in the case of the Ulster Volunteers, and had logically acquiesced in the formation of a rival organisation on the Nationalist side and the turning of Ireland into an arsenal. They were tied,

particularly, by the ruling of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of the landing of arms at Howth just before the outbreak of war that the attempt made to deprive the National Volunteers of arms surreptitiously landed for their use was illegal. By the end of 1914, however, it was recognised that the Irish Volunteer organisation, in the *personnel* of the Committee, its declaration of policy, the utterances of its leading representatives in the Press and at public meetings, its opposition to the efforts of Mr. Redmond and the Nationalist Parliamentary Party to bring Ireland into line with Great Britain in the war, and its crusade against enlistment into the Army, had shown itself to be a potential danger to the British power in Ireland. It was further recognised that it must be treated on different terms from the other Volunteer bodies in Ireland, and henceforth the proceedings of the organisation were carefully watched.

The policy of not allowing Government servants to belong to it was consistently followed, and where membership had been found to continue after warning had been given dismissal followed. Persons were dismissed from the Post Office, the Inland Revenue, the Ordnance Survey and Ordnance Stores, and other Government departments. Considerable numbers whose association with the Irish Volunteers could not be proved, however, remained in the Government's employment. In the case of priests assisting the Volunteers in any public way representations were made to the higher ecclesiastical authority. The priests in general discountenanced the movement, but some of the younger clergy in certain districts prominently identified themselves with it, and publicly delivered violent speeches in its support. Action against seditious newspapers was taken during the winter of 1914, but during the following year

they reappeared under different names, and, though the question of their suppression was from time to time considered by the Irish Government, their activity proceeded with few checks during the year, and continued with ever increasing licence up to the date of the outbreak in April, 1916.

In dealing with the movement in its military aspect the military and police authorities were hampered, in the same way as they were hampered in dealing with it in its propagandist aspect, by the *vis inertiæ* of the Irish Government. Mr. Birrell, in announcing his resignation of the office of Chief Secetary in the House of Commons, admitted that he had formed an incorrect estimate of the danger of the seditious movement. The responsibility of the Irish Government for permitting it to attain such formidable dimensions was, indeed, incapable of evasion; but it may be conceded that the Irish Government suffered under certain disabilities. An amendment to the Defence of the Realm Act had deleted the provision whereby offences under it could be tried by court-martial. In the atmosphere which the seditious propaganda had engendered in Ireland, neither benches of magistrates nor juries could not be trusted to try these cases. Obvious miscarriages of justice occurred in Dublin, Cork and elsewhere. It was necessary, therefore, to bring such cases before stipendary magistrates, and these had no power, however serious the offence, to impose more than the *maximum* punishment of six months' hard labour, which did not prove an adequate deterrent. In July 1915, four of the Volunteers' organising instructors were so tried and sentenced, one to four and others to three months imprisonment, and were ordered, under the power conferred on the authorities by the Defence of the Realm Act, to leave Ireland; but they were told

that at the expiration of their sentences the order would not be enforced unless their conduct was unsatisfactory, Two of them were deported, and their deportation was followed by somewhat violent demonstrations in Dublin. One of these men, Mellowes by name, subsequently returned, and led the insurrection in Galway.

The general attitude of the Irish Government, however, was that the movement was not capable of becoming dangerous unless its members were armed. That Government expressed itself, in its subsequent *apologia* through the mouth of Mr. Birrell and his subordinates, as considering it of primary importance to prevent the Irish Volunteers from becoming a military danger and to place every obstacle in the way of arms and ammunition getting into their hands. But no steps were taken to make even this policy thoroughly effective. It was not until late in 1915 that the importation of arms and ammunition into Ireland was absolutely prohibited. Up to this time they were freely imported, subject to the precautions recommended by the Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary and detailed above, for the use of Volunteer bodies other than the Irish Volunteers, and the military and police authorities had to endeavour to discriminate as best they could against consignments which they thought were ultimately intended for the seditious organisation, being always compelled to apply for sanction to the civil authorities, and being at every turn frustrated in their efforts by the standing instructions of those authorities that they must avoid wherever possible any action at all likely to provoke an open conflict with the Volunteers. In these circumstances it was impossible to prevent a somewhat extensive leakage. English manufacturers had been importing freely into Ireland for some time after the outbreak of war,

and even after importation was forbidden owing to the action of the Customs examiners it was not practicable to stop forbidden goods from getting through. As late as April 16th, 1916, a case of bayonets was detected by the police on the way from a Sheffield cutler to a *Sinn Fein* manager of what was believed to be a loyalist firm.

The Irish Volunteers employed other methods besides smuggling of this kind for obtaining possession of arms and ammunition. Revolvers and pistols, to a number known to be much in excess of that on record, were brought into Ireland in passengers' luggage and otherwise. There were extensive thefts of rifles consigned to the National Volunteers. In one case in August, 1915, a hundred rifles consigned to them, which came in openly with the permission of the Government, were stolen from the railway company, probably with the connivance of one of the company's employees; these rifles were taken away about two o'clock in the morning, and apparently removed in a motor car. There were defections throughout 1915 from the National Volunteers to the Irish Volunteers, and in this way also a number of rifles consigned to the former eventually found their way to the latter. Further, there were thefts of rifles from the military which amounted in the aggregate to a considerable number. In addition, rifles were purchased from soldiers on leave. It was known to the authorities that there had been at least one considerable theft of military ammunition and also that the rounds carried by soldiers were being purchased. Finally, man-killing ammunition for minature rifles and shot guns, as well as bombs, were manufactured in various secret arsenals. Offences connected with thefts of explosives and the manufacture of bombs occurred in Enniscorthy in Co. Wexford, in Sligo, in Co. Galway, at Cork, and in Castlebellingham in Co.

Louth, as well as in Lanarkshire in Scotland, at different dates in 1915. Searches made from time to time in Dublin and the provinces, however, had revealed no considerable store either of arms or ammunition, and the authorities were led to believe that there was no great supply of ammunition in the hands of the Volunteers—an impression which was, as the event proved, entirely erroneous.

In January 1916, the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who had throughout taken a much more serious view of the situation than the Irish Government, drew the attention of the Chief Secretary to the public danger that arose from the fact that extremists were believed to be getting possession of explosives, and urged the necessity for more rigid regulations in Ireland against their unauthorised possession. He also stated that he considered it deserving of consideration (*a*) Whether the time had not now come to put some limit to the carrying of rifles, shot guns and revolvers by persons who would be likely to abuse the privilege; (*b*) whether all persons not connected with the forces of the Crown should not be obliged to get a military permit to carry rifles and revolvers, and whether a similar permit should not be necessary for training in drill or in the use of firearms. Some time later—only a short time, in fact, before the outbreak of the Rebellion in April—the Attorney-General for Ireland submitted to the Chief Secretary a minute to this effect: "I can conceive nothing more dangerous or mischievous than to allow at this time any person to parade in public carrying rifles, bayonets, or arms of any description which can be identified as military service weapons, the property of His Majesty. In my opinion ample machinery exists for dealing with such cases, as possession is *primâ facie* unlawful, and they can only have been

acquired by those in possession of them in one or other of the following ways: by direct theft from a soldier, by being purchased from a soldier, or by direct theft from the stores, or by sale or gift by the persons in charge of the stores. All these methods are unlawful, and the persons in possession can be proceeded against my several different methods." The Attorney-General recommended that proceedings should be taken under Regulation No. 2 of the Defence of the Realm Act, a regulation expressly framed for the emergency of war. "It is true," the minute proceeded, "that the seizure must be necessary for securing the public peace or the Defence of the Realm; but I can hardly conceive any circumstances under which it would be more necessary for each of these purposes to direct the seizure than in the cases under consideration where any arms are in possession of persons notoriously disaffected, and have been stolen or otherwise improperly or unlawfully acquired from persons entrusted with them for the defence of the Realm. In any case, I should leave it to the persons found in unlawful possession to challenge the seizure, on the ground that no such necessity existed." The Chief Secretary, however, adhered to the view that, while no definite evidence existed of the association of the seditious organisation with the enemy, an armed insurrection was improbable, though bomb outrages were not unlikely, and that any attempt to suppress and disarm the organisation would provoke a rising which might otherwise be avoided.

Thus, in the spring of 1916, the rebel military force was ready for action. It numbered in the whole of Ireland some sixteen thousand men, of whom about three thousand were in Dublin, and the remainder distributed throughout the branches in all the southern provinces and in the southern counties of Ulster, with the chief strength

in the provinces concentrated in the counties of Cork, Wexford and Galway. The disproportion between the rebels' numbers and their armament was marked. Shortly before the rising it was estimated by the military and police authorities that there were rather more than a thousand rifles and a number of shot guns, revolvers and pistols in Dublin, and rather less than two thousand rifles and a number of other firearms in the provinces. The number of rifles, especially in Dublin, was subsequently found to have been somewhat under-estimated. The rebels in Dublin, besides, brought into action three machine guns, their possession of which was not suspected by the authorities. Their store of ammunition was similarly under-estimated. Bullets were expended freely by the rebels in Dublin, and after the surrender three hundred and sixty-five thousand rounds were captured. The rebel ammunition, as was to be expected from the circumstances in which it was collected and produced, was of a highly varied character. Some of that used by the rebels in the fighting in Dublin was of a terrible nature, including flat-nosed bullets and split bullets, and reverse bullets were also found. Buck-shot, slugs and bombs made out of workmen's cans were employed in addition. The proportion of home-made to service and foreign ammunition was considerable. The rebels, therefore, in respect of arms and especially of ammunition, were by no means ill-equipped. Their armament was, however, inadequate to the numbers of which, given an ample supply of arms, they could dispose. It was insufficient to supply a general rising throughout the country, and this deficiency was destined to prove a factor of capital importance in both the conception and execution of the rebel plans.

CHAPTER VII.

THE REBEL PLANS

The military plans of the rebels were concerted in close association with the agents of Germany. In their perfection, as in all earlier parts of the negotiations, the *entourage* of the German Embassy at Washington played a conspicuous part. Plans of Dublin and maps of various Irish districts discovered after the rising bore internal evidences of German draughtsmanship. There was immediately after the Rebellion, owing to causes which will appear in a later chapter, a widespread tendency exhibited in the Press of the United Kingdom to belittle the gravity of the Rebellion in its purely military aspect. The Rebellion of 1916 was, in fact, the best conceived and, up to a certain point, the best executed in the whole history of Irish risings. But for a series of accidents, it might easily have confronted not Ireland alone, but the whole Kingdom, with the gravest menace that it had so far encountered in the great war. It is true that the Rebellion was the work of a minority, even a small minority. It is also true that there existed outside that small minority a larger minority in which the movement was capable of arousing a latent sympathy; that in Ireland, of all countries in Europe, nothing succeeds like success; and that such a measure of success as the rebel plans contemplated would infallibly have attracted support outside of the actively seditious organisations. This measure of success the rebel leaders had a right to expect; for their plans, concerted with Germany's agents, displayed a strategic instinct of a high order.

Even if the possibility of an accession to the numerical strength of the rebels is left out of account, the armed action in Ireland of the numbers of which the seditious organisations disposed constituted in itself, when that strategic significance of Ireland in relation to the war which has already been discussed is borne in mind, a formidable menace to the security of the State at war.

Thanks to the chapter of accidents which interposed, those numbers did not actually take the field against the forces of the Crown. The Irish Volunteers had branches throughout every part of the three southern provinces and in some districts of Ulster. The rebel plans proposed, accordingly, that the rising should be general and simultaneous throughout the country. Had those plans been carried fully into execution the history of the Rebellion in its military aspect would have been very different, and certainly would not have been comprised, as it was in fact comprised, within the brief period of one week. Everything turned upon the success of the rising in the provinces, and it was no fault of the rebel leaders that the provincial rising issued in failure. The rebel plans proposed the seizure by a surprise stroke of the capital—the Government buildings, the strategic approaches to the city, the nodal points of communication, physical and other—and in this it was largely successful at the outset. This seizure of the capital city of Ireland, however—the only part of the scheme of operations which was put fully into execution—was only one element in that scheme, and it depended for its ultimate success upon other factors. It required a larger rebel force than was immediately available, and it required that while this larger force was being concentrated the forces of the Crown should be prevented from a rapid and effectual

intervention. The concentration of this larger force in turn depended on such a general rising throughout the country as would not merely put the Irish provinces largely in rebel hands, but would also enable surplus rebel troops to be available for the reinforcement of the bodies holding Dublin.

In both its offensive and its defensive aspects the success of this scheme required the active co-operation of Germany. Despite months of secret preparation, no adequate provision existed in the country for the extensive arming of rebel forces which the leaders' plans presumed. All their men were trained to some extent in the use of arms; but for a very considerable proportion of these men no arms were ready to hand. This deficiency was to be supplied from overseas. It was the function of the Casement expedition which subsequently sailed from Wilhelmshaven for the west coast of Ireland to supply it. So far as operations in Ireland itself were concerned, arms were the essential requirement of the rebels upon Germany. They would have been assisted, and were to have been assisted, by the simultaneous landing in Ireland of a small force—a couple of battalions with the "Irish Brigade" as their nucleus—of German troops. Such a force operating under mobile conditions in the hills of Kerry would have diverted to that remote region, if only for the reason that its appearance on Irish soil would have exercised a profound moral influence upon the British public, a much larger body of British troops. But arms, and not men, were the essential requirement of the rebels. Elaborate arrangements had been made for the rapid and systematic distribution throughout the South and West of Ireland of the arms which the Casement expedition was to land on the coast of Kerry near Tralee on the morning of Good Friday, April 21st.

With the landing of those arms and their dis-

tribution the chosen moment would have arrived for the full development of concerted operations by the rebels and the naval and military forces of Germany. The capital city and districts at once extensive and scattered in the Irish provinces would have been in rebel hands. The forces of the Crown present in Ireland would have been altogether inadequate to engage with them with any prospect of success; for the considered policy of the military authorities, so far as their advisers in the civil Irish Government had led them to envisage at all the emergency of an Irish rising, was not to augment the military garrison in Ireland, but to hold forces available in Great Britain for rapid despatch to that country should occasion for their employment ever arise. Such a general rising as the rebel plans contemplated, however, would have made a draft on the strength of the British home defence forces far in excess of the modest provision which the military authorities had ear-marked for Irish purposes, rather as a measure of precaution than with any serious expectation that an emergency would require the use of any considerable scale of British troops in Ireland. Certainly the Irish Government had never given the War Office any reason to apprehend that forces would be required to deal with such a situation as would have arisen in Ireland if the rebel plans had attained their full fruition. In the situation which the rebel plans presumed military forces from Great Britain would have been engaged throughout Ireland in operations which, alike from the necessity that the rebellion should be rapidly suppressed and from the scope and diversity of the scenes of action, would have involved the employment of a strength so large as possibly to compromise very seriously that secure defence of Great Britain against invasion which it was the function of the home defence forces to

guarantee. The transport and supply of the forces engaged in Ireland would have required simultaneously for their protection against submarine attack a considerable proportion of the British naval flotillas. The diversion to this service of a class of vessels in which the British margin of superiority was never excessive would have impaired gravely the capacity of the flotillas to discharge in the North Sea area their prime function of observing the movements of the enemy's naval forces and the screening the movements of the Grand Fleet.

On land and by sea alike, therefore, a rising general throughout Ireland—possibly assisted by the landing in Ireland of such a small German force as might hope in its passage under neutral colours to elude the vigilance of the British naval patrol—would have weakened very appreciably the forces available for the protection of Great Britain against invasion. Of this situation the Germans would then have taken advantage to deliver, by a combined operation, a stroke against the East Coast of Great Britain in the most favourable circumstances which could arise for throwing ashore an invading army or, at least, a raiding force in considerable strength.

All that, in fact, emerged into actuality in the concerted plan of campaign in so far as it involved the co-operation of the naval and military forces of Germany was the hasty and ineffective raid which on Wednesday, April 26th—two days after the outbreak in Ireland, when the movement of troops to Ireland was in full process of development—was made by a squadron of fast German cruisers upon Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth. It was already apparent by this time that the Rebellion in Ireland was doomed to early collapse, and it is unlikely that this raid was intended to be the first phase in a series of grand operations

designed for the invasion of England, or that it had any more serious purpose than to contribute to that temporary demoralisation of British public opinion which, in the German view, the Irish Rebellion would induce. Its undertaking, however, after a very prolonged period of inaction by the German naval forces since the encounter off the Dogger Bank in January 1915 had shown that the policy of raids was at once expensive and unprofitable, supplies corroborative evidence that in the plans concerted between the rebels and Germany the active co-operation of Germany by action across the North Sea was contemplated. Had those plans not miscarried there would have arisen that situation which German military writers have openly discussed in their consideration of the prospects in an Anglo-German or general European war. Great Britain would have had to contemplate the fact, or at least the imminent peril, of invasion from the east with all the embarrassment, the confusion, and the dissipation of strength involved in the exposure of her strategic flank upon the Atlantic in the west.

It will be obvious from the foregoing considerations that the factor of capital importance in the German-rebel plan of campaign was the landing in Ireland of a great quantity of arms and ammunition. Without that landing there could be no wholesale arming of that very considerable proportion of the rebel forces which was at present unequipped. Without such a wholesale arming there could be no general rising throughout the country. Without such a general rising there could be no very large diversion to Ireland of military and naval forces. Without such a very large diversion of those forces to Ireland there could be no favourable opportunity for a German stroke by a combined operation at the East Coast of Great Britain

The success of the grandiose scheme concerted between Germany and the rebels; the gathering of the fruits of long months of intrigue in Berlin, in Washington and in Dublin; the creation of the supreme opportunity in the war for the defeat of Great Britain, depended wholly, in the ultimate analysis, upon the running, in a lonely spot upon the West Coast of Ireland, of a cargo of arms. The history of the Irish Rebellion of 1916 provides another instance of the ridiculously trivial incidents upon which the destiny of Empires so often turns. As in the great war in its wider issues the crucial moment, decisive of the final issue of the campaigns despite all their subsequent vicissitudes, is to be discovered in the battle of the Marne—it might almost be said in the fleet of taxi-cabs whose employment for transport purposes secured that Allied victory—so in this Irish Rebellion which was an integral incident in the great war the crucial moment, decisive of its final issue, is to be discovered in the interception of the arms ship which was to have landed its cargo, with Sir Roger Casement, on the coast of Kerry upon the morning of Good Friday.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EVE OF REBELLION

The expedition upon which so much depended left Wilhelmshaven on April 12th. On the preceding day Casement had been embarked in a submarine with two companions. One of these was a man named Bailey, a private of the Royal Irish Rifles, who, rejoining as a reservist on the outbreak of the war, went out with the first Expeditionary Force and was taken prisoner during the retreat from Mons in September 1914. With other Irish prisoners he was interned in the camp at Limberg, where, in the spring of 1915, he responded to Casement's appeal for recruits for the "Irish Brigade," in which he was given the rank of sergeant. Towards the end of March 1916 he was sent to Berlin to a school of instruction in the use of explosives. In this place he had as a fellow-student the same Monteith who had earlier been employed in Ireland as an organiser of the Volunteers. These two men sailed with Casement from Wilhelmshaven in the submarine. In company with the submarine there sailed a captured Wilson liner, rechristened the *Aud*.

This vessel was disguised as a timber ship, with a forged manifest of such a cargo, and flew the Norwegian flag; the Norwegian colours were also painted on her sides. She carried a concealed cargo of twenty thousand rifles, ten machine guns, a million rounds of ammunition and a considerable quantity of explosive and fire bombs. A slight accident to the submarine immediately after starting compelled her to put into Heligoland for repairs. The expedition restarted before dawn

on the 19th April. Hugging the Danish and Norwegian coast closely, it proceeded to make the north-about passage by way of the Shetland Islands. North of the Shetlands the *Aud* was challenged by a patrol cruiser, but was permitted to proceed.

The expedition arrived off the south-west coast of Ireland during the night of April 20th-21st, by which time the authorities were fully advised of its pending appearance. The three passengers in the submarine, Casement, Bailey and Monteith, were put off in a collapsible boat to land on the sands of Ardfert about 2 o'clock on the morning of Good Friday. It was very rough weather and the boat capsized in the surf. The three men, however, were able to wade ashore. They recovered from their swamped boat three Mauser pistols, ammunition, a flash lamp, maps and a large green Irish flag, and buried these articles on the strand. Monteith and Bailey proceeded to Tralee to meet the local leader of the Volunteers, while Casement remained near the place of landing in a *rath* known as MacKenna's Fort. From Tralee, although the police were on the watch for the conspirators, Monteith disappeared, and, after remaining in hiding during the period of the rebellion, subsequently made good his escape from Ireland.

This incident provided a curious instance of the manner in which the rebellions of 1798 and 1916, while they differed widely in essentials, bore marked resemblance in point of detail. In 1798 Wolfe Tone, like Casement in 1916, negotiated with the enemies of Great Britain in time of war, and, like Casement, he approached the shores of Ireland in an enemy ship, hoping to help a rebellion. Tone, like Casement, was accompanied by two other rebel agents, and in his case, as in that of Casement, one of these companions eluded

observation and escaped. It is not often that history repeats itself in details so minute.

From Tralee Bailey returned to the *rath* near Ardfert, and here he and Casement were arrested. Upon Casement was found a code consisting of such contemplated messages as the following:— "Wait further instructions," "Wait further opportunity," "Send agent at once," "Please answer by cablegram," "Railway communications have been stopped," "Further ammunition is needed," "How many rifles will you send us?" "Will you send plans about landing?" "Cannons with plenty of ammunition are needed," "Send more explosives," "Send a vessel if possible." These were the contemplated communications required to develop the situation in Ireland. Casement and Bailey, after their examination at Ardfert, were at once removed with all possible secrecy to Dublin, whence they were promptly forwarded to London, and there lodged in the Tower to await their trial for high treason.

On June 29th Casement was found guilty and sentenced to death, after making an eloquent and impassioned speech from the dock which will be found elsewhere in this volume.* Against Bailey, in consideration of the fact that he joined the Irish Brigade only in order to escape from Germany, the Crown entered a *nolle prosequi*, and he was discharged. The conviction of Casement was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal, and, despite numerous petitions for his reprieve, he was hanged in Pentonville on August 3rd.

Meanwhile the *Aud*, with her cargo of arms,

* Appendix C. It should be mentioned here that, after Casement's arrest, there grew up in Ireland a legend that his mission was not to assist, but to stop, the Rebellion. A statement to this effect was attributed to Casement himself; but no such plea was urged in his defence at the trial.

after lying at anchor inshore while the Casement party were being disembarked from the submarine, proceeded in the early morning of Good Friday under slow steam for Fenit, near Tralee, where her cargo was to be discharged by night. *En route* she was overhauled and challenged by His Majesty's sloop *Bluebell*, patrolling the Kerry coast. The *Bluebell* hoisted a signal demanding the suspicious vessel's name and destination. The vessel replied that she was the *Aud* of Bergen for Genoa. The captain of the *Bluebell* ordered her to follow into harbour. As the *Aud* remained without moving when the *Bluebell* went ahead a shot was fired across her bows, and she then signalled "What am I to do?" and was again ordered to follow. This she did without further trouble until the following morning, when the two vessels in company were off Queenstown. Near the Daunt Rock Lightship the *Bluebell* headed for harbour, but the *Aud* stopped. The *Bluebell* then went back about a cable's length and saw a small cloud of white smoke issuing from the after-hold. At the same time the *Aud* broke the German naval ensign from the mast, and two boats were launched, one from each side. The *Aud's* crew, realising that their attempt had failed, and wishing to save their cargo from capture by the British, had scuttled their ship. The *Bluebell* went round across the bows and picked up the occupants of two boats, who had hoisted a flag of truce. They were found to be three officers and twenty men of the German Navy, and were taken prisoners. The *Aud* sank in twenty fathoms of water almost immediately afterwards. So ended ingloriously the expedition on whose successful mission depended the realisation of all the larger hopes which Germany and her confederates in Ireland and the United States had based upon the Rebellion.

Until this event occurred the Irish Government had no definite evidence of association between the seditious organisations in Ireland and the German Government. The Casement expedition, however, satisfied its members that such association existed, and that the situation in Ireland was further advanced and very much more dangerous than they had hitherto believed. They realised that the landing of the arms was to have been the signal for the rising; that, in spite of the miscarriage of the expedition, the rebel leaders might nevertheless decide to strike; and that the time for action against them had come. A meeting of the Irish Executive, attended by the Lord Lieutenant, Lord Wimborne, the Under Secretary, Sir Mathew Nathan, and military officers representing Major-General Friend, Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in Ireland, who was away in London on leave, was held on Saturday, April 22nd, as soon as the news of the interception of the Casement expedition was received at Dublin Castle. It was finally decided to raid the rebel headquarters, to arrest all the leaders, and to seize any stores of arms which could be found. Warrants for the arrests and authority for the other operations were signed by the Lord Lieutenant. It was appreciated, however, that the execution of these steps was likely to involve some fighting. An overwhelming display of force was desirable. Time was required to concentrate troops. It was agreed, therefore, to postpone action until later in Easter week.

It is probable that this decision of the Irish Executive almost immediately came to the knowledge of the rebel leaders, whose intelligence department, thanks largely to the fact that the Government offices were full of their sympathisers, was at all times singularly well-informed. By this channel also the rebel headquarters is likely

to have received its first intelligence of the interception of the Casement expedition. The leaders in Dublin had despatched to Kerry in a motor-car three agents who were to meet Casement, attend the disembarkation of the arms, supervise the first stages of their distribution through the southern and western counties, and subsequently report in person at headquarters. An accident which befell this motor-car party was not without a serious effect on the rebel plans. Upon its arrival in Kerry the party gathered some information of the fate of the expedition, and, without waiting to make other arrangements for the transmission of the news to Dublin, started back at breakneck speed to report. Driving furiously in the dark, the party pitched over the side of the road into one of the long and narrow arms of the sea which penetrate inland from the coast of Kerry, and all the occupants of the motor-car, with the exception of the chauffeur, were killed. News of the interception of the Casement expedition, therefore, reached somewhat belatedly the rebel headquarters, in anxious session in Dublin awaiting the information of its arrival which would enable them to complete their pre-arranged plans for the Rebellion and issue the orders for their execution.

The report of the expedition's miscarriage, arriving almost on the eve of Easter Monday, produced in the rebel council of war a sharp division of opinion. A large section of the leaders argued strongly against the insurrection. They urged, we may suppose, that, with the miscarriage of the Casement expedition, the basis on which the whole plan of campaign reposed had been swept away. There was no hope of a successful rising in the provinces in default of the necessary arms. There was no hope of preventing a rapid concentration in great strength of British troops upon Dublin, where

the rebel strength immediately available would be inadequate to hold out long enough to give opportunity for favourable developments in the country. Germany, realising that the plans in Ireland had gone awry, would make no serious effort to fulfil her share in the contract by a combined operation against the East Coast of Great Britain. They declined to believe the report that the Irish Government had decided to suppress the organisation by force of arms, and argued from the past record of that Government that, if no overt action was now taken by the Volunteers, the authorities would continue to refrain from forcible measures. They recalled the issue, towards the end of March, of the manifesto by the council of the Irish Volunteers.* From the refusal of the Irish Government a month earlier to take action upon this public challenge, the *Sinn Fein* section of the rebel leaders argued that the Government would not now attempt to disarm the Volunteers or to enforce any other measure which, as it had been warned, would involve a collision in arms between the Volunteers and the forces of the Crown. On all these counts they urged that, since with the miscarriage of the Casement expedition favourable opportunity for the Rebellion was gone, the leaders should hold their hand and await the possible development of another occasion.

Upon the other hand, another section of the leaders, and especially, as is believed, the labour element, urged immediate action. We may conceive them, with all the eloquence and passion at their command, as arguing, in the first place, that the miscarriage of the Casement expedition did not demolish the basis of the plan of campaign so completely as the other side represented. A rising, even if not upon the general scale contemplated in that plan, was still possible. It

* See Chap. III.

should still attain a considerable measure of success. If it did, the country would rally round Republic, and Germany might still find opportunity to play her allotted part. In a word, the probable development of events in the new situation was an open question, and they were justified in putting their fortunes to the test. In the next place, if they did not take the offensive in the circumstances, granted even that those circumstances were less favourable than they had anticipated, in which they found themselves, they would be forced to defensive action in circumstances much less favourable. The Casement expedition must convince the Irish Government that a definite association existed between the Volunteers and Germany, and that Government would certainly proceed as soon as it could to the forcible suppression of the organisation. At the moment, however, it was not in a position to do so. The Chief Secretary and Major-General Friend, the General Officer Commanding the Forces in Ireland, were both away in England, and troops were not immediately available. After the interception of the Casement expedition the authorities would probably believe that a rising need not be apprehended. In a few days, however, the situation would be completely changed. Troops would be concentrated upon Dublin, and the measures of suppression upon which the Government had decided would be put into force. In a word, it was a question of striking at once or not being able to strike at all. It was better in any case, this section of the leaders urged, to strike for the liberties of Ireland, whatever the result, than to permit the movement to expire in impotence.

The exact issue of this discussion at the rebel council on Saturday, April 22nd, is doubtful. One of two things happened. Either the leaders suspended their final decision until the following

day, or reached a tentative and inconclusive decision which was capable of being misinterpreted, or was wilfully misinterpreted, by that section of the council which was strongly opposed to immediate insurrection. In either case a development of capital importance now occurred. In preparation for the rising, it had been arranged that the Volunteers were to assemble on Easter Sunday for manœuvres, in which all the branches of the organisation throughout Ireland were to take part. This mobilisation of the rebel forces—for such, in fact, it was intended to be—was suddenly cancelled by the following order signed by John MacNeill on Saturday night, and published in the next day's Sunday papers:—"Owing to the very critical position, all orders given to Irish Volunteers for to-morrow, Easter Sunday, are hereby rescinded, and no parades, marches, or other movements of Irish Volunteers will take place. Each individual Volunteer will obey this order strictly in every particular."

If, by the issue of this order, MacNeill hoped and intended to force the hands of his colleagues in the rebel council and compel them to abstain from immediate action, he was not successful in his purpose. Another meeting of the leaders was held on Sunday, April 23rd. It was now recognised that the plans for a general and simultaneous rising, already impaired by the miscarriage of the Casement expedition, had gone altogether by the board with the issue of MacNeill's order. It was now too late to attempt to cancel this order or confirm the original orders without creating the utmost confusion. The rebel council seems to have been inclined to submit to the logic of events and abandon the whole enterprise; but the elements which threw their influence in this direction were finally overborne by the impetuous labour element. The arguments which it had advanced on the

previous day were presumably recapitulated. The contemplated provincial rising could not now take place simultaneously with the rising in Dublin; but, given success in Dublin, the provincial bodies of Volunteers would quickly fall into line. MacNeill's order cancelling the Easter manœuvres, if it had gravely deranged the plans, had at least this good result—that it would improve the chances of the rising in Dublin by throwing the authorities completely off their guard. The authorities would assume that, after the interception of the Casement expedition, the enterprise had been abandoned by the leaders, and would take no precautions against an outbreak the following day, Easter Monday. The line of argument at the rebel council which attributed this attitude to the authorities was, as the event proved, abundantly justified; they were thrown completely off their guard, and took no precautions. Finally the argument of the labour element prevailed, and, by a small majority, the council of the rebel leaders decided upon immediate action.

The first of the orders necessary to make this decision operative was so worded as to confirm the impression which it was calculated the issue of MacNeill's order would have produced upon the authorities. A "Dublin Brigade Order," dated Headquarters, April 23rd, was published in the following terms:—"(1) As publicly announced, the inspection and manœuvres ordered for this day are cancelled. (2) All Volunteers are to stay in Dublin until further orders." This was signed by Thomas MacDonagh, Commandant, and countersigned by Edward de Valera. It was not until early on the morning of Easter Monday, April 24th, that the fateful order was issued which set the forces of rebellion actually in motion. It ran as follows:—"Dublin Brigade Order, H.Q., 24th April, 1916. (1) The four city battalions will

parade for inspection and route march at 10 a.m. to-day. Commandants will arrange centres. (2) Full arms and equipments and one day's rations." The order was signed by Thomas MacDonagh, Commandant, and, on this occasion, countersigned by P. H. Pearse. The secret had been well kept. Very few Volunteers outside the inner circle of the leaders shared it. Most of the men who assembled under the instructions of their Commandants at the various centres at 10 o'clock on the morning of Easter Monday entertained no other idea than that they were to take part, as announced, in a parade and route march; and it says much for the discipline of the Volunteers that they obeyed loyally and with alacrity the summons of the leaders which called them at high noon to engage in armed rebellion against the King.

It was the lack of premeditation in the enterprise which, as the next chapter will show, secured its first facile success, and the same cause produced its early and complete collapse. The Rebellion, in the circumstances in which the leaders decided to strike, was foredoomed to rapid failure from the outset. They could not count in Dublin upon forces sufficient for their contemplated task—the effective seizure of the capital city of Ireland. Their forces were insufficient actually and still less sufficient relatively to the strength of the forces of the Crown which must rapidly be arrayed against them. The provincial rising upon which they reckoned both to divert those forces from Dublin and to reinforce their hold upon the capital could not be other than sporadic, uncoördinated, and ineffective. The prompt and decisive measures taken for the suppression of the Rebellion in Dublin, which acted as an effectual deterrent elsewhere; the military precautions at once put into force in some other parts of the country; the confusion and derangement produced by MacNeill's

order countermanding the Easter manœuvres; the miscarriage of the Casement expedition—these causes, and the last most of all, conspired to render largely abortive that provincial rising upon which so much in the plans concerted between the rebels and Germany depended. The only element in those comprehensive and elaborate plans which was put fully into execution was the rising in Dublin; and this rising, with the disappearance from the plan of the other elements with which its chances of success were vitally involved, was doomed to issue in a tragic and impotent conclusion. The rebels struck in Dublin with a strength probably inadequate to the immediate execution of their task, and certainly inadequate to the lengthy prosecution of that task.

CHAPTER IX.

THE REBELLION IN DUBLIN

The first shot in the Rebellion was fired shortly after noon on Easter Monday, April 24th. It was fired, with a fine sense of the dramatic, before the seat of Imperial authority in Ireland, Dublin Castle, and killed an unarmed policeman on duty. That shot was the signal which set in motion various bodies of men numbering in the aggregate rather less than three thousand. One of these bodies at once rushed and occupied the General Post Office in Sackville Street, expelling the staff, some members of which were in league with the rebels. At the Post Office was established the Headquarters of the "Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." The colours of the Republic —a tricolour flag of green, orange and white— were flown from the flag-staff on the roof of the building, and on the door was posted a copy of the following Proclamation:—

Poblacht Na HEireann.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

OF THE

IRISH REPUBLIC.

TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

Irishmen and Irishwomen! In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives the old tradition of nationhood,

Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag, and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes with full confidence of victory. We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign power and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to National freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees civil and religious liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and de-

clares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland, and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic, in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government.

Thomas J. Clarke.

Sean MacDearmada.	Thomas MacDonagh.
P. H. Pearse.	Eamonn Ceannt.
James Connolly.	Joseph Plunkett.

This striking and dignified document, nicely calculated as it was to engage the support of such sections of the people of Dublin as might be sympathetic, failed completely in its main object.

There is no evidence that throughout the rising any persons other than those already identified with the conspiracy took any active part in the Rebellion. We may conveniently consider here to what extent the behaviour of the rebels vindicated the sincerity of the leaders' prayer that no one who served their cause should "dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine." Certainly no charge of cowardice could lie against them. They fought for a week against hopeless odds with a fine courage, and the number which remained in arms at the end of the week, when, since the majority were in civilian dress, opportunities for desertion were ample, was a sufficient tribute to their valour. They could not so easily be acquitted of the charge of inhumanity. One Irish party has made it its business to protest that their fighting record was absolutely clean, and the other to assert that it was utterly foul. The truth lay somewhere between these two extremes.

On the first day of the rising, any wearer of British uniform, soldier or policeman, armed or unarmed—and many soldiers on leave or convalescent were in the city—ran great risk in moving about the streets. It is not suggested that there was any general attack with intent to kill upon the unsuspecting police and military: in some cases the representatives of the Imperial authority were unmolested; in other cases they were taken prisoners. Again in further cases the excuse was offered that the orders of the rebel sentries were disobeyed; but Dublin, it should be remembered, was scarcely aware of the outbreak of hostilities until the afternoon of the first day. And such an act as the shooting from ambush at a body of Veteran Volunteers, general opinion could not distinguish from sheer murder. A considerable number of civilians were shot on the first day of the rising; but in the great majority of cases they were

shot by accident and not deliberately. In this connection some distinction may be drawn between the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army. The former were the military instrument of a political idea, the latter the military instrument of a social challenge; and the difference in theory was exhibited in practice to some extent in the behaviour of the two bodies during the Rebellion. Outrages occurred which the signatories of the Proclamation of the Provisional Government would have been the last to excuse. These outrages were the work principally of members of the Citizen Army. The general body of the rebels did fight, in the main, a clean fight. Military and police prisoners were not harshly treated; the Red Cross was usually, though not always, respected; the rebels' own ambulances and nursing service ministered on occasion to the fallen of their opponents.

Nor could the rebels in general fairly be accused of "rapine." A great amount of property was taken and destroyed during the Rebellion, but again there is a distinction to be drawn between the commandeering and the mere looting of this property. In the majority of cases where property was commandeered by rebel bodies—the peremptory holding-up and seizure of motor-cars in the streets falls into a different category—receipts were given to this effect:—"Commandeered by Irish Republic, to be paid for, goods to the value of..... By Order of the Irish Republican Government." No mere looting for the sake of gain, as distinct from the commandeering of articles required for the prosecution of their operations, could be charged against the rebels. As instancing their punctilious respect for the niceties of the laws of war in some cases, it is on record that a party which entered a house in order to commandeer material for supplying a hospital, on being informed that the house was that of a

foreign Consular representative, at once left it without molesting its contents and with ample apologies. The extensive looting which did occur upon the lapse of constituted authority was the work, not of the rebels, but of the city rabble. It occurred within the area of the rebel occupation, and much of it certainly might have been prevented if the rebels had chosen to prevent it; but it is intelligible that they had no desire to multiply the difficulties of their position by coming into conflict with the looters, and, at the time when the looting was at its height, they were fully occupied with more serious work than that of attempting to suppress it.

The outbreak of the Rebellion took the authorities completely by surprise. Many officers of the Dublin garrison were absent at a race meeting in the vicinity; the troops, inadequate in numbers to resist the rebel operations, were not in any case effectively disposed for action; the garrison of Dublin Castle at the time of the outbreak mustered half a dozen men with blank cartridges. The scattered soldiers and police were at once withdrawn to barracks from the central area of the city, into effective occupation of which the rebels entered without encountering serious resistance. Their chief stronghold was established in the district surrounding the General Post Office. Here they promptly cut all the telegraph wires, and for the rest of the week Dublin was completely isolated from the outside world so far as telegraphic communication was concerned. The rebels committed a serious blunder in neglecting to seize the central telephone exchange. This was protected by the ruse of an old woman who told the party detailed to occupy it that it was strongly held by troops. It was, in fact, garrisoned by nothing more formidable than twenty girl operators, who stood to their posts with a fine

courage throughout the Rebellion. The maintenance of telephonic communication, though the wires were "tapped" by the rebels, was of the first importance to the authorities for the development of measures to suppress it. By this means orders for reinforcements were despatched to the Curragh, and news of the rising was sent to the Naval Centre at Kingstown, thence to be transmitted by wireless telegraphy to the Admiralty and the War Office.

The General Post Office was put in a state of defence by the rebels, and steps were taken to seize and garrison various houses at the corners of the streets abutting on Sackville Street as supporting defences, while the streets themselves were barricaded. Special precautions were taken for the protection of the Wireless School in Sackville Street. The aërial here had been dismantled on the outbreak of war; it was replaced by the rebels, who thus maintained wireless communication with their outlying bodies until the destruction of the building by fire on Thursday, April 27th. Simultaneously a body of the Citizen Army, under the command of Countess Marcievicz, occupied and entrenched St. Stephen's Green, an ornamental park covering an extensive grouping of road communications. Other bodies occupied the Four Courts and Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the Citizen Army, flanking on the right and left respectively the central rebel position in the Sackville Street area facing towards the river. Further out from the centre of the city other bodies occupied the South Dublin Union, Jacob's Biscuit Factory, and Boland's Mills at Ringsend. Smaller parties established themselves in houses all about the city commanding the military barracks and along the routes into the city likely to be used by troops taking up posts.

Of the five railway stations in Dublin, three

fell into the hands of the rebels. The exceptions were Kingsbridge, the terminus of the Great Southern and Western Railway, and Amiens Street, the terminus of the Great Northern Railway. On the north side of the city, the Broadstone Station, the terminus of the Midland Great Western Railway, though not actually occupied, was within the area of rebel occupation; and on the south side they occupied the two termini of the Dublin and South Eastern Railway, Westland Row and Harcourt Street; the latter, however, was found unsuitable for defence, and was almost immediately evacuated. Attempts by the rebels to destroy the railway lines some miles out from the termini were so far successful that for the rest of the week no trains except troop trains were able to reach the city. Thus, before the evening of the first day of the rising the whole centre of the city was firmly in rebel hands, with a strong cordon of fortified posts in the suburbs.

One place alone in the central area of the city stood like a rock in the surge of revolution. That place was Trinity College. The Officers' Training Corps, the strength of which had been depleted to a *minimum* by the enlistment of its members for foreign service, mustered when the Rebellion broke out an exiguous garrison of some thirty rifles. The senior officer in charge, Captain Alton, a Senior Fellow of the University, at once took steps to organise the defence. Stray soldiers were summoned from the adjacent streets and from the Central Soldiers' Club hard by the College to reinforce the garrison; these included some "Anzac" sharpshooters. The gates were shut and barricaded; sandbags were placed in the windows and on the parapets of the roof; the scanty strength of the garrison was distributed to the best advantage. It was at once decided to attempt to hold only the main block of buildings fronting on College Green.

From the rear this block commanded an open field of fire across the College Park to Westland Row Station, which was held in force by the rebels. A picquet was maintained in the Park during the night close enough to the station to hear the challenge of the rebel sentries and the exchange of the password "Limerick;" but this picquet was withdrawn before dawn. The formidable appearance of the preparations made for defence deceived the rebels, who were ignorant of the real strength of the garrison. Trinity College was, perhaps, the one important place in the city where no spy was present to reveal the dispositions. The rebels did succeed in gaining admittance for a spy in the disguise of one of the stray soldiers summoned to reinforce the garrison, but he was detected before he was able to escape to betray its poverty. In these circumstances the rebels attempted no attack. The garrison exchanged a brisk fire to their right with the rebel outposts in the Sackville Street area across the river; the sharpshooters accounted for several rebel despatch riders on bicycles who sought to run the gauntlet of their fire; the shots of snipers on the adjacent roofs were returned.

The possession of Trinity College by loyal forces was a factor of high importance in the military situation. It dominated in front the Bank of Ireland, and Dame Street leading up to the Castle; on the right, Westmoreland Street leading to the rebel fortress across the river; on the left Grafton Street leading up to St. Stephen's Green—the three streets which contained the bulk of the banks, insurance offices, and great business houses of South Dublin. To the command of these streets by the garrison of Trinity College was chiefly due the fact that this area was spared that visitation of fire and sack which later devastated the business centre of Dublin on the north side of

the river. The College separated the rebel centre at the General Post Office from the outlying bodies on the south side. The garrison held the commercial centre of the city in trust until it was relieved later in the week by the arrival of the troops, when the College proved a valuable *point d'appui* in the development of operations against the rebel headquarters in Sackville Street.

Little serious fighting occurred on the first day of the rising. The inadequate strength of the troops in Dublin limited them to strictly defined objectives which it was essential to secure. The most important were three—the recovery of the magazine in the Phoenix Park, where the rebels had set fire to a quantity of ammunition; the defence of the docks at the North Wall, where the Custom House, dominating Liberty Hall, had to be occupied to prevent a possible attack upon the docks from that quarter; and, finally, the relief of Dublin Castle. The Magazine was quickly reoccupied and the Custom House secured by night, in both cases without opposition. The relief of the Castle was a more serious undertaking. At the outset the Castle, which was almost entirely unprotected, would have fallen an easy prey to the rebels; but they held off, suspecting a ruse, until the garrison was as strongly reinforced as to render attack hopeless. Within an hour after the outbreak some two hundred soldiers in parties had made their way to the Castle, meeting with some opposition from houses and barricades. One regiment on its way to the Castle later was held up by the rebels in the South Dublin Union; this building was attacked and partially occupied. In the course of this day's operations a party of fifty cavalry, with two officers, convoying ammunition from the docks, was surrounded by rebels; but it defended its convoy for three days, losing one officer killed, and the second wounded, until it

was relieved by improvised armoured cars—Scotch boilers mounted on motor lorries and loop-holed for machine guns and rifles—which later played an important part in the street fighting. All the first day's operations were of a purely defensive character, and left the rebels in undisputed possession of the positions which they had seized.

In the course of the day the Lord Lieutenant issued a Proclamation to the effect that "Whereas an attempt, instigated and designed by the foreign enemies of our King and Country, to foment Rebellion in Ireland, and thus endanger the safety of the United Kingdom, has been made by a reckless, though small, body of men, who have been guilty of insurrectionary acts in the City of Dublin," he warned all his Majesty's subjects that "the strictest measures are being and will be taken for the prompt suppression of the existing disturbances, and the restoration of order." The Proclamation enjoined all loyal and law-abiding citizens to abstain from any acts or conduct which might interfere with the action of the Executive Government, and, in particular, warned them of the danger of unnecessarily frequenting the streets or public places, or of assembling in crowds. On the following day another Proclamation was issued placing the City and County of Dublin under martial law for the period of one month, and on Wednesday, April 26th, three further Proclamations were issued, of which the first ordered all persons to keep within their houses between the hours of 7.30 p.m. and 5.30 a.m., unless provided with a written permission of the military authorities; the second suspended in Ireland Section I. of the Defence of the Realm Act, which gave the right to a British subject charged with offence to be tried by a jury; and the third placed the whole of Ireland for a period of one month under martial law.

During the whole week of the Rebellion the social and economic life of Dublin lay under an almost complete paralysis. The business centre of the city was the theatre of military operations. No trams ran through the city; no trains ran into it. All banks were closed. The gas supply was cut off as a measure of precaution, and citizens who had no electric light installation were compelled to fall back upon lamps and candles. There was no postal service, and no newspapers, with one exception. This was the *Irish Times*, which enjoyed an advantage over its contemporaries in that it possessed a suction gas plant of its own, and was not totally dependent for its machinery motive power upon the city gas supply. Its office lay in the No Man's Land between Trinity College and Sackville Street, and here, in a state of siege, it was published daily during the rebellion until Friday, April 28th, when its issue was suspended by mechanical difficulties until the following Monday. Dublin's only newspaper, however—no newspaper from outside was able to circulate during the week—was permitted to publish no more than the proclamations and the official *communiqués*. Nobody knew how serious the situation might be; nobody knew the state of the provinces. There were rumours of risings here, there, and everywhere; of large rebel forces marching on the capital; of a German landing in Kerry. But the better-class people of Dublin kept their heads and went their unaccustomed way with a nonchalance not generally attributed to the Irish temperament. As the days passed, and the fighting spread, and the great fires, whose glare was visible for miles around, broke out, though there was growing strain, there was always calm, and nothing in the nature of panic.

Among the upper and middle classes of all creeds, whatever sentimental sympathy with

sedition there might have been before the Rebellion, there was none during its progress. These classes generally treated the troops as their deliverers from a *régime* of anarchy. They gave the soldiers from England a welcome which vastly surprised these unfamiliar men, who imagined at the outset that every inhabitant of the city was a potential enemy. Food was short; but when reinforcements—railed across England, packed in transports across the Channel, and tramping into the city, to be thrown almost immediately upon their arrival in the last stages of exhaustion into desperate street fighting of the most hellish kind—reached the suburbs, citizens cheerfully surrendered to the soldiers the last square meal which they had in immediate prospect. Women and girls ran out of houses in the suburbs during the hottest action to give food and drink to the troops or help the wounded into shelter. Everywhere about the city, in spite of the restrictions upon movement, the people followed the military operations with a close interest that often came near to foolish recklessness, and not infrequently paid its extreme penalty.

The attitude of the lower classes was necessarily more complex and uncertain than that of the upper and middle classes. In the case of the former there was a divided allegiance in that some of their relations and friends were fighting in the rebel ranks, while others fought in the ranks of the Irish regiments engaged in the suppression of the rising. In these circumstances the people in many cases extended a negative support to the rebels in such ways as facilitating their escape when opportunity offered. But they extended no active support; the mass of popular opinion manifested itself unmistakeably as not with the rebels. Beyond a vague sympathy in some quarters, the rebellion was not favoured by

the working classes, as distinguished from the hooligans who are always the allies of the enemies of the police. The working classes, moreover, early appreciated the economic penalties of revolution. The shortage of food quickly became acute, and prices rose rapidly to famine level. The actual food shortage was aggravated by the abeyance of means of distribution, and a suspension of money currency. In the case of the upper and middle classes citizens went foraging for their own supplies, and where they found themselves, as numbers of people did, short of ready cash, were able to secure them on credit. By these classes, living principally in the suburbs, food, though with great difficulty and in increasingly restricted amounts, was at least obtainable.

But by the working classes, concentrated principally in the centre of the city, food soon became altogether unobtainable by legitimate means. In the poorer quarters of Dublin a large proportion of the population lives, in normal times, perilously near the starvation line. The Larkinite labour movement had owed its spread and power not only to the persuasive teaching of class war by the agitator, but even more to the existence of the most deplorable economic conditions.* The war, by relieving a congested labour market in one direction by enlistment, and in the other by the prosperity of industries concerned with war work, and by endowing numerous families with separation allowances which represented wealth in a city of low-paid labour, had greatly improved for the time being the material conditions of life in the Dublin tenements. The terms of existence of their inhabitants, however, remained precarious. Their unwonted prosperity had induced no habit of thrift; they remained narrowly dependent, with

* See Report of the Departmental Committee on Dublin Housing.

no financial reserves of any kind, upon weekly payments. These weekly payments, upon the outbreak of the Rebellion, suddenly ceased. Industry was at a standstill; unemployment, instead of being an exceptional, became at once a general condition; separation allowances could not be paid. It was rather sheer hunger than mere lust of plunder in the first instance which drove the slum mob into an orgy of looting in the central area of the city. The behaviour of the crowds, in the entire absence for a considerable time over wide areas of any authority, was in general remarkably orderly; the amount of looting, in view of the unique opportunity which the Rebellion presented, was comparatively small. Looting was most extensive and reckless in the Sackville Street district. It began with attacks induced by hunger on the provision shops. It was headed, however, by the hooligan element; it lost all savour of restraint when the contents of the publichouses became available to the crowd, and it degenerated inevitably into a carnival of pillage and destruction which spared the stock of no establishment of any kind within the reach of the looters.

The city remained in effective rebel occupation throughout the second day of the rising, Tuesday, April 25th. By this time the Curragh mobile column, consisting of sixteen hundred men, which had been ordered to Dublin on the previous day to reinforce the garrison—which at the time of the attack numbered only some two thousand three hundred men—had been followed by a battery of four eighteen pounder guns from the Reserve Artillery Brigade at Athlone, the 4th Dublin Fusiliers from Templemore, a composite battalion from Belfast, and an additional thousand men from the Curragh. With the arrival of the first details of these reinforcements, Brigadier-General Lowe, commanding the Reserve Cavalry Brigade

at the Curragh, who had assumed command in Dublin, and now disposed of about four thousand five hundred men, began serious operations for the suppression of the Rebellion. The first steps taken were to relieve and open communication with the Castle and Trinity College, and to this end a line of posts was established from Kingsbridge Station to the College *via* the Castle. This operation was completed by noon with little loss; it had the effect of completing that division into two of the rebel forces which the holding of Trinity College by its garrison had begun, and of giving a safe line of advance for troops extending operations to the north or south. The hold of the troops upon the Castle, however, was not yet secure. The rebel body detailed to seize it, baffled in its first attempt, had occupied the City Hall, the Dublin *Daily Express* office, and some other houses commanding the Castle Yard. From these it maintained a heavy fire upon the Castle. In this fighting the rebels first employed bombs. Those used in the attack on the Castle were of faulty construction. In many cases they failed to explode; but, on being readjusted by the soldiers, they were used with good effect against the rebels. It was decided to clear the buildings dominating the Castle, and an assault with bomb and bayonet succeeded in this object after encountering a very desperate and tenacious resistance.

Upon the arrival of further military reinforcements a cordon was established round the northern part of the city from Parkgate, along the North Circular Road to North Wall. It was obvious, however, by this time that the strength of the rebels' position was so great that, except at excessive loss, its reduction could not usefully be attempted until a great numerical superiority and considerable artillery support were available.

Though a cordon had been drawn round the north side of the city, the south side still remained open, and it was necessary to await the arrival of the reinforcements which were on the way from England to complete the cordon before the advance on the north side was pressed. Nothing further was attempted on this side on April 25th, therefore, than the clearance of the Broadstone Station, and the destruction of a barricade at Phibsboro' by artillery fire.

The military situation at this stage as it was envisaged by the rebel leaders was thus represented with some approximation to the truth in the terms of the Second Proclamation of the "Provisional Government" to the Citizens of Dublin. It ran as follows:—

> The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic salutes the Citizens of Dublin on the momentous occasion of the Proclamation of a "Sovereign Independent Irish State," now in course of being established by Irishmen in arms.
>
> The Republican Forces hold the lines taken up at twelve noon on Easter Monday, and, nowhere, despite fierce and almost continuous attacks of the British troops, have the lines been broken through. The country is rising in answer to Dublin's call, and the final achievement of Ireland's freedom is now, with God's help, only a matter of days. The valour, self-sacrifice, and discipline of Irish men and women are about to win for our country a glorious place among the Nations.
>
> Ireland's honour has already been redeemed; it remains to vindicate her wisdom and self-control. All citizens of Dublin who believe in the right of their country to be free will

give their allegiance and their loyal help to the Irish Republic. There is work for everyone; for the men in the fighting line, and for the women in the provision of food and first aid. Every Irishman and Irishwoman worthy of the name will come forward to help their common country in this her supreme hour.

Able bodied citizens can help by building barricades in the streets to oppose the advance of the British troops. The British troops have been firing on our women and on our Red Cross. On the other hand, Irish Regiments in the British Army have refused to act against their fellow-countrymen.*

The Provisional Government hopes that its supporters—which means the vast bulk of the people of Dublin—will preserve order, and self-restraint; such looting as has already occurred has been done by hangers-on of the British Army. Ireland must keep her new honour unsmirched.

We have lived to see an Irish Republic proclaimed. May we live to establish it firmly, and may our children and our children's children enjoy the happiness and prosperity which freedom will bring.

Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government:

P. H. PEARSE.

Commander-in-Chief the Forces of the Irish Republic, and President of the Provisional Government.

* Neither of these allegations was true. The loyalty and discipline of the Irish Regiments stood fast in the supreme test—most severe of all in the case of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers—of acting against their own people.

When this document was written the downfall of the Irish Republic was already at hand. By Tuesday evening the first details of two infantry brigades of the 59th Division, which Viscount French, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, had ordered to Dublin immediately upon receipt of news of the outbreak, began to arrive at Kingstown. These reinforcements moved on Dublin on Wednesday, April 26th, and by the next day the cordon around Dublin was completed on the south as well as on the north side. From this point the potential elements of failure in the rebels' plan of campaign began to operate progressively towards its actual failure. The inadequacy of the rebels' strength in Dublin to the execution of their design stood fully revealed when, on the one hand, military reinforcements from England, contrary to their expectation, arrived promptly and in overwhelming numbers, and, on the other hand, the reinforcements which the rebels themselves hoped for from the country did not arrive in consequence of the failure of the provincial rising. In the result the rebels in Dublin were unable to maintain their internal lines of communication. The isolated strategic points which they had seized became so many traps into which they were gradually penned. Forces were now available for the military authorities to develop the scheme of drawing in the cordon upon the rebel centre, leaving the detached rebel bodies which its progress left behind to be surrounded and submerged in detail.

Heavy fighting, however, was necessary before this decision emerged. The first brigade to arrive at Kingstown was ordered to move on Dublin by road in two columns on Wednesday, April 26th. The left column marched by way of the Stillorgan-Donnybrook Road and South Circular Road to the Royal Hospital, where it arrived without

opposition. The right column, consisting of two battalions—the 7th and 8th—of the Sherwood Foresters, the majority of whom had less than three months' service, marched by the main tram route through Ball's Bridge, directed on Merrion Square and Trinity College. Early in the afternoon its marching van came suddenly under heavy fire at the northern corner of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road. Here, on Easter Monday, a body of Dublin Veteran Volunteers—composed of professional men over military age—had been ambushed while returning without arms from a route march in the Dublin Mountains. Six of its members were killed and ten wounded. The remainder made their way to Beggar's Bush Barracks, where they assisted the garrison in the defence of the barracks until it was relieved by the advance of the troops. The Rebellion thus made history for more than one branch of the armed forces of the Crown. The Trinity College Officers' Training Corps was the first of such corps ever called upon to defend its own University against attack; the Dublin Veteran Volunteers were the first Volunteers in the United Kingdom who shed their blood in their country's service. The operations on the south side of Dublin, moreover, were the first in which units of the New Armies were thrown solely upon their own resources. They emerged from the test with great credit. The leading battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, coming suddenly under heavy and accurate fire at the corner of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road, took such cover as was available and returned the rebel fire while bombing parties were organised, who dislodged the rebels. With the reduction of this first rebel outpost the relief of Dublin may be said to have begun.

The Sherwood Foresters, however, had not

advanced far before they became still more seriously engaged. Close to Mount Street Bridge crossing the Grand Canal they found a strong body of rebels holding the schools and other houses on the north side of the road. Here the advance was held up for more than two hours, when the whole column, accompanied by bombing parties, attacked the rebel position in successive waves and carried it, after suffering considerable loss. Half the total military casualties in the course of the operations in Dublin were sustained in this fighting, in which four officers were killed, fourteen wounded, and two hundred and sixteen men killed and wounded. On the following day, Thursday, April 27th, the troops pushed on over Mount Street Bridge, into the city. They were again heavily engaged in the warren of mean streets inside the bridge on the right of the line of advance towards the river mouth at Ringsend, and behind the advance as the troops moved forward accurate sniping broke out from the roofs. It was long before the line of communications was wholly cleared of these hidden irregulars, but by evening picquets had penetrated into the heart of the city, and communication was established between the advancing bodies and Trinity College.

From this point the main operation consisted in the reduction of the chief rebel stronghold and the seat of the "Provisional Government" in the General Post Office, which was now isolated from the other rebel positions in the city, all of which were also surrounded. Early in the morning of Friday, April 28th, General Sir John Maxwell, who on the day before had been appointed to the supreme command in Ireland and invested with plenary powers to take all necessary means for the suppression of the Rebellion, arrived at the North Wall to find the city

illumined by the great fire in the Sackville Street area. The great fire had broken out on Thursday morning on the west side of Sackville Street close to the river. How it originated—whether as a result of the shelling of the area from across the river, from the explosion of a rebel ammunition store, or by some accident of looting—is uncertain. Fanned by a breeze from the sea, the flames, which the almost ceaseless fusilade made it virtually impossible for the Fire Brigade to attempt to fight, spread gradually across to the east side of the street, and a wide area, containing upwards of two hundred buildings, which included the General Post Office, several banks and insurance offices, two churches, and a number of important business houses, as well as the Royal Hibernian Academy, had been burnt out before the fire was finally brought under control the day after the collapse of the Rebellion.

Upon his arrival, Sir John Maxwell issued a Proclamation in these terms:—

"Most rigorous measures will be taken by me to stop the loss of life and damage to property which certain misguided persons are causing by their armed resistance to the law. If necessary I shall not hesitate to destroy all buildings within any area occupied by the rebels, and I warn all persons within the area now surrounded by His Majesty's troops forthwith to leave such areas under the following conditions:—(a) Women and children may leave the area from any of the examining posts set up for the purpose, and will be allowed to go away free. (b) Men may leave by the same examining posts and will be allowed to go away free, provided the examining officer is satisfied they have taken no part whatever in the present disturbance; (c) All other men who present themselves to the said examining posts

must surrender unconditionally, together with any arms and ammunition in their possession."

In accordance with the terms of this Proclamation the process of "squeezing out" the surrounded areas of Sackville Street and the Four Courts was continued remorselessly throughout Friday, April 28th. It encountered strenuous opposition on the north side of the river, where at one point nearly twenty-four hours were occupied in an advance of a hundred yards down a single street—North King Street. From the south side of the river progress was easier. At the end of Sackville Street abutting on the bridge the rebels had occupied houses and shops immediately commanding the bridge, and bringing Westmoreland Street and D'Olier Street under a searching fire. On the left of these rebel positions, Liberty Hall, the Headquarters of the Citizen Army, could bring enfilade fire to bear on O'Connell Bridge, and direct fire on Butt Bridge This buttress of the rebel position, however, was early reduced by the combined operations of a gunboat lying in the Liffey off the Custom House and field pieces manœuvred from Trinity College into the adjacent streets. Before the end of the week the rebel outposts commanding the bridge had succumbed to the flames; their defenders suffered severely from machine gun fire directed from the roof of Trinity College while attempting to make their escape. The operations of the troops from the south side were thus linked up with the operations of the troops pressing in on the north side.

Thus, by Friday, April 28th, the position of the rebels in their headquarters in the Sackville Street area, ringed by a circle of fire and steel, was already hopeless. In these circumstances the two real leaders of the Rebellion, Pearse and Connolly, composed valedictory documents as widely differ-

ent in their spirit as the characters of the two men. There was in Pearse's vindication of his action—a document which incidentally threw some light on the proceedings of the rebel headquarters on the eve of the rising—some trace of regret for the the ruin in which he had involved his followers, but more in a spirit of passionate exaltation and stoic resignation to the inevitable end. Pearse, at least, whatever his confidence in its moral justification, had no illusions about the material issue of the enterprise. This was his valedictory:

" Headquarters: Army of the Irish Republic.

" General Post Office,

" Dublin, 28th April, 1916.
9.30 a.m.

" The Forces of the Irish Republic, which was proclaimed in Dublin on Easter Monday, 24th April, have been in possession of the central part of the Capital since 12 noon on that day. Up to yesterday afternoon, Headquarters was in touch with all the main outlying positions, and those positions were then still being held, and the Commandants in charge were confident of their ability to hold them for a long time.

" During the course of yesterday afternoon and evening, the enemy succeeded in cutting our communications with our other positions in the city, and Headquarters is to-day isolated.

" The enemy have burnt down whole blocks of houses, apparently with the object of giving themselves a clear field for the play of artillery and field guns against us. We have been bombarded during the evening and night by shrapnel and machine gun fire, but without material damage to our position, which is of great strength.

" We are busy completing arrangements for the

final defence of Headquarters, and are determined to hold it while the buildings last.

"I desire now, lest I may not have an opportunity later, to pay homage to the gallantry of the Soldiers of Irish Freedom who have during the past four days been writing with fire and steel the most glorious chapter in the later history of Ireland. Justice can never be done to their heroism, to their discipline, to their gay and unconquerable spirit, in the midst of peril and death.

" Let me, who have led them into this, speak, in my own and in my fellow-commanders' names, and in the name of Ireland present and to come, their praise, and ask those who come after them to remember them.

" For four days they have fought and toiled, almost without cessation, almost without sleep, and in the intervals of fighting, they have sung songs of the freedom of Ireland. No man has complained, no man has asked " why?" Each individual has spent himself, happy to pour out his strength for Ireland and for freedom. If they do not win this fight, they will at least have deserved to win it. But win it they will, although they may win it in death. Already they have won a great thing. They have redeemed Dublin from many shames, and made her name splendid among the names of cities.

" If I were to mention names of individuals, my list would be a long one. I will name only that of Commandant-General James Connolly, Commanding the Dublin Division. He lies wounded, but is still the guiding brain of our resistance.

" If we accomplish no more than we have accomplished, I am satisfied. I am satisfied that we have saved Ireland's honour. I am satisfied that we should have accomplished more, that we should have accomplished the task of enthroning, as well as proclaiming, the Irish Republic as a Sovereign

State, had our arrangements for a simultaneous rising of the whole country, with a combined plan as sound as the Dublin plan has been proved to be, been allowed to go through on Easter Sunday. Of the fatal countermanding order which prevented those plans from being carried out, I shall not speak further. Both Eoin MacNeill and we have acted in the best interests of Ireland.

"For my part, as to anything I have done in this, I am not afraid to face either the judgment of God or the judgment of posterity.

" (Signed) P. H. PEARSE,
" Commandant-General.
" Commanding-in-Chief, the Army of the Irish Republic and President of the Provisional Government."

Connolly had been wounded in the leg on the day before, and this incapacity of the man who was the chief driving force in the enterprise contributed materially to the rapid disintegration of the rebels' remaining resistance. His letter, however, which took the form of an " Order of the Day "—though there was by this time no chance of getting such an Order distributed—was written in a strain of confidence very different from that of Pearse. It was, of course, the business of a Commander to attempt to hearten his men; but the—in the circumstances—excessive cheerfulness of Connolly's document suggests that he still entertained some hope that a stroke by Germany might yet transform the situation. It read as follows:—

" Army of the Irish Republic,
" (Dublin Command)
Headquarters, April 28th, 1916

" To Soldiers,

" This is the fifth day of the establishment of the Irish Republic, and the flag of our country still

floats from the most important buildings in Dublin, and is gallantly protected by the officers and Irish soldiers in arms throughout the country. Not a day passes without seeing fresh postings of Irish soldiers eager to do battle for the old cause. Despite the utmost vigilance of the enemy we have been able to get information telling us how the manhood of Ireland, inspired by our splendid action, are gathering to offer up their lives if necessary in the same holy cause. We are here hemmed in, because the enemy feels that in this building is to be found the heart and inspiration of our great movement.

" Let me remind you of what we have done. For the first time in 700 years the flag of a free Ireland floats triumphantly in Dublin City. The British Army, whose exploits we are for ever having dinned in our ears, which boasts of having stormed the Dardanelles and the German lines on the Marne, behind their artillery and machine guns, are afraid to advance to attack or storm any position held by our forces. The slaughter they have suffered in the first few days has totally unnerved them, and they dare not attempt again an infantry attack on our position.

" Our Commandants around us are holding their own. Commandant Daly's splendid exploit in capturing Linen Hall Barracks we all know. You must know also that the whole population, both clergy and laity, of this district are united in his praises. Commandant MacDonagh is established in an impregnable position reaching from the walls of Dublin Castle to Redmond's Hill, and from Bishop's Street to Stephen's Green. In Stephen's Green, Commandant ..... holds the College of Surgeons, one side of the Square, a portion of the other side, and dominates the whole Green and all its entrances and exits.

" Commandant de Valera stretches in a position

from the Gas Works to Westland Row, holding Boland's Bakery, Boland's Mill, Dublin South Eastern Railway Works, and dominating Merrion Square.

"Commandant Kent holds the South Dublin Union and Guinness's Buildings to Marrowbone Lane and controls James's Street and district. On two occasions the enemy effected a lodgment, and were driven out with great loss.

"The men of North Co. Dublin are in the field, have occupied all the Police Barracks in the district, destroyed all the telegraph system on the Great Northern Railway up to Dundalk, and are operating against the trains of the Midland Great Western. Dundalk has sent 200 men to march upon Dublin, and in the other parts of the north our forces are active and growing. In Galway Captain ..... fresh after his escape from an Irish prison, is in the field with his men. Wexford and Wicklow are strong, and Cork and Kerry are equally acquitting themselves creditably. We have every confidence that our Allies in Germany and kinsmen in America are straining every nerve to hasten matters on our behalf.

"As you know I was wounded twice yesterday, and am unable to move about, but have got my bed moved into the firing line, and with the assistance of your officers, will be just as useful to you as ever.

"Courage, boys, we are winning, and in the hour of our victory let us not forget the splendid women who have everywhere stood by us and cheered us on. Never had man or woman a grander cause, never was cause more grandly served.

"(Signed) JAMES CONNOLLY,
"Commandant-General, Dublin Division."

Connolly's presentation of the military situation in this document was a complete travesty of the

facts. The position outside Dublin, as we shall see in the chapter dealing with the Rebellion in the provinces, did not at all justify his claims. In Dublin, the prospects of the Commandants outside the Sackville Street area were by this time hopeless. Daly, on Thursday, April 27th, had set fire to and destroyed Linen Hall Barracks, occupied by the Army Pay Office, but subsequently his forces were hemmed in and surrounded. MacDonagh and his body were invested in Jacob's factory. Countess Marcievicz and her body of the Citizen Army had early in the week been dislodged from St. Stephen's Green. The seizure of this position was a conspicuous tactical blunder on the part of the rebels. The Green was dominated from the roofs and upper stories of the buildings enclosing it, particularly from the lofty structure of the Shelbourne Hotel. On the roof of this hotel and on that of the United Service Club picquets with machine guns had been posted early in the week, and from these commanding positions were able to rake the Green from end to end. The rebels returned the fire without causing any casualties in the hotel, where the visitors remained under a strict state of siege, but they soon found their position in the Green untenable, and retired from their hastily improvised entrenchments, not without considerable loss, to the massive building, on one side of the Green, of the College of Surgeons, on which the military machine gun continued to play. De Valera and his forces, after the forcing of Mount Street Bridge, had been driven back into his headquarters in Boland's Mills; in the clearance of this district a naval gun, skilfully handled, played a very useful part. Finally, Kent maintained a most precarious footing in a part of the South Dublin Union. All these rebel positions were completely isolated from each other and from the Headquarters in the Sackville Street area.

On Saturday, April 29th, there came the end. Throughout the morning the investing ring round the rebel headquarters pressed in more closely. A battery of field artillery wrought great execution upon its defences. The rebels fought with the courage of despair in a confused and desperate affair of ambuscades and sniping in which the baleful glare of the fires paled the light of the sun. Before noon, however, the block of buildings in front and rear of the Post Office was demolished, and the Post Office was itself in flames. The rebel garrison made good its escape from the burning building after sending out its military prisoners to draw the fire of the troops; but its case was little better outside than within. Early in the afternoon a Red Cross nurse brought in a message from Pearse asking for terms. A reply was sent that only unconditional surrender would be accepted. At two o'clock Pearse surrendered himself unconditionally, and was brought before Sir John Maxwell. He then signed notices in the following terms ordering the various Commandants to surrender unconditionally:—

"In order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, now surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, members of the Provisional Government present at Headquarters have agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the Commanders of all Units of the Republican Forces will order their followers to lay down their arms."

Connolly subscribed to this document on behalf both of the forces in his immediate command and those in the St. Stephen's Green command. MacDonagh, Kent and De Valera made their submission on Sunday, April 30th, on which date all organised resistance to the forces of the Crown

came completely to an end. Though sniping continued in various districts of the city for several days, to be suppressed only gradually by a systematic house-to-house search for rebels and arms, Dublin began to recover something of its normal aspect on the Sunday after Pearse's surrender. Movement within the military cordon was now permitted, and the citizens emerged from the shock of a week of revolution to survey the ruins of the centre of the city and to bury their dead.

CHAPTER X.

THE REBELLION IN THE PROVINCES

MEANWHILE there had taken place a rising in the provinces, but a rising very different in character from the rebel leaders' conception. The vital function which the provincial rising was designed to fulfil has already been emphasised, and the variety of causes which conspired to defeat the fulfilment of that function has already been outlined. It was intended to be general throughout the country; the provincial outbreaks were to have as their main objects on the one hand the diversion of military forces which would otherwise be available for immediate concentration upon the capital, and on the other hand the reinforcement from the country of the rebel troops whose strength was inadequate to the task of holding Dublin after its seizure. The interception of the Casement expedition and the consequent failure of the arms supply, for whose rapid distribution in the south and west elaborate arrangements had been made, was the prime cause which deranged these plans. The countermanding by MacNeill of the order for mobilisation on Easter Sunday completed the dislocation of the plans for the provincial rising.

Except in the immediate vicinity of Dublin, where the local centres were in close touch with headquarters, the local leaders, doubtful of the situation, held their hands and waited upon the development of events. The prompt measures taken for the suppression of the Rebellion in Dublin and the military precautions at once

adopted elsewhere acted, when the news of events in the capital was received, as an effectual deterrent in most parts of the country. In the upshot the provincial rising was sporadic, disjointed, and ineffective in so far as its main objects were concerned. The areas of disturbance were limited in extent and widely separated one from another, with the result that the outbreaks were of purely local significance. Their suppression, however, though it issued in little actual fighting, involved military operations of some scope.

The provincial rising, as was to be expected, was best conceived and executed in the immediate vicinity of the capital. The whole area of North County Dublin, the adjacent area of County Meath, and beyond into County Louth by way of Ardee as far north as Dundalk—all this district, with the exception of Drogheda and its neighbourhood, was more or less affected by the rebel operations. Connolly, in his " Order of the Day " written at the Dublin Headquarters on the Friday before the surrender, said that " the men of North County Dublin are in the field, have occupied all the police barracks in the district, destroyed all the telegraph system on the Great Northern Railway up to Dundalk, and are operating against the trains of the Midland Great Western. Dundalk has sent two hundred men to march on Dublin, and in other parts of the north our forces are active and growing." In point of fact, the rising beyond the borders of County Dublin was of insignificant proportions.

In County Louth a body of some seventy rebels left Dundalk in motor cars on Easter Sunday and proceeded to rendezvous with some smaller bodies near Ardee, where arms, including some stolen from the National Volunteers, were distributed. On Easter Monday, April 24th, a part of the

County Louth force proceeded into the North County Dublin area. The remainder returned towards Dundalk by way of Castlebellingham, losing some of its strength by desertions *en route*. At Castlebellingham the rebels arrested some policemen, who were hopelessly outnumbered and offered no resistance, and one of their number was shot and mortally wounded, more probably by accident rather than in cold blood. Vehicles on the northern high road were stopped and searched, and some motor cars were seized. The occupant of one of them, a military officer, was shot and severely wounded at the same time as the police constable. Some country houses in the Castlebellingham district were briefly occupied, but the County Louth rebels disbanded early in the week before their activities had become serious enough to require military measures for their suppression. In Drogheda, where no outbreak occurred, the National Volunteers turned out to assist the police in maintaining order.

In County Dublin the rising was much more formidable. Here the rebel headquarters was at Swords, and an extensive district around this centre remained in rebel hands for the best part of the week. In this area several police barracks were surprised and occupied. Swords and Donabate and Lusk, two villages on the coast, fell successively into the rebels' hands. At Donabate two attempts were made to blow up the railway bridge; these attempts were only partially successful, but railway communication between Dublin and Drogheda was effectually interrupted. On Wednesday, April 26th, the rebels from this district, reinforced by bodies from the district further east towards the County Meath border, proposed to march on the little seaside resort of Skerries, with the object of seizing the Marconi station which

had been erected there by the Admiralty. The town was almost entirely unprotected against attack. Only seven soldiers were available to guard the wireless station, with a still smaller number of Constabulary to reinforce them. The rebel strength, on the other hand, was estimated to be between three and four hundred. Preparations were, nevertheless, made to receive them. A wounded officer on sick leave took command of the small force in charge of the wireless station, and a Red Cross hospital was organised in the local Carnegie Library. Word was received that the rebels were approaching. The townspeople gathered on the hill above the station to watch the unequal fight. Suddenly a patrol boat, escorted by two gunboats, was seen approaching at a great speed from the direction of Lambay Island. As she drew nearer it was seen that the decks were crowded with soldiers. The little flotilla put into Skerries Harbour on a flood tide, and two companies of the North Staffordshire Regiment were promptly disembarked and marched to the wireless station, where they entrenched. The gunboats meanwhile cruised offshore with their guns trained on the roads leading to the town by which the rebels were expected to arrive. On the following day the Staffords dug themselves in, put up barricades of carts and sandbags on all the roads, and made every preparation for a siege. These measures effectually prevented the projected rebel attack, which was abandoned. They provided the first instance of naval participation in the operations for the suppression of the Rebellion—a participation which the fact that the Rebellion was essentially a blow at the security of British sea power invested with a peculiar fitness.

The Rebellion in County Dublin, however, was

not to end without serious fighting. Foiled in their action towards the coast, the rebels turned their attention inland towards County Meath, where no rising had taken place. On Friday, April 28th, the police authorities received information that Ashbourne Police Barracks was being attacked by a body of rebels from County Dublin, some hundred strong. A relief force was at once organised at Navan. The County Inspector, the District Inspector, and fifty Constabulary left in motor cars, proceeding by way of Slane and Balrath towards Kilmoon, where there was another small barracks a short distance from Ashbourne. Near Kilmoon the force was ambushed by the rebels. The motor cars had proceeded a short distance from Kilmoon, which is on an eminence, at the foot of which a lane branches off. The rebels had secreted themselves in a small grove by the roadside at this point. The police, on getting out of their motor cars at the ascent of the hill with the object of marching to Ashbourne, were surprised by a fusilade of bullets. Several were wounded immediately, and one killed. They took what cover they could behind their cars and in the ditches, and returned the rebel fire. The rebels, however, closed in on all sides, and their leader, a dispensary doctor by name Hayes, sent a messenger to the County Inspector demanding the surrender of his men. This demand was refused. A pitched battle lasting five hours followed, in the course of which seven of the constabulary, including the District Inspector, were killed, and fifteen wounded, the County Inspector mortally. The rebel losses are believed to have exceeded in dead alone the total number of police casualties. Two civilians were killed and a third mortally wounded by accident in the course of this bloody affray. The police fought until they had expended

their last cartridge, when the survivors surrendered. The rebels took possession of their rifles and seized some of their equipment, but the men were afterwards released. Sobered by this desperate encounter the rebels withdrew upon Swords, and remained quiet until Sunday, April 30th, when, after sending an emissary under a white flag to Dublin to verify the surrender of the leaders, they capitulated without coming into active conflict with the troops.

Outside the vicinity of the capital the most serious risings occurred in County Wexford and County Galway, which faithfully maintained their rebel tradition. In County Wexford the *Sinn Fein* movement was started in Enniscorthy in 1904; its founders were persons who had been connected with the old Fenian conspiracy. *Sinn Fein* in the county, therefore, was of a more militant character, and less in the nature merely of a passive resistance movement, than elsewhere; its aims, besides the establishment of Irish industries and the boycotting of English manufacture, included the forcible overthrow of British rule in Ireland. In these circumstances, the Irish Volunteers were able without difficulty to capture the machinery of the movement, and found in County Wexford congenial soil for the development of their propaganda. The organisation had in the county seven branches, the members of which held weekly and bi-weekly drills and route marches, some indoor and some outdoor, and on several occasions paraded in public under arms. The Volunteers, the most active of whose leaders were local journalists, were from time to time visited by P. H. Pearse, and by some of the regular organisers. They numbered in the whole county, at the time of the insurrection, rather less than a thousand men, and here, as elsewhere, the dis-

proportion of armament to numerical strength was marked.

On Tuesday, April 25th, the day after the rising in Dublin, a body of Volunteers marched into Enniscorthy, the local headquarters of the rebellious movement; they remained the night, and dispersed on the following morning. During the day a despatch rider arrived with information from the Dublin Headquarters upon the situation in the capital, and at dawn on the next day, Thursday, April 27th, the rebels took possession of Enniscorthy by surprise and without opposition. None could have been offered in any case with hope of success, for the strength of the rebels was some six hundred men, of whom two hundred were armed with rifles and shot guns, while the constabulary force in the whole county numbered little more than two hundred. The rebels established their headquarters in Enniscorthy at the Athenæum, and pressed citizens into service as Irish Republican Police. They posted sentries, and allowed no one to enter or leave the town without a permit. They commandeered motor cars, food, and every description of goods, and searched houses exhaustively for arms. The police barrack, which was surrounded by an open space, offering a good field of fire, was held by District Inspector and five constables; the bank, in view of the barrack, was held by a sergeant and one man. From the castle on the hill overlooking the town, of which they had taken possession, and from the slopes of Vinegar Hill, the rebels exchanged shots with the police. No attempt. however, was made to rush the barracks, where the police held out until the arrival of military relief.

With Enniscorthy in their possession, the rebels proceeded to develop their operations northwards.

They made no movement southwards towards the town of Wexford, fourteen miles distant, where order was maintained with the assistance of the National Volunteers, beyond attempting, with but partial success, to blow up the bridge of Scarawalsh, which crosses the Slaney on the main road between Enniscorthy and Wexford. The signalling wires on the railway were also cut, and the instruments in the cabin destroyed. Northwards the rebels advanced on the 28th in the direction of Ferns, and at a point between Enniscorthy and that place entrenched and sent scouts forward. These reported no military forces in the vicinity. The rebels, renewing their advance, occupied the town of Ferns. On the following day they proceeded in the direction of Gorey, having as their ultimate objective the munitions factory at Arklow, just across the Wicklow border. Arklow was at this time inadequately protected, though later a military force was landed and entrenched to defend the munitions factory. The County Wexford rebels, however, who were of a less adventurous disposition than their forbears of 1798, did not even advance as far towards Arklow as Gorey. At Camolin Station, a short distance north of Ferns, they met a train containing a few soldiers. These, in fact, had been detailed for ordinary guard duty on the railway. The rebels, however, believing them to be the advanced guard of a force coming up from Arklow, retreated precipitately, evacuating Ferns, and retired upon Enniscorthy.

In the meantime measures for the suppression of the rising in County Wexford had been set in motion. A military force consisting of eleven hundred foot and seventy cavalry, with a 4.7 inch gun, was organised at Wexford, and despatched northwards with a view to engaging the rebels at

Enniscorthy. The force was accompanied by the first armoured train ever employed in Ireland. It was a home-made fighting machine, slung together hastily, but effectively, of materials to hand. It consisted of an ancient but still serviceable engine, to which two or three steel trucks were coupled, armoured with hastily pierced sheets of iron. Upon this contrivance, which was painted slate colour, was mounted the fifteen pounder gun, familiarly known to her crew as "Enniscorthy Emily."

At the approach of the military force from the south, the rebels evacuated the town of Enniscorthy, and took up their position on Vinegar Hill, an eminence rising over Enniscorthy at the opposite side of the Slaney, and the scene of the desperate encounter in the Rebellion of 1798. In that rebellion, the encampment on Vinegar Hill was the chief rebel station, being flanked by two others, Carrickbyrne Hill, eight miles from New Ross on the road to Wexford, and Carrigroe Hill, four miles east of Ferns. Vinegar Hill in '98 was held from about the end of May until the 21st of June, when it was attacked by General Lake with twenty thousand men operating in converging columns. One of these columns, that of General Needham, failed to reach its station at the proper time. The other columns attacked the encampment, where the rebels, although they were almost without ammunition, and their ranks were decimated by a heavy fire of grape and musketry, maintained the unequal fight for nearly two hours, after which they made good their escape to Wexford, by way of what came to be called "Needham's Gap."

Before action was joined on this historic ground, however, news arrived from Dublin of the surrender in the capital and the order of P. H. Pearse to his followers in the country to lay down their

arms. The leader of the rebels at Enniscorthy, a journalist named Etchingham, was permitted to proceed to Dublin in a motor car under escort to verify the information, and in the meantime a truce prevailed. Upon his return on the night of April 30th, he and his colleagues attempted to open negotiations with the military on the basis that they should surrender themselves and all arms, on condition that their followers were allowed to return to their homes. They were informed that the only terms acceptable were unconditional surrender. At dawn on May 1st the rebels appeared to be contemplating resistance, but the negotiations for surrender were stimulated by the discharge from "Enniscorthy Emily" of a blank shell, and white flags were promptly run up on Vinegar Hill. Some of the rebels, whose members by this time were reduced to about four hundred, attempted to escape to the hills, but were rounded up and captured with those who surrendered. After the capitulation, the military and police seized in the Enniscorthy district forty-six rifles, sixty-six shot guns, eight pistols, six revolvers, a bomb, twenty-one and a half stone of blasting powder, six hundred and sixty-seven rounds of sporting ammunition, four thousand and sixty-seven rounds of rifle and machine ammunition, and a quantity of gelignite and other explosives; the rifles were mostly of German pattern, and among the ammunition was a quantity of soft-nosed bullets.

In the neighbouring County of Kilkenny no actual outbreak occurred, but the Volunteers were mobilised, and certain military precautions had to be taken. In County Kilkenny the Volunteer movement was started in March, 1914, at a meeting held in Kilkenny City, which was addressed by Roger Casement and Thomas MacDonagh.

After the split between the Volunteer bodies, one of the Irish Volunteers paid organisers arrived in Kilkenny, in April, 1915, and from this time the seditious organisation showed much activity and began to spread over the country districts. Kilkenny was a county which had supplied large numbers of recruits for the Army, and the number of Volunteers in the whole county did not exceed three hundred. What they lacked in numbers, however, they made good in efficiency, being perhaps the best drilled and best armed body of Volunteers in the provinces.

During the week of the Rebellion, though they did not rise, their activity engaged the close attention and aroused the anxiety of the police. On Easter Monday, in Kilkenny City, they moved about in groups—without arms—and in an obvious state of excitement. In the afternoon they attended at the railway station, apparently for the purpose of receiving some information which, however, did not arrive. Their cyclists were also very active, going out into the country, and one of their number who owned a motor car moved frequently about the county. The County Inspector of Royal Irish Constabulary took prompt steps to assemble as many armed men as possible, and by the morning of Wednesday, April 26th, had concentrated seventy under his command. On the following day he observed heliograph signalling in progress from Mount Leinster, on the border of County Wexford and County Carlow, which overlooks Enniscorthy, and answering signals from a northerly direction. A Constabulary force was hurried to protect the Barrow Bridge between County Wexford and County Waterford, by which troops from the south would be railed up to Wexford; its protection was subsequently taken over by the military. These precautions effectually

prevented a rising in County Kilkenny. After the suppression of the Rebellion, the police raided the local Volunteer hall, but discovered only a number of bayonets and pikes. The Volunteers' rifles, which were of modern magazine pattern, mostly Enfields, and their ammunition, had been concealed, and were not surrendered.

In County Galway the rebel centre was the town of Athenry, which since 1882 had been the headquarters of a secret society associated with the *Clan-na-Gael* in the United States. In this congested district, celebrated in the annals of Irish agrarian troubles, the Volunteer organisers had no difficulty in gaining adherents. The original Volunteer movement was established in Galway City at a meeting addressed by Casement, Pearse, MacNeill and a Galway man named Nicholls. After the split, the seditious movement was actively organised throughout 1915 by William Mellowes, who, after his deportation, returned to lead the rising. The Irish Volunteers drew their support chiefly from farmers' sons and labourers; they had little following in Galway City, which had recruited very well for the Army. In the country districts seditious publications enjoyed a large circulation. The police said they noticed that people not normally prosperous had a good deal of money to spend. The number of Volunteers in the county at the time of the outbreak was over a thousand. Less than a quarter of this number, however, were armed with rifles or shot guns. The majority of the insurgents employed the favourite weapon of the Rebellion of 1798—the pike. In another respect the rising in Galway in 1916 reproduced the conditions of the rising in Wexford in 1798. Most of the rebels were a type of men who did not take kindly to military discipline, and in their case nothing approximating to the state

of organisation and training that obtained elsewhere in the provinces had been reached. The rising in Galway in 1916, like the rising in Wexford in 1798, was less in the nature of a movement by a military force, such as that in the Dublin district and in County Wexford, than in the nature of an outbreak by an ill-armed and undisciplined rabble.

To make the history of this somewhat amorphous rising coherent, it is convenient to separate the operations in the West Riding and the East Riding of County Galway respectively. In the West Riding the Rebellion began soon after daybreak on Tuesday, April 25th, with an attack on the police barracks at Gort, nine and a half miles south-east of Galway. The barrack was defended and held for three hours by five policemen against a body of rebels who numbered about one hundred at the outset and received reinforcements during the fight. Finally the rebels withdrew to Clarenbridge, where they were further reinforced. Meanwhile another body of rebels, shortly after noon, began an attack on the barracks at Oranmore, some four miles east of Galway. They cut the telegraph lines, tore up the railway, and blasted a large hole in the bridge. The barrack at Oranmore was defended by four policemen during the whole afternoon until 7.30 p.m. when the County Inspector with a force of Constabulary, and a few soldiers from Galway, charged up the barricaded street, and put the rebels to flight. They retreated in the direction of Athenry, some in motor cars which had been held up and seized during the day. Ten were taken prisoners, and placed on board ship in Galway Bay.

On the following day, April 26th, the rebel bodies in the West Riding concentrated in the neighbourhood of Oranmore to the number of about

four hundred, and began a march upon Galway City. Three neighbouring barracks had in the meantime been closed, and the police withdrawn to Galway. The total force available, however, was small, and many of the men had seen exhausting service on the previous day. One party of police was nevertheless sent out along the Oranmore Road, and another on the Tuam Road, as it was uncertain by which route the rebels would attack the city. In Galway special constables were sworn in and armed with every available firearm, and all possible preparations were made for defence. The prospects of holding the town against the rebels were apparently small; but for the second time in the Rebellion there was a dramatic intervention of sea-power at the critical moment. A sloop of war, steaming up the Bay, turned its guns on the rebels, who had taken cover on a hill to engage the police.The first shell bursting on the hill decided the situation; the rebels retreated precipitately back towards Oranmore. Later in the day a force of two hundred troops was landed at Galway. At dawn on the following morning, April 27th, a mixed force of military and police moved out of the town and were met by a considerable party of rebels at Cahermore Cross-roads. A sharp encounter took place in which one constable was shot dead and others wounded, and the rebels were put to flight with some loss. Their main body had already retired to the old ruined Castle of Moyvore, in the wild country between Craughwell and Loughrea.

Meanwhile in the East Riding the first intimation the police had of the outbreak was on Tuesday, April 25th, when word came in that near Moyvore a constable had been shot and seriously wounded. On the same day the rebels in Athenry seized and established their headquarters at the

Town Hall, where they made bombs during the night. No attack was made on the barracks at Athenry, where the police had been reinforced. On the following morning they moved out about two miles to a farm belonging to the Department of Agriculture, where they remained for the night. On Thursday, April 27th, having torn up the railway line, cut the telegraph wires, and commandeered foodstuffs, they marched to Moyvore. Here the combined strength of the rebel forces from the East and West Ridings totalled about a thousand.

On Friday, April 28th, military went out from Galway to Athenry, and closed in upon the rebel encampment from the north. To the south the police of the district, reinforced by two hundred extra men from Belfast, were concentrated at Loughrea. By this time extensive desertions from the rebel force had begun, and, as it seemed likely that an encounter could be avoided, efforts were made to induce them to disperse. To these efforts a local priest lent his good offices. A contest for the decision ensued between him and Mellowes, who was strongly in favour of resistance. Finally the priest prevailed, and the rebels disbanded. Subsequently some five hundred arrests were made, and the majority of the men arrested were deported to England. Twelve of the men most prominent in the Galway rising were tried by Field General Court-martial and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Mellowes, after remaining in hiding for some time, finally succeeded in making good his escape from Ireland.

In the neighbouring County of Clare, the default of a rising was directly traceable to the interception of the Casement expedition. In this county the active Volunteers numbered about four hundred; but Clare had a bad re-

cord for agrarian crime, and the County Inspector, in his evidence before the Royal Commission on the Rebellion, gave it as his opinion that sympathy with the seditious movement was so extensive that, in the event of a rising, the number of insurgents would have been swollen to at least twelve hundred. The Clare Volunteers, who conducted themselves during the year before the Rebellion in a most aggressive fashion, and excited the people by marching under arms, were well drilled, and, in some cases, uniformed. They practised shooting with miniature rifles. With these and with shot guns they were well provided, but they were quite inadequately armed in respect of rifles, the total number of which in the county was estimated by the police at no more than about thirty-five. Immediately before the rising there was great activity on the part of the Volunteer organisers in Clare. On Easter Sunday the Volunteers massed in considerable numbers along the banks of the Shannon in the evident anticipation of the landing of arms from the Kerry side of the river. The arms, of course, did not arrive, with the result that there was no actual rising in Clare. The County, however, especially in the neighbourhood of Ennis, and the district about the railway between that place and the City of Limerick, remained during the week in such a disturbed condition that measures were taken to put Limerick in a state of defence against attack from the Clare side. All the approaches to Limerick were patrolled by military and police, and the bridges leading into the city from Clare were fortified with barricades and implacements for machine guns to resist attack. This state of tension in the City of Limerick—no disturbance occurred in the county, where the Volunteer strength was small—continued throughout the

week until the surrender in Dublin. After that surrender an extensive search for arms was made by the police in the County Clare, with small result, except at Listowel, where the Volunteers gave up their arms in a body.

Similarly in County Kerry the miscarriage of the Casement expedition effectively prevented an actual outbreak. The history of the seditious movement in Kerry is worth tracing in some detail, in the first place because it supplied an epitome of the development of events in Ireland generally, and in the next place because German connection with it was here definite and unmistakeable. Sir Morgan O'Connell, a descendant of Daniel O'Connell, "the Liberator," and a popular landowner, with a long association with the county, gave evidence on these points before the Royal Commission. In August, 1914, on the outbreak of war, the County of Kerry was absolutely peaceful. A good number of National Volunteers were carrying out drills and route marches, mostly on Sundays. These bodies were always well conducted on the roads, and considerate for other traffic. The vast majority of Kerry men were in complete sympathy with Great Britain in the war. Considerable numbers in the towns of the county enlisted in the Army, and these included many Volunteers. The Volunteers generally assisted recruiting, in many cases marching with their bands to the local railway stations to send off reservists and recruits. At this time there was not many arms in the county. These conditions persisted as late as May 1915, when the Band of the Irish Guards visited Killarney for recruiting purposes, and met with an excellent reception.

In that month, however, a sweeping change occurred in the situation. The Irish Volunteer

headquarters in Dublin decided to capture Kerry, and realised that in the state of the county a spectacular method was necessary to achieve this object. It had already been carrying on propagandist work on a limited scale, and with little success. Now it organised a monster demonstration to be held in Killarney on May 23rd. The holding of the meeting was advertised throughout the county, and John MacNeill was billed to deliver a speech and enlist recruits for the "Army of Ireland." The meeting was to be held immediately after some Gaelic Athletic Sports, which were the ostensible object of the gathering. The police warned the Irish Government of the purpose of the demonstration, and stated that it was plainly anti-recruiting and seditious. Sir Morgan O'Connell on May 22nd—the Saturday previous to the Sunday meeting—telegraphed to the Lord Lieutenant: "A meeting under auspices of *Sinn Fein* party is to be held here to-morrow, calling itself a football match, but with the perfectly open and avowed intention of being turned into an anti-recruiting meeting. Will Your Excellency do anything to stop this?" He received a reply to the effect that "Lord Lieutenant was not advised to prevent the meeting from taking place." He also telegraphed to the Central Recruiting Committee, which had been in constant correspondence with him about recruiting in Kerry, that, if this meeting were held, recruiting in Kerry would be killed. The meeting was, nevertheless, held, and John MacNeill delivered at it a strong speech for the Volunteers. There were five special trains at cheap fares to Killarney, bringing thousands of country people to hear the speech, as well as some five hundred armed Volunteers, who paraded the streets, while the countryside for ten miles round flocked into the town.

After this imposing demonstration of the strength of the Volunteer movement and the impotence of the Government, "*Sinn Feinism*," in Sir Morgan O'Connell's words, "spread in Kerry like fire on a mountain." Branches of the Irish Volunteers were actively organised, and their strength rapidly increased. The county was frequently visited by various members of the Dublin headquarters, and was flooded with seditious papers and pamphlets. Large quantities of arms and ammunition found their way into the county; in some districts house-to-house collections were made for the purpose of purchasing arms. Recruiting meetings for the Army still continued to be held, but the forces against recruiting became more and more hostile, and Sir Morgan O'Connell's prediction was completely justified by the event. By September 1915 the Volunteers carried out a good deal of skirmishing throughout the country and also practised night manœuvres. much to the terror of the people of Kerry. In the next month a deputation waited on the Listowel Race Committee and induced it to rescind a decision to give a penny in the shilling of the receipts to the Royal Munster Fusiliers' Fund. By February 1916 there were eighteen branches, with a membership of more than one thousand two hundred. During the month an organiser from Dublin was giving instruction in the use of the rifle and revolver in the west coast districts, and special instruction was also given in bayonet exercise and skirmishing.

The County Inspector of Royal Irish Constabulary, who had constantly kept the Government supplied with information on which it refused to act, fully appreciated the gravity of the situation when news of the pending arrival of the Casement

expedition was received, and took prompt steps to cope with the emergency. He followed up the arrest of Casement, on the morning of Good Friday, April 21st, by arresting Austin Stack, the local leader of the Volunteers, who was subsequently tried by Court-martial and sentenced to penal servitude for life. On the same day he telegraphed for extra police for Tralee, and these came in from outlying stations. Extra men were at once placed at Valentia Island and Waterville to patrol the cable stations. The County Inspector also got into communication with the General Officer Commanding at Queenstown, requesting the despatch of a military force. A force of a hundred soldiers, who were later reinforced, were promptly despatched by train, and arrived in Kerry early on the morning of Saturday, April 22nd. In the meantime more than 300 Volunteers had mobilised in Tralee with the evident intention of assisting in the landing of arms. But the arrest of Casement and Stack, who was in complete charge of the local plans, and the arrival of troops from Queenstown and of extra police from the country acted as a sufficient deterrent. The Volunteers at Tralee took no overt action, and those of them who had come from the country districts gradually left for their homes. Elsewhere the show of force was adequate to prevent an outbreak. No disturbance occured in the county except at Firies, near Killarney, where two police constables posting the proclamation of martial law were shot and seriously wounded. After the suppression of the Rebellion wholesale arrests were effected throughout the County Kerry.

A remarkable feature of the Rebellion in the provinces was the absence of an outbreak in the City of Cork—" rebel Cork "—a stronghold of

the Irish Volunteers. Apparently the rebels in Cork did not receive, until it was too late for them to take action, news of the rising in Dublin, whither some of their members were believed to have gone between Good Friday and Easter Monday to take part in the Dublin operations. When the news of events in the capital reached Cork the local Volunteers proposed to follow the example of the Dublin rebels and seize the General Post Office; but in the meantime the military, under the orders of an officer more alert, had occupied this building and other important points. The Volunteers, frustrated in their design, stood to arms doing the work in their headquarters, where they were visited by the Roman Catholic Bishop and the Lord Mayor, whose appeals to them to lay down their arms were unavailing. No collision with the troops occurred, however, and upon the suppression of the Rebellion elsewhere the Cork Volunteers, after negotiation, surrendered their arms.

In the County of Cork a general parade of Volunteers was held on Easter Sunday, April 23rd. They were ordered to be fully equipped, to take two days' rations, and to march to various named destinations—all situated in the the direction of County Kerry. When it was discovered that the sinking of the German arms ship had frustrated their obvious intention of taking over arms from her, they returned to their respective places of assembly, where they remained mobilised during the week. No disturbance, however, took place in the County of Cork, with the exception of an affray in the Fermoy district, where the police in attempting to effect arrests in the house of a family named Kent were met with armed resistance, and the Head Con-

stable was shot dead. On the arrival of military reinforcements, the occupants of the house, all of whom were wounded, surrendered. One who attempted to escape was shot and killed; another was subsequently tried by Court-martial for the murder of the Head Constable and executed.

The rest of the South of Ireland was quiet throughout the week of the Rebellion. Some unrest was apparent in Belfast and the southern districts of Ulster, and early in the week the police, acting under military instructions, made a large number of domiciliary visits in the city and suburbs of Belfast, arresting some thirty persons suspected of being connected with the rebellious movement. Though the situation in Ulster throughout was officially described as "normal," a serious outbreak threatened in County Tyrone, and prompt military measures were organised in Belfast to prevent a rising. Observations of the movements of some local *Sinn Fein* sympathisers prompted the conclusion that secret mobilisation might be in prospect in the mountains of Mid-Tyrone. The military authorities in Belfast issued an immediate appeal for motor transport, and within an hour, with the aid of civilian organisation and that of the Ulster Volunteers, over a hundred vehicles were placed at their disposal. A flying column of 300 men was thus despatched on Tuesday, April 25th, to Dungannon, where post office, telegraph and telephone business was prohibited, and to Cappagh, where a guard was mounted on the reservoir. The column pushed on to Carrickmore, where a search for concealed guns revealed three thousand rounds of ammunition in cases and bandoliers. For the remainder of the week military and police in motor transport were actively engaged in rounding up Volunteers in

various parts of Ulster, and some three hundred arrests were effected.

In the three Southern Provinces during the week after Easter Week flying columns similarly proceeded to various points to stimulate surrenders. No opposition was encountered in the course of these measures of pacification. On Tuesday, May 2nd, Sir John Maxwell issued an order that "all members of the Irish Volunteer *Sinn Fein* organisation, or of the Citizen Army, shall forthwith surrender all arms, ammunition and explosives in their possession to the nearest Military Authority or to the nearest Police Station." Despite the fact that this order proceeded to declare that any member found in possession of arms or explosives after May 6th would be severely dealt with, and despite the closest search, only about thirty *per cent.* of the amount of arms and explosives known to be in the possession of the seditious organisations throughout the country was surrendered.

The Rebellion, now suppressed, though, as later events were to show, its members were not yet quenched, had cost a heavy toll of life. The military casualties, as reported by Sir John Maxwell in his despatch, totalled 17 officers killed and 46 wounded, and 89 other ranks killed and 288 wounded. In addition, naval casualties were one killed and two wounded, and six loyal Volunteers killed and ten wounded. Police casualties numbered two officers and twelve men killed, and twenty-three men wounded in the case of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and three men killed and three wounded in the case of the Dublin Metropolitan Police. According to the reports received from the police and medical authorities, 180 civilians were killed, and 614 wounded passed through the hospitals. These figures, doubtless, included a

certain percentage of the rebel casualties, which, in the conditions of the fighting, were not ascertainable with any degree of accuracy; the rebels' losses, it may be presumed, since they fought for the most part behind cover, were substantially less than the military.

CHAPTER XI.

THE AFTERMATH OF REBELLION

It is probably no exaggeration to say that, immediately after the suppression of the Rebellion, Home Rulers and Unionists alike, apart from the passively and actively seditious groups now submerged and impotent, were prepared for, and would have welcomed, a period of what, in the convention of Unionist politics, is called "firm government." While there were many who admired the courage of the enterprise, its aftermath left those who had taken part in it with no open supporters in the vocal body of the Irish people. The social and economic life of Dublin, though it began to recover with remarkable rapidity, was for the moment completely disjointed. The actual loss of property in the Rebellion was estimated at two and a half million pounds, and the consequential damage was, of course, enormously greater. Great numbers of people were thrown out of work, though the task of clearing the ruins, strengthening buildings whose fabrics had been weakened or damaged, and restoring the civic services, relieved to a considerable extent the volume of unemployment. In the provinces, though the destruction of property had not been extensive, the normal course of industry and commerce had been completely interrupted; in particular agriculture, the staple industry of Ireland, which was enjoying a vastly swollen prosperity in consequence of the war, had been brought to a standstill so far as the export of stock and produce was concerned as a result of the suspension of all ordinary communication facilities while troop movements were in progress.

On the one hand, therefore, the loss of life and the damage to their material prosperity in which it had involved them were scarcely calculated to engage the sympathy of the Irish people for the authors of the Rebellion. On the other hand, the *régime* of martial law produced in commercial circles a sense of security which, after some three years' experience of the utmost unsettlement and instability in the conditions of Irish life, was by no means unwelcome.

A variety of causes, however, conspired to defeat the prospect that the Rebellion would rapidly become an unhappy incident of the past in Irish history, and to turn a great volume of Irish opinion into a channel of emotional sympathy with the rebels and of strong hostility to the British connexion. In the first place, the Government, presumably with the object of reassuring British and Allied opinion, made no attempt to explain the real gravity of the Rebellion, but rather inspired the English Press to treat it merely as a sort of street riot on an extensive scale. To that unintelligent attitude of the British Government may ultimately be traced many of the troubles which followed upon the Rebellion. Its policy of minimising the gravity of the Rebellion inevitably threw into disproportionately high relief the punishment inflicted on the leaders of the rising, and the measures taken for the pacification of Ireland. Whether that punishment and these measures were excessive, judged by the standard of the facts of the situation, is one question, which this historical survey is not concerned to answer. Whether the gloss which the Government put upon the facts of the situation by depreciating the gravity of the outbreak did not make them appear excessive to a large section of the Irish public is another question, which admits of but one answer.

On Wednesday, May 3rd, four days after the surrender of the rebels, it was officially announced in Dublin that "three signatories of the notice proclaiming the Irish Republic, P. H. Pearse, T. MacDonagh, and T. J. Clarke, have been tried by Field Court-Martial and sentenced to death. The sentence having been duly confirmed the three above-mentioned men were shot this morning." That brief announcement may be said to have begun the great revulsion of Irish National feeling which subsequently swept over the whole country and went far towards securing in their death the objects which the leaders of the Rebellion had failed to secure in their lives. It was not so much the fact of the executions as the manner of them and their announcement which shocked a considerable section of the Irish public. Had the rebel leaders been tried in public even by a Military Court; had it been possible to try them all while the tragic events of the Rebellion were fresh in the public mind; had their association with Germany and the extreme gravity of their action in relation to the European war been clearly stated and brought home to the Irish people which, if the sacrifice of soldiers on the battlefields of Europe be a test, had unmistakably proved where lay its sympathies in the war—had such a course been followed the executions, while they might still have been criticised, would probably not have produced so profound a stir among peaceable Nationalists. It was the bald announcement of the executions, following upon the complete secrecy which invests the proceedings of "drumhead" Courts-martial, with no statement whatever of the degree of guilt which justified the infliction of the capital penalty, that aroused National sentiment.

The effects of the executions, moreover, were

cumulative. Day by day, as the Rebellion itself receded more and more into memory, day by day the tale of executions was told piecemeal.*

On Thursday, May 4th, a curt official notice announced the executions of Joseph Plunkett, Edmund Daly, Michael Hanrahan, and William Pearse. On Friday, May 5th, followed the announcement of the execution of John MacBride. On Saturday, May 6th, it was announced that Constance Georgina Marcievicz and Henry O'Hanrahan had been sentenced to death, but that the sentence had been commuted to penal servitude for life by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. In numerous cases Sir John Maxwell exercised clemency in commuting death sentences to varying terms of penal servitude, and in remitting portions of sentences of penal servitude; but the daily list of executions in the eyes of the growing mass of Nationalist opinion quite offset the effects of this clemency. On Monday, May 8th, came the announcement of the executions of Cornelius Colbert, Edmund Kent, Michael Mallin and J. J. Heuston. Three of these were quite unknown names, and the notice added that they "took a very prominent part in the Rebellion." On Wednesday, May 10th, the execution of Thomas Kent was announced, and in this case it was specifically stated that his offence was the murder of a police constable in the affray near Fermoy. It was not until Thursday, May 11th, however, that there was added to a further list of

* The mood of Nationalist sentiment was expressed by Mr. James Stephens in the lines:—

"And day by day they told that one was dead,
And day by day the seasons mourned for you
Until that count of woe was finished,
And Spring remembered all was yet to do."

the result of trials by Court-martial a notice in the following terms:—

"In view of the gravity of the Rebellion and its connection with German intrigue and propaganda, and in view of the great loss of life and property resulting therefrom, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has found it imperative to inflict the most severe penalties on the known organisers of this detestable rising and on those Commanders who took an active part in the actual fighting which occurred. It is hoped that these examples will be sufficient to act as a deterrent to intriguers, and to bring home to them that the murder of his Majesty's liege subjects, or other acts calculated to imperil the safety of the Realm, will not be tolerated."

There followed almost immediately the announcement of the two final executions, those of James Connolly, whose execution had been delayed by his wound, and MacDermot.

Among other leaders dealt with by secret Court-martial sentences amounting in the aggregate to several hundred years of imprisonment were passed. The rank and file taken in the fighting were lodged temporarily in Dublin barracks.

Meanwhile the process of arresting "suspects" was in active operation everywhere throughout the country. Some three thousand persons, apart from those who were being dealt with by Court-martial, were finally deported to England. In the course of this process a not inconsiderable number of men perfectly innocent of any connection with the rising, including even a couple of Orangemen, were arrested. In the haste and confusion of the moment mistakes of this kind could scarcely be avoidable; but they

served to add fuel to the fire of resentment against the *régime* of martial law. Perhaps the most potent cause of unrest, however, were the reports which simultaneously began to circulate that during the military operations in Dublin a number of peaceful citizens had been deliberately shot without cause by the troops. There was, unhappily, a certain measure of solid and incontrovertible foundation for these reports. During the Rebellion, three men, Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, an ardent pacificist, who was actually on his way to use his influence to put a stop to looting; McIntyre, the editor of an anti-Larkinite paper; and Dixon, the editor of a weekly publication called the *Eye-Opener*, were arrested and taken to Portobello Barracks. None of them had the smallest sympathy or connection with the Rebellion; but all of them, without any form of trial whatever, were shot at the Barracks by order of Captain J. C. Bowen-Colthurst, an officer who was subsequently tried by Court-martial, and found to be of unsound mind. Other cases of the shooting of innocent persons did undoubtedly occur; but they were explained, if not excused, by the nature of the fighting. On the establishment of the cordons some streets were found to be strongly held by rebels occupying the roofs of houses, upper windows, and strongly constructed barricades, from which they inflicted severe loss on the troops, and, once the cordon was established, the troops were subjected to a continuous fire by night from rebels concealed in houses. One such street was North King Street, where, after the Rebellion, several persons whom there was no reason to suspect of complicity in the rising were found dead of bullet wounds in circumstances which suggested a desire to conceal their bodies. In confused and desperate fighting of this char-

acter some innocent persons were shot in error; there may have occurred cases where individual soldiers, harassed and short of rest and food, "saw red." Not only innocent citizens suffered, however; that the conditions of fighting were not calculated to induce the nicest discrimination is sufficiently proved by the fact that in Guinness's Brewery, when a night attack by rebels was expected, two officers were shot dead by their own men. Cases of wrongful as distinct from accidental shooting of citizens, when the circumstances were taken into account, were surprisingly few. Sir John Maxwell claimed in his despatch respecting the operations that "the troops as a whole behaved with the greatest restraint, and carried out their disagreeable and distasteful duties in a manner which reflected the greatest credit on their discipline." Nevertheless the belief that the troops had perpetrated "atrocities" in Dublin gained the widest currency.

From all these causes Sir John Maxwell's administration of Ireland under Martial Law became in the eyes of a great mass of Nationalists utterly detestable. That old suspicion and dislike of the British Army which the war seemed to have destroyed gained a new lease of bitter life. There occurred a profound reaction of National sentiment. The rebel leaders, without any wide public influence in their lives, became in their death popular heroes and martyrs. Martial Law, widely welcomed at the outset as a guarantee of public security, became identified with odious memories of *régimes* of "Coercion" which had been fading into the forgotten backgrounds of Irish history. Badges of the Republican colours were everywhere openly worn about the streets of Dublin. Throughout the country a wave of emotion swept great numbers of Nationalists into the Republican camp. The whole basis of the con-

stitutional Home Rule movement seemed in imminent danger of being undermined. The origins of the most formidable physical force movement in Irish history seemed to be in process of being laid in the ruins of the Rebellion.

This revulsion of popular feeling in Ireland was accompanied by a similar revulsion of feeling among the Irish of the United States. Here, again, though American journalists flocked to Ireland on the suppression of the Rebellion, the British Government made no effort to explain the gravity of the Rebellion to the American public. Even the best informed of the great pro-Ally American newspapers, while admitting that they were imperfectly informed, declared that in any circumstances the execution of the rebel leaders was a capital political blunder. The severity of Martial Law was undoubtedly exaggerated in the United States. There was an appeal issued by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, which drew a pathetic picture of the hunger and distress alleged to have arisen out of the Rebellion. It stated that, under the presidency of Cardinal Gibbons, Farley and O'Connell, "a nation-wide movement has been inaugurated to relieve the appalling misery and destitution that exist to-day in Ireland," and that an American Relief Committee would proceed to Ireland and administer the funds under the direction of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin.

It is probable that the sum total of distress among the families of rebels was less than that among the families which the Rebellion had thrown out of employment. A few of the persons arrested were almost at once released, being obviously innocent. The aggregate of persons deported was, as has been stated, about three thousand. Some of the cases were quickly dealt with, and the men released after a short detention. Finally about

2,000 prisoners reached the Frongoch internment camp in North Wales. Of these about seventy *per cent.* were set free three months later on the recommendation of an advisory committee. Meanwhile the public had taken good care of the families of the rebels; two separate funds started for this purpose collected within two months a sum of eleven thousand pounds. The appeal to America was also very successful. It was read at mass meetings in New York and other American cities. At one of these meetings considerable capital was made of the presence of Miss Monteith, a relative of the Robert Monteith who landed in Ireland from the German submarine with Casement and Bailey.

The temper of a great mass of Irish and Irish-American opinion was in an excited state when on May 12th, having announced in the House of Commons on the previous day that the Government regarded the situation as unsatisfactory, and that he considered it to be his duty to proceed to Ireland and to consult the authorities, Mr. Asquith landed in Ireland. He remained in Ireland about a week, during which he visited Belfast and Cork, and conferred with representatives of various parties, not excluding the rebel prisoners in Dublin. On May 24th he reported the result of his mission to the House of Commons. It had left, he said, 'two main dominant impressions' on his mind. "The first was the break-down of the existing machinery of the Irish Government, and the next was the strength and depth, and I might almost say, without exaggeration, the universality of the feeling in Ireland that we have now a unique opportunity for a new departure for a settlement of outstanding problems, and for a general and combined effort to obtain agree-

ment as to the way in which the government of Ireland should in future be carried on."

Evidence of the breakdown of the existing machinery of Irish government was visible in the heart of Dublin, which wore the appearance of a war-swept town in Flanders. Nor was the strength and depth of the desire of all parties in Ireland for a settlement open to question. There hung on the walls of Dublin and other Irish towns a recruiting poster, the first lines of which displayed in bold type these words:—"The Curse of War—What it means—Keep it from Ireland's Fields and Towns." Some of these posters in Dublin now hung in mockery scored with bullet holes. The curse of war had come upon Ireland, and the citizens of Dublin, at least, know only too well what war meant. They had heard in their streets the rattle of musketry, the vicious knocking of machine guns, the boom of artillery, the screech and deafening explosion of shells. They had seen their dead lying in streets lit up by the glare of infernal conflagrations. They had seen a wide area of the city lying in impressive ruin. They had experienced that complete stoppage of all the amenities of life, and much of that suspension of the bare necessaries of existence, which war brings in its train. They realised, as in a flash, the real significance of that "Civil War" of which there had been such almost light-hearted talk before the war; and all Ireland recoiled from the contemplation of the mere possibility that after the war in which Irishmen of all creeds and classes, north, south, east and west, had fought shoulder to shoulder, there could be any return to the old bitterness and violence of domestic strife in Ireland.

The moment, as Mr. Asquith claimed, was propitious for settlement. But both the Minister de-

puted to negotiate the settlement and the scheme of settlement proposed were alike unfortunate. The negotiation was entrusted to Mr. Lloyd George, who was not liked by either party in Ireland, and that Minister committed what was afterwards recognised to be the capital blunder of attempting the task of settlement without even paying a visit to Ireland. Moreover, the Government did not make, as Mr. Asquith had said, "a new departure" for the settlement; instead it took up the negotiations at the point where they had broken down in the Buckingham Palace Conference on the eve of the war two years before. The basis on which Mr. Lloyd George was commissioned by the Cabinet to attempt to negotiate a settlement was that the Home Rule Act should be brought into immediate operation, but that the six Ulster Counties of Down, Antrim, Londonderry, Armagh, Monaghan and Tyrone should be excluded from its scope. This arrangement was to continue for the period of the war and a year afterwards, by which time, it was given to be understood, an Imperial Conference would bring the question of Irish government under review in relation with the general problem of Imperial reconstruction. Whether the excluded Ulster counties were to be bound by the decisions of such a Conference, or were to preserve complete freedom of action—whether, in other words, exclusion was to be "temporary" or "permanent"—was a question which, probably not without intention, was left vague and uncertain in the earlier steps of the negotiations.

The first body in Ireland to deliberate upon the proposed settlement was the Ulster Unionist Council, which met under the presidency of Sir Edward Carson on Monday, June 12th. Many Irishmen at least were astonished when the Council

proceeded to tear up the Solemn Covenant, and agreed to the terms proposed on the strict understanding that the exclusion of the six Counties was to be "definite." Its assent was secured largely by the aid of a mysterious plea of "Imperial necessity" which Mr. Lloyd George invoked; this was understood to concern the state of Irish-American opinion, and the safe output and transit of American munitions of war, but it was afterwards denied that the latter consideration carried any weight with the Government. The decision of the Ulster Unionists was followed by a Convention of the Nationalists of Ulster, which also—after a stern contest with the Ulster Roman Catholic Hierarchy, which strongly opposed the settlement—agreed to the terms proposed, but in this case on the strict understanding that the exclusion of the six Counties was to be "provisional." Vague hopes were also held out of a general amnesty for the prisoners under sentence of penal servitude.

From this fundamental variation in the terms accepted by the two contracting parties; from the fact that neither their leaders, nor Mr. Lloyd George, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, were plenipotentiaries; and from the fact that a scheme which proposed the partition of Ireland was repugnant to the national instinct of the great majority of Irishmen of all parties—from all these causes, but especially from the last, the "settlement" miscarried. The actual occasion of its collapse was the insistence of Unionist Ministers that the terms of the Amending Bill embodying the "settlement" should make it clear that the excluded Ulster counties could not be brought into the Home Rule Scheme against their will, and that, when the Home Rule Act was brought into operation, the Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament should be reduced.

On the ground that these provisions departed from the proposals submitted to him by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Redmond, on behalf of the Nationalist Party, repudiated the "settlement." But there is little doubt that he was not altogether sorry for the opportunity, and that the attitude of the Unionist Ministers was merely the occasion, and not the cause, of the breakdown. Its causes lay deeper. Delays in the Cabinet in giving effect to the "settlement" afforded time for the Irish people to disown the "settlement" which their political leaders had accepted. It rapidly became clear that these leaders on both sides had ceased to be representative. Nationalist public bodies all over the country protested against the partition of Ireland, permanent or temporary. Steps were taken by the Nationalists of Ulster, with the approval and support of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, to organise a new party which should maintain the traditional Nationalist policy of a United Ireland. Only the abandonment of Mr. Lloyd George's proposals prevented a split in the Nationalist ranks as serious as the Parnellite split, and the repudiation of Mr. Redmond's leadership by a large body of his nominal followers. On the Unionist side, opposition to the "settlement" was equally formidable. The Southern Unionists, who had hitherto slavishly followed the lead of Ulster in all things, assumed an attitude of independence and warmly denounced the action of the Ulster Unionist Council in deserting them. Even the Unionists of Ulster were not satisfied with the situation. They had never been sincere in their demand for exclusion; that demand was at the outset a tactical manœuvre designed to defeat the whole Home Rule policy, and later a *pis aller* adopted more for the sake of consistency than anything else. The

policy of exclusion had never yet been seriously considered by Ulster Unionists on its merits, and it became apparent, once they stood committed to it, that the more they considered it the less they liked it.

The delay on the part of the Government in pressing forward the "settlement" which enabled popular opposition in Ireland to repudiate its acceptance by Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Redmond was secured chiefly by the action of the Southern Unionists. These represented to the Unionist Ministers in the Coalition Government, in a *memorandum* presented on June 26th that "if these proposals are carried out, the members of the *Sinn Fein* movement will themselves usurp the power of Government in Ireland," and that "if Ireland remains in an unsettled and dangerous condition, as we believe it will under these proposals, special naval and military arrangements will have to be made to meet this condition, and this would be manifestly a dangerous interference with the best use of both services in the prosecution of the war." There was sufficient substance in this argument to impress the Cabinet. The Republican party, already large and growing, as we have seen, accepted the fact of the proposed "settlement" as a reward of rebellion, and used the form of "settlement," which was repugnant to the national instincts of the vast majority of Irishmen, to recruit its strength further. The Ulster Unionists had played fast and loose with their Solemn Covenant. The Irish Party had hauled down the flag of an "United Ireland." The Republicans seemed to be the only party left which still had convictions and the courage of them, and thus attracted the support of political elements which turned to any quarter where they could find consistency and sincerity. In any case, the argu-

ment of the Southern Unionists made the Unionist Ministers so doubtful of the wisdom of the "settlement" that they delayed in giving effect to it long enough for Irish public opinion to make itself articulate in determined opposition to it. There was to those who preferred constitutional to violent methods in politics, and moral suasion to physical force, a consoling reflection in the fact that the failure of the partition proposals was secured, in the last analysis, by the action of Southern Unionists; for that party made its voice effective in spite of the fact that it was the only party in Ireland which preserved a strict right to be called constitutional, the only party which had not participated in the Volunteer movement, the only party which was not in a position to support its arguments with rifles.

On July 24th, 1916, two years to a day after the breakdown of the Buckingham Palace Conference, Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons that, in default of any prospect of securing agreement, the Government did not intend to proceed with the "settlement." A week later he announced that it proposed to restore the machinery of Irish Government which not three months before he had described as having "broken down;" a new Chief Secretary was appointed in the person of Mr. Duke, the Unionist member for Exeter; Lord Wimborne was re-appointed Lord Lieutenant, and the discredited administration of Dublin Castle was reconstituted. At this point the history of the Irish Rebellion of 1916 may conveniently be brought to an end; for at this point the immediate train of events which it set in motion reached its period. The ultimate consequences of the Rebellion, however, remained to be revealed: there was rarely a time in the history of Ireland when her future political conditions were less easily

calculable. We must end this book, like the sceptical German philosopher, with a question mark. Would the influence of the Rebellion produce, in spite of the failure of the first impulse in that direction, a secure and lasting Irish settlement? "Or else——?"

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE REBELLION IN IRELAND.

[*The Royal Commission was appointed on May 10th, 1916, and consisted of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Sir Montague Shearman, and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers.*]

TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

May it please Your Majesty—

1. We the undersigned now humbly submit to Your Majesty our Report on the matters into which we were directed to inquire.

2. The terms of reference to us were "to inquire into the causes of the recent outbreak of rebellion in Ireland, and into the conduct and degree of responsibility of the civil and military executive in Ireland in connection therewith."

3. In pursuance of these instructions we have held nine meetings, of which five were held in London and four in Dublin. At the first sitting the Commission of Your Majesty was read.

4. We have examined twenty-nine witnesses. They were examined in public except in so far as their evidence dealt with German intrigues or police information. Four other persons submitted to us signed statements, and these will be found in the Appendix immediately following upon the evidence taken in public.

5. We had interviews with various persons who kindly discussed with us the subjects into which we had to inquire. We also received statements from several persons who offered to give evidence, but, having regard to the scope of our inquiry, we did not think it necessary to call them as witnesses.

6. We purpose to consider the matters referred to in the following order—namely, (*a*) the constitution of the Irish Executive, in so far as it is concerned with the maintenance of law and order ; (*b*) the legal power vested in that Executive ; and (*c*) the history of events leading up to the outbreak of the 24th April, 1916, together with our observations and conclusions thereon.

The Irish Government.

The executive government of Ireland is entrusted to three officers, namely, the Lord Lieutenant, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, and the Under-Secretary ; and for the purpose of maintaining order they have at their disposal two police forces, namely, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police force. " Theoretically," says Sir William Anson, " the executive government of Ireland is conducted by the Lord Lieutenant in Council, subject to instructions which he may receive from the Home Office of the United Kingdom. Practically it is conducted for all important purposes by the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant." (Law and Customs of the Constitution, ed. 1892, p. 189.)

The Lord Lieutenant (who is also Governor-General) is resident in Ireland. By the terms of his patent he is responsible for the civil government of the country, and the naval and military forces of the Crown in Ireland are under his orders. But, when the Chief Secretary is in the Cabinet and the Lord Lieutenant is not, all powers and responsibility are in practice vested in the Chief Secretary. His policy is the policy of the British Government as a whole, and it is obviously impossible that there should be any other independent authority or responsibility in Ireland. For many years past the office of Lord Lieutenant has been a ceremonial office ; apart from the exercise of the prerogative of mercy he has no executive functions. Proclamations, appointments and other State

documents are issued in his name, but they are put before him for signature, without previous consultation. He is only furnished with information as to the state of the country which he nominally governs, when he asks for it, and then as a matter of courtesy. The military and naval forces in Ireland take their orders from the War Office and Admiralty respectively.

The office of Chief Secretary is a political office, changing with the Government. The Executive Government of Ireland is entirely in his hands subject to the control of the Cabinet. When the Chief Secretary is a member of the Cabinet, as has been the case in recent years, he is, of necessity, to a great extent an absentee from Ireland. He has to attend Cabinet Meetings, and he is the only person who can, with authority, answer questions and defend the Government policy in the House of Commons. Although the Chief Secretary is in the position of a Secretary of State, he has no Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and the Irish law officers are frequently not members of the House of Commons. During the last two and a half years of Mr. Birrell's nine years' tenure of office Parliament has been in almost continuous session. He had, therefore, during this critical period but little opportunity of making himself personally acquainted with the state of affairs in Ireland. He was dependent for information on the reports of his Under-Secretary and the advice given by those Irish members of Parliament whom he chose to consult.

The Under-Secretary is a civil servant, residing in Ireland. For practical purposes he can only take action under authority delegated to him by the Chief Secretary. His duty is to report fully and fairly to his Chief all information that he can obtain, to give his advice freely as to what should be done, and then loyally to carry out the instructions of his Chief without regard to any personal opinion of his own.

For the ordinary maintenance of law and order the Irish Government have two police forces, viz., the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police Force. Both forces are under the direct control of the Irish Government, though a rate is levied in Dublin as a contribution to the expenses of the Dublin force (see 12 & 13 Vict. c. 91,

ss. 29, 30). It appears that since 1905 the Dublin Corporation have refused to pay the proceeds of this rate into the police fund, and that the matter has been adjusted by deducting the amount from the Local Taxation account. The Royal Irish Constabulary is a quasi-military force. Its members are armed with carbines and taught to shoot. They police the whole of Ireland, except the Dublin police district. When the rebellion broke out the Constabulary was somewhat under strength, as it had furnished a good many recruits to the Army. The military authorities were naturally anxious to get recruits from a body of men with splendid physique and a fine record of honourable service. The Dublin police is also a fine body of men, and its numbers were also slightly diminished by reason of enlistments. The force is unarmed, consequently when an armed rebellion broke out in Dublin the police had to be withdrawn from duty. If Dublin, like Cork and Belfast, had been policed by the Royal Irish Constabulary, a thousand armed and disciplined policemen, knowing every nook and cranny of the city, would have been a formidable addition to the thousand soldiers who were available when the rebellion first broke out, and the rebels might have hesitated to face them. As Sir Matthew Nathan expressed it in his letter of the 18th December, 1915, to Mr. Birrell, in the event of an outbreak, "Each policeman would be worth three soldiers." It is clear from the evidence that the two police forces work cordially together, but it is obvious that two separate forces, under separate commands, cannot be in a time of emergency as efficient as a single force under one command. Each of the forces has a small special Crimes branch, drawn from uniformed men. For ordinary police purposes this branch does its work well, but it is not specially qualified to deal with political crime, which takes no notice of the boundaries of police districts, and which in the case of Ireland assumes an international complexion.

If the Irish system of government be regarded as a whole it is anomalous in quiet times, and almost unworkable in times of crisis.

Legal Powers of the Irish Executive.

The legal powers vested in the Irish Government for the maintenance of law and order and the suppression of sedition must now be considered.

From 1881 to 1906 the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act (44 & 45 Vict., c. 5)* was in force in that country. Under that enactment the Govenment had complete control over the importation and sale of arms and ammunition, and over the carrying of arms or the possession of ammunition. The Act was a temporary one continued from year to year by the Expiring Laws Continuance Act. In 1906 the Act was allowed to lapse by Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman's Government. But the Irish Government had other, though less efficient, powers for dealing with unauthorised bodies who sought to arm themselves. If the ordinary excise duty on carrying a gun had been enforced a complete register of firearms would have been obtained, and the poorer members of the community might have found difficulty in paying the license duty (see the Gun License Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 57)). It seems that no attempt was made to enforce this law, the only reason alleged being that the people concerned would have refused to take out the license and pay the duty.

The Explosive Substances Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 83), which applies to the whole of the United Kingdom, gives drastic powers for dealing with explosives, and it may be assumed that the term "explosive" would include stores of ammunition as well as high explosives. Under that Act if any person has in his possession any explosive substance he is guilty of felony and liable on conviction to 14 years' penal servitude, unless he can show that he was in possession thereof for a lawful object (sect. 4). Accessories are liable to a like punishment. For the purpose of discovering stores of explosives, the Attorney-General, if he has reasonable ground for believing that the Act has been disobeyed, may order an inquiry at which witnesses may be examined on oath, although no person is charged with any crime under the Act.

The Unlawful Drilling Act, 1819 (60 Geo. 3. c. 1), is an Act

* Commonly known as the Arms Act.

" to prevent the training of persons to the use of Arms and to the practice of Military Evolutions and Exercise." It prohibits drilling and military exercises unless authorised by the Crown, the lieutenant, or two county justices, and authorises any justice or peace officer to disperse any meeting unauthorised for drilling, and to arrest the persons attending it. As regards procedure, the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 20), besides providing for special jury trials in proclaimed districts, empowers the Lord Lieutenant by proclamation to prohibit or suppress " dangerous associations," and defines as dangerous any association which (*inter alia*) interferes with the administration of the law or disturbs the maintenance of law and order.

It may be noted too that the old Acts, known as the Whiteboy Acts, some of which were passed by the Irish Parliament, appear to be still in force. These Acts give the Government extensive powers for dealing with riotous or unlawful assemblies.

The Irish Government have also the ordinary common law powers for proceeding against persons who publish seditions libels or engage in seditious conspiracies. But legal powers are of no avail unless the Government make up their minds to put them into execution, and can rely on juries and magistrates to do their duty when prosecutions are supported by adequate evidence.

War broke out on the 4th August, 1914, and on the 8th August the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29), was passed. This Act authorised His Majesty in Council to issue Regulations, during the continnance of the war, " for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm," and instituted trial by Court Martial for serious offences against the Regulations. Under these provisions there appeared to be ample powers for dealing with any manifestations of sedition or rebellion. But as regards Ireland, the teeth of this enactment were drawn by the Defence of the Realm Amendment Act, 1915 (5 Geo. 5, c. 34), which was passed on the 18th March, 1915. That Act provided that any British subject (not being a person subject to military law) charged with an offence under the Defence of the Realm

Acts might claim to be tried by a jury in a civil court, instead of by court martial. Power was given to His Majesty to suspend the operation of this provision "in the event of invasion or other special military emergency." But it certainly would have been difficult to have justified the exercise of this suspensory power in Ireland before any actual outbreak in arms had occurred. It was impossible, as stated by Mr. Birrell and other witnesses, to get a conviction, in any case tried by a jury, for an offence against law and order however strong the evidence for the Crown might be. The power of internment conferred by the regulations applied primarily to foreigners, and only extended to British subjects when "hostile association" could be established. Therefore, however serious an offence might be, the only remedy was a prosecution before a court of summary jurisdiction, where six months' imprisonment was the maximum punishment that could be imposed, and when a case was tried before justices there was no certainty that the decision would be in accordance with the evidence.

Causes of the Outbreak.

In dealing with the series of events which led up to the outbreak of the 24th April, 1916, and in endeavouring to elucidate the causes of the rebellion in Ireland, the fact should be borne in mind that there is always a section of opinion in that country bitterly opposed to the British connection, and that in times of excitement this section can impose its sentiments on largely increased numbers of the people. As Mr. Birrell described it: "The spirit of what to-day is called *Sinn Feinism* is mainly composed of the old hatred and distrust of the British connection, always noticeable in all classes, and in all places, varying in degree, and finding different ways of expression, but always there as the background of Irish politics and character."

The incidents which preceded the rising in April 1916 are fully detailed in the evidence of the witnesses, but may be summarised as follows:—In the winter of 1913, while industrial strikes were in progress in Dublin, an armed force of working men, officially called the Citizen Army, was first created. As this force was partly armed, and the Dublin Metropolitan

Police are an unarmed force, the employers were in some cases compelled to arm their carters to resist intimidation by the strikers. This lawless display of force should have been a warning against the recent policy of permitting the indiscriminate arming of civilians in Ireland in times of turbulence and faction. In periods of peace it may be desirable in an orderly community to disregard some seditious utterances as mere vapouring, but when a country is engaged in a serious struggle sedition alters its aspect and becomes treason, dangerous to the community, and should promptly be suppressed. As stated by Sir David Harrel in his evidence, the Irish people "are easily led, and it is therefore the more incumbent on Government to nip lawlessness and disorder in the bud. Neglect in this respect has invariably led to things getting out of hand, with the result that strong repressive measures become necessary, and much hardship is imposed upon misled, but perhaps comparatively inoffensive people."

On the 13th December, 1913, in view of information that arms were entering the province of Ulster from foreign countries, including Germany, a Proclamation was issued under the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, prohibiting the importation of arms into Ireland In defiance of this, large quantities of arms were surreptitiously imported by night at Larne and other places, in April, 1914. Before this date other similar consignments had been seized and confiscated. It has been stated that as a matter of policy it was decided by the Government not to take proceedings against those responsible for this breach of the law. The validity of the Proclamation was afterwards questioned in an action brought by a gunsmith of Ulster against the Customs authorities, but on the 15th June, 1914, a majority of an Irish court upheld its validity. Notwithstanding this decision the Irish Government decided to withdraw the Proclamation, and the withdrawal, though decided on before the outbreak of the War, was publicly notified on the 5th August, 1914, the day after War broke out.

On Sunday, the 26th July, 1914, a large consignment of arms and ammunition from abroad was landed at Howth, near Dublin, for the use of the Irish National Volunteers who will be hereafter described. Members of that force overpowered the Customs Officers and landed and distributed the arms.

An attempt was made by the Dublin Metropolitan Police acting under orders of Mr. W. V. Harrel, the Assistant Commissioner, to enforce the Proclamation by seizure. After trying fruitlessly to obtain the co-operation of a detachment of the Royal Irish Constabulary he called in a military force to assist him, and a few arms were taken, but most of the Volunteers retired with the weapons before the arrival of the military. Whilst the troops were returning to barracks they were attacked by a mob and an unfortunate incident occurred by which some members of the public lost their lives through shots from the soldiers in Bachelor's Walk. Mr. Harrel was immediately suspended by the Chief Secretary pending further investigation. A Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into this matter, and sat from the 6th to the 11th August, 1914. In their report which was submitted to Your Majesty, Mr. Harrel was censured by the Commission for his conduct in invoking the assistance of the troops, and he resigned his position. The Chief Commissioner—Sir John Ross, of Bladensburg—had previously resigned his position after the order of temporary suspension had been issued against Mr. Harrel. The resignation of Mr. Harrel was looked upon by the public in Dublin as tantamount to dismissal, and while it appears that it had no effect on the loyalty of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, it tended to discourage the officers of that body from initiative in enforcing the law. Further, there can be no doubt that his dismissal tended to weaken the authority of the police, as it gave rise to the opinion amongst the more ignorant classes that in any case of disorder the Government might not support their action.

In spite of the breach of the Proclamation of December, 1913, in the landing of arms at Howth, the Irish Government decided (as in the case of the arms imported at Larne) to take no action and to institute no prosecution, and on the 5th August, as has been above stated, the restriction upon the importation of arms into Ireland was removed.

From the evidence given before the Royal Commission it is clear that the insurrection was caused by two bodies of men allied together for this purpose and known as the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army. It is now a matter of common notoriety that the Irish Volunteers have been in

communication with the authorities in Germany and were for a long time known to be supplied with money through Irish American societies. This was so stated in public by Mr. John McNeill on the 8th November, 1914. It was suspected long before the outbreak that some of the money came from German sources.

The following facts show what was known of the origin and development of these two bodies and the action taken by the Irish Government in dealing with their activities :—

The Irish National Volunteers owed their origin to a meeting at Dublin in November, 1913, of twelve men who came together to discuss the formation of an Irish Volunteer Army. The founders of the force included John McNeill, Bulmer Hobson, P. H. Pearse and The O'Rahilly. After the decision to enrol Volunteers had been taken, a meeting attended by some thousands of people was held in Dublin, and the movement took shape.* It was started quite independently of any Irish Political Party by men strongly opposed to any political connection of Ireland with England. By June, 1914, 65,000 men were reported to have been enrolled, and Mr. Redmond in that month succeeded in securing the addition of enough members to the Committee to secure to himself and his party the control of the movements of the body, to the great dissatisfaction of the original Founders. On the eve of the Prime Minister's meeting in Dublin on the 25th September, 1914—where Mr. Redmond spoke strongly in favour of recruiting—a manifesto was issued attacking Mr. Redmond's attitude This was signed by McNeill and six others (afterwards involved in the Rebellion), and concluded by regretting that Sir Roger Casement's absence prevented his being a signatory. On September 30th this party disassociated themselves from the Irish National Volunteers and formed a new Force under the name of the Irish Volunteers. By the end of October the force enrolled numbered over 13,000, including 2,000 in Dublin. Of these, more than 8,000 were known to be actively engaged in drilling at the end of 1914, and to be in possession of over 1,400 rifles.

It was of paramount importance that after the outbreak of the present war no opportunity should have been given for

* "Secret History of the Irish Volunteers," by The O'Rahilly.

the drilling and arming of any body of men known to be of seditious tendency, and no other consideration should have interfered with the enforcing of this duty. After the war broke out there was a considerable wave of feeling in Ireland in favour of the Allies. Reservists joining the Colours were greeted with enthusiasm, and recruiting was successful. It was owing to the activities of the leaders of the *Sinn Fein* movement that the forces of disloyalty gradually and steadily increased, and undermined the initial sentiment of patriotism.

The words "*Sinn Fein*" (ourselves alone) rather describe a movement than an association, and the principal efforts of those connected with the movement before the outbreak of the war had been active opposition to any recruiting of Irishmen for the British Army and Navy, and a passive opposition to all Irish parliamentary parties. From the fact that some leaders of the *Sinn Fein* movement also led the Irish Volunteers, the latter have frequently been called the *Sinn Fein* Volunteers, and the two expressions from the end of 1914 are synonymous. Between the 5th August, 1914, and the 5th December, 1914, there was no law in force prohibiting the importation of arms into Ireland. Certain warrants had been issued by the Lord Lieutenant authorising the police to seize arms, but on the 5th December an amendment of the Regulations under the Defence of the Realm Act empowered the police to seize arms and explosives which might be landed on the coast, an exception being made in favour of sporting shot guns, which was, however, cancelled on the 5th February, 1915. Nevertheless, arms and explosives continued to be smuggled into Ireland. A flood of seditious literature was disseminated by the leaders of the Irish Volunteer Party early in the War, and certain newspapers were suppressed, but according to the statement of the Under-Secretary for Ireland, action against the seditious Press was not very consistently taken, and prominent members of the Irish Parliamentary Party were strongly against newspaper suppression.

By the end of March, 1915, the Irish Volunteers do not appear to have increased much in numbers although they had acquired more arms. On March 16th, 1915, the Defence of the Realm Act, Number 2, was passed, by which any British

subject could claim the right to trial by jury for an offence against the Defence of the Realm regulations, and this Act to a great extent hampered the Irish Executive in dealing with cases of sedition in Ireland. Insufficient attention appears to have been paid to the state of affairs in Ireland in both Houses of Parliament.

Throughout the whole of the remainder of the year 1915 the Irish Volunteer Party were active in their efforts to encourage sedition. Seditious papers were published, pamphlets of a violent tone issued and circulated, paid organisers were sent throughout the country to enrol and drill volunteer recruits, and the leaders themselves were active in attending anti-recruiting meetings at which disloyal speeches were openly made. A considerable number of the younger members of the priesthood in certain districts joined in the movement, and schoolmasters who were followers of the *Sinn Fein* movement disseminated treason amongst the younger people through the medium of the Irish language.

Action was taken during this period against seditious newspapers and against certain paid organisers of the Irish Volunteer Party, but this course was strongly opposed by members of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Nationalist press. Major Price in his evidence says :—

" One unfortunate thing which hindered us a good deal was the attitude of the official Nationalist Party and their press. Whenever General Friend did anything strong in the way of suppressing or deporting these men (the organisers) from Ireland, they at once deprecated it, and said it was a monstrous thing to turn a man out of Ireland."

Irishmen no doubt appreciate the maintenance of order, but they appear to have an inveterate prejudice against the punishment of disorder.

So seditious had the country become during 1915, that juries in Dublin and magistrates in various parts of the country—through fear or favour—could not be trusted to give decisions in accordance with the evidence. The only tribunals which could be relied upon at this time were those presided over by resident magistrates in Dublin or Belfast,

who had no power to impose a greater sentence than six months' hard labour.

The question of the application of compulsory service gave a great stimulus to the Irish Volunteer movement in the autumn of 1915, and shortly before the recent outbreak the number of Irish Volunteers was estimated by the police authorities to be about 15,000, armed with over 1,800 rifles and about the same number of shot guns and pistols.

During the greater part of this period the Citizen Army remained distinct from the Irish Volunteers. The movement which led to the formation of the former body, composed chiefly of Dublin workmen, was to a large extent inspired by anarchist sentiment based on Irish discontent. The leader was James Connolly, who is described as a man of great energy and ability. By the month of November, 1915, it was known that the two bodies were acting in combination in Dublin.

In the newspaper *The Workers' Republic*, edited by James Connolly, the following passage occurs :—

"The Irish Citizen Army was the first publicly organised armed citizen force south of the Boyne. Its constitution pledged and still pledges its members to work for an Irish Republic and for the emancipation of labour."

Throughout the whole of this year Ireland was in a state of great prosperity, so that Irish discontent could hardly be attributed to economic conditions, except that the housing conditions of the working classes in the City of Dublin might have accounted for an underlying sense of dissatisfaction with existing authority.

In the meantime the Volunteers were steadily drilled and practised military manœuvres by day and night. Ambulance classes were formed in imitation of a similar organisation in Ulster formed by the Ulster Volunteers. In Dublin the Irish Volunteers held officers' training schools and carried out night attacks, and some manœuvres took place in the middle of the city and in the neighbourhood of the Castle.

During this period the National or Redmondite Volunteers had sunk into almost complete stagnation, and towards the close of the year 1915 the largest armed and drilled force in

the provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught—excluding soldiers—were the Irish Volunteers.

In a letter intercepted by the Censor in the post on the 24th March, 1916, and believed to have been written by one of the teaching staff of St. Mary's College, Rathmines, to a friend in America, the following extract appears and is of interest as an indication of the spirit that was abroad in disloyal sections of the community :—

" On St. Patrick's Day there was a lot of people put into prison under the Defence of the Realm Act. There was a rumour that they intended to seize the arms of the Volunteers. The Police raided a lot of places but only got one fire-arm in a house, and gave up the job. The Castle is watching them closely, but is afraid to do anything against them. There was a march in the streets of Dublin right through the City in front of the Foreign College of Trinity and before the Parliament House. The Volunteers were all armed with rifles. Eoin McNeill was present, and they saluted him as they marched by, and all this under the nose of the Castle. It is a dangerous thing to do, but the Volunteers do not care. They are getting stronger every day. Many efforts are being made for it is known now that they are our only hope since they put conscription down sometime ago. Redmond is done for. Whoever wins the War this country will be wronged and plundered, but the people of Ireland are not disposed of yet. Their spirit is always improving and growing more Irish. One thing is clear if not others. An end is being put to the rule and insolence of the ' Peeler.' They are not nearly so arrogant as they used to be. I hope to God we may see you in Ireland when you have finished your time over there. We want the like of you to strike a blow at John Bull. Easter will soon be over, then there will be the Summer coming on. May and June will pass by—not very hot as yet—and then—you know as well as I do, and no doubt much better."

Before turning to the events of the present year it is desirable to refer to the confidential reports of the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary and of the Chief Commissioner

of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, to show that even before the outbreak of War and during the War, full knowledge of the existing state of affairs was supplied to the Under-Secretary, and through him to the Chief Secretary. On the 15th June, 1914, a report was submitted from the office of the Inspector-General in which it was stated :—

" In Ireland the training and drilling to the use of arms of a great part of the male population is a new departure which is bound in the not distant future to alter all the existing conditions of life. Obedience to the law has never been a prominent characteristic of the people. In times of passion or excitement the law has only been maintained by force, and this has been rendered practicable owing to the want of cohesion among the crowds hostile to the police. If the people became armed and drilled effective police control will vanish. Events are moving. Each county will soon have a trained army far outnumbering the police, and those who control the volunteers will be in a position to dictate to what extent the law of the land may be carried into effect."

As early as the 7th September, 1914, the Dublin Metropolitan Police were warning the Government of the danger to be expected within Dublin itself. On that date the following statement was made to the Government :—

" There is no doubt that so far as Dublin is concerned the majority of the Irish National Volunteers would follow the lead of the extreme section, and hints have been given that they are not without hope of being able to assume and establish control of the Government of Ireland before the present difficulties are over, and that they may attempt some escapade before long."

On the 26th October, 1914, the Detective Department of the Dublin Metropolitan Police submitted to the Under-Secretary notes of the speeches made by the Irish Volunteers at their first Annual Convention. The demonstrators had marched to the meeting nearly 1,000 strong, 230 of their number armed with rifles and 20 of the National Boys Scouts similarly

equipped. Speeches of the most inflammatory and revolutionary character were delivered. The leaders predicted rebellion and the shedding of blood " in the great fight of Ireland against the British Empire."

These documents were seen by the Chief Secretary, but he wrote no comment on their contents, and no proceedings were taken.

From the commencement the Dublin Metropolitan Police were in all respects as diligent as the Royal Irish Constabulary in forwarding to the Government regular information as to the conduct and progress of the hostile organisations within their jurisdiction.

In the Annual Report of the Inspector-General, delivered at the end of the year 1914, the following words occur : " In the personnel of the Committee, in its declaration of policy, in the utterances of its leading representatives in the Press, and at public meetings, in its opposition to the efforts of Mr. Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party to bring Ireland into line at the present national crisis, and in its crusade against enlistment in the Army, the Irish Volunteer organisation has shown itself to be disloyal, seditious, and revolutionary, if the means and opportunity were at hand."

On the 12th February, 1915, a further report was submitted, in which it was stated that at certain meetings of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in Tyrone members were reminded of the opportunity afforded by the present crisis to strike a blow for the independence of Ireland, and they were promised arms and ammunition when the time arrived.

At certain places in Co. Wexford after the promulgation of military orders under the Defence of the Realm Act for the action of the inhabitants in the event of an invasion, counter notices were placarded calling on the people to disobey the orders issued, and to welcome the German troops as friends.

In a report submitted on the 13th July, 1915, it was stated that information had been received from a reliable source that a sum of 3,000 dollars had been recently sent from America to the Council of the Irish Volunteers.

In a report submitted on the 14th September, 1915, the following passage occurs :—

" According to the information confidentially obtained,

communications are passing between the leaders of the *Clan-na-Gael* in America and the *Sinn Fein* in Ireland, and money has been sent over to the latter to help them in a campaign of disloyalty. As the leaders of the Irish Volunteers apparently aim at National independence, the force bears resemblance to the old Fenian movement, but unlike the latter is ready to drill and arm its members and is not regarded as a secret society. As already reported, according to the confidential information, at a meeting of the Council of Irish Volunteers held in Dublin on the 30th May, 1915, Professor McNeill in the chair, a resolution in favour of the Irish Volunteers declaring themselves in favour of immediate insurrection, proposed by Bulmer Hobson, was only defeated by the casting vote of Professor McNeill."

A report dated the 13th November, 1915, contained the following statement :—

"This force is disloyal and bitterly Anti-British and is daily improving its organisation. Some drill is practised, but its activities are mainly directed to promoting sedition and hindering recruitment for the Army, and it is now pledged to resist Conscription with arms. According to information from a reliable source the *Sinn Feiners* have already planned a rising in the event of Conscription, and as this is perhaps the one object in which they would find many Redmondites in agreement with them, they might give a serious amount of trouble."

On the 14th December, 1915, a report was submitted that :—

"The Irish Volunteers were very active during the month and gained 1,300 new members. Lieutenant O'Leary, V.C., was hooted and insulted by a party of volunteers route marching. A party of 800 held military manœuvres at Artane, Co. Dublin. The liberty of action at present enjoyed by the openly disloyal and hostile *Sinn Feiners* is having a very undesirable effect."

On the 29th November, 1915, a special report was delivered which deserves study. It contains the following statement :—

"It is a fact that this body of Irish Volunteers numbers

10,000 strong in the provinces with control of 1,500 rifles and possibly more, thoroughly disloyal and hostile to British Government, is apparently now on the increase, and I desire to point out that it might rapidly assume dimensions sufficient to cause anxiety to the military authorities. As it is in the event of an invasion, or of any important reverse to our troops in the field, the Irish Volunteer Force would seriously embarrass arrangements for home defence."

In addition to the information contained in the above-mentioned reports of the Royal Irish Constabulary, Lord Midleton in November, 1915, had an interview with the Chief Secretary in which he strongly urged that the Irish Volunteers should be disarmed, and not permitted to parade, and he pressed for the prosecution of those responsible for seditious speeches. His warnings were entirely neglected.

On the 18th December, 1915, a letter was sent by the Under-Secretary to the Chief Secretary, of which the following passage is an extract :—

" What is Redmond up to with his comparisons between Ireland and Great Britain in the matters of Police and Crime ? He knows, or should know, after what Dillon wrote to him over a month ago in the enclosed ' confidential ' letter and repeated verbally on the 3rd inst. The present situation in Ireland is most serious and menacing. Redmond himself sent me the other, ' private ' enclosure on the 9th. He knows, or should know, that the enrolled strength of the active *Sinn Fein* Volunteers has increased by a couple of thousand members in the last two months to a total of some 13,500, and each group of these is a centre of revolutionary propaganda. He knows, or should know, that efforts are being made to get arms for the support of this propaganda—that the Irish Volunteers have already some 2,500 rifles, that they have their eyes on the 10,000 in the hands of the supine National Volunteers, and that they are endeavouring to supplement their rifles with shot guns, revolvers and pistols. New measures possibly requiring additional police at the ports will be required to

counter these attempts, and unless in other matters we keep these revolutionaries under observation, we shall not be in a position to deal with the outbreak, which we hope will not occur, but which undoubtedly will follow any attempt to enforce conscription, or even if there is no such attempt might take place as a result of continual unsuccess of the British Arms."

On the 8th January, 1915, Lord Midleton called attention in the House of Lords to the condition of Ireland. In the course of his evidence he said : " I also named four seditious newspapers, and pressed the Government to oppose them, and to say exactly what was the status of the Irish Volunteers. Lord Crewe's reply, which I hand in, minimised the increase of the organisation, expressed sanguine hopes that regulations issued by the Military authorities would practically put a stop to this dissemination of seditious newspapers, and undertook, under renewed pressure from me, that the full attention of the Irish Government and the Military authorities would be given to the status of the Volunteers. Lord Midleton further said : " On the 26th January, 1916, I had an interview with the Prime Minister by appointment, and I brought all these facts before him. The Prime Minister asked me to hand him a memorandum giving the views which had been placed into my hands, into which he undertook to make most careful examination. I sent him subsequently at his wish a memorandum which I produce." He added : " I had an appointment with the Prime Minister for the 14th March on another very important subject, and I proposed then to lay before him the Report of this Committee " (which had met to discuss this subject) " and to give him a copy of it. Unfortunately the Prime Minister was taken ill on the 13th, and subsequently had to go to Rome. In the result the interview never took place."

Besides the warnings above mentioned Lord Midleton gave further warnings at later periods. In his evidence he stated that on February 28th he saw Sir Matthew Nathan, and on March 6th Lord Wimborne, and that :—

" All the questions which had been discussed before

were brought up at this meeting, and Sir Matthew Nathan especially pressed on me that since our previous interview the movement had been developing much more seriously in Dublin. He mentioned to me the names of those who were known to the Government as the chief conspirators and urged me to read as a specimen an article by Sheehy-Skeffington in the January or February number of the *Century*. I felt so strongly that Sir Matthew had not the necessary powers that I asked the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland whether I could go over and see him, and as he was n London he was good enough to arrange a meeting with me on March 6th in Arlington Street. I found Lord Wimborne took rather a more favourable view of the position in Ireland than Sir Matthew Nathan . . . but the general trend of the conversation showed that he was most anxious to deal with some of the ringleaders, and I gathered, although he did not say so in words, he was unable to move further owing to the general attitude of the Government towards Ireland which it was impossible to disturb."

Between January, 1916, and the outbreak of the insurrection, the Irish Volunteers steadily increased in numbers and discipline. During this time they were known to be supplying themselves with quantities of arms and high explosives by theft, or otherwise, when opportunity offered. In the early months of the year the state of various parts of the country was known to be lawless. In January the heads of the Royal Irish Constabulary submitted to the Under Secretary suggestions for the amendment of the Defence of the Realm Act and Regulations. They pointed out that trial by jury had proved to be a failure, and that in many parts of Ireland the magistrates could not be relied upon to enforce the existing regulations. A conference was held at the Castle to consider these recommendations early in February. Amendments of the law and prohibition of the carrying of arms by the Irish Volunteers were suggested as remedial measures in a carefully written paper of recommendations submitted to the conference. It was attended by Mr. O'Connell, Deputy Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary, the Under Secretary, General Friend, and the Solicitor-General. The only suggestion dis-

cussed was that dealing with explosives—the more serious matters were not even brought forward. Upon this point Mr. O'Connell remarked :—" It was my impression, rightly or wrongly, that they had been discussed by higher authorities."

The publication of newspapers containing seditious articles continued during the spring of 1916. A number of seditious books called " Tracts for the Times " were circulated. Major Price, of the Army Intelligence Department, informed the Commission that he had consultations with regard to this matter, but added :—" I liken myself to John the Baptist preaching in the Wilderness as to taking steps on the subject. The Civil Authorities did not think it desirable to take steps."

On St. Patrick's Day, the 17th of March, there was a parade of the Irish Volunteers throughout the Provinces, under orders from their Headquarters. About 4,500 turned out, of whom 1,817 were armed. The report of the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary, dealing with this parade, contained the following remarks :—

" There can be no doubt that the Irish Volunteer leaders are a pack of rebels who would proclaim their independence in the event of any favourable opportunity, but with their present resources and without substantial reinforcements it is difficult to imagine that they will make even a brief stand against a small body of troops. These observations, however, are made with reference to the Provinces and not to the Dublin Metropolitan area, which is the centre of the movement."

At the end of last March the Council of the Irish Volunteers assembled in Dublin, and issued a manifesto warning the public that the Volunteers :—

" Cannot submit to be disarmed, and that the raiding for arms and the attempted disarming of men, therefore, in the natural course of things can only be met by resistance and bloodshed."

On the 7th April, 1916, public meetings of the Irish Volunteers were held for the purposes of protesting against the deportation orders and to enlist recruits. The speeches were

very violent, threats being used that persons attempting to disarm the volunteers would be "shot dead."

The Chief Commissioner made a report to the Under Secretary, and that document shows clearly the view that Colonel Edgeworth-Johnstone took of the situation :—

"These recruiting meetings are a very undesirable development, and are I think causing both annoyance and uneasiness amongst loyal citizens. . . . The *Sinn Fein* party are gaining in numbers, in equipment, in discipline, and in confidence, and I think drastic action should be taken to limit their activities. The longer this is postponed the more difficult it will be to carry out."

This report reached the Under Secretary on the 10th April, who wrote on it "Chief Secretary and the Lord Lieutenant to see the Chief Commissioner's minute." On the 12th the Chief Secretary wrote upon it, "Requires careful consideration. Is it thought practicable to undertake a policy of disarmament, and, if so, within what limits, if any, can such a policy be circumscribed ?" Upon the same day the Lord Lieutenant wrote upon it, "This is a difficult point ; could the disarming be satisfactorily effected ?"

No answer to the minute was returned to the Royal Irish Constabulary, and the file did not find its way back to the Inspector-General until the 24th May.

For some months before the rising, a newspaper campaign was carried on suggesting that if an attempt were made by the Government to disarm the Irish Volunteers, it could only arise from the deliberate intention of Englishmen to provoke disorder and bloodshed.

There is no doubt that these articles were intended to intimidate the Irish Government, and to prevent their taking active repressive measures.

On the 18th April news reached Dublin Castle that a ship had left Germany for Ireland on April 12th, accompanied by two German submarines, but the news was accompanied by a caution as to its accuracy. The statement added that the ship was due to arrive on the 21st, and that a rising was timed for Easter Eve. On the 19th April a special meeting of the

Dublin Corporation was held at the Mansion House to discuss the police rate. Alderman Thomas Kelly, in the course of a speech attacking Mr. Justice Kenny (who had alluded at the opening of his Commission to the state of disorder in Dublin and had urged military action), made a statement to the effect that he had received that morning from the Editor of *New Ireland* a circular which he would read. It was from a man named Little, *New Ireland* Office, 13 Fleet Street, Dublin, 16th April, 1916 :—

"Sir,—The gravity of the present situation in Ireland compels me to invite your serious attention to the enclosed. It is a copy of portion of a document recently addressed to, and on the files in, Dublin Castle. In view of the deliberate intention here revealed on the part of the Government to cause bloodshed in Ireland by an attack on the Irish Volunteers—a body formed openly in pre-war times —in a manner certain to provoke armed resistance, I appeal to you to use your influence, public and private, in whatever manner you may consider would best benefit this country. The cipher from which this document is copied does not indicate punctuation or capitals.

"The following precautionary measures have been sanctioned by the Irish Office on the recommendation of the General Officer Commanding the Forces in Ireland. All preparations will be made to put these measures in force immediately on receipt of an Order issued from the Chief Secretary's Office, Dublin Castle, and signed by the Under Secretary and the General Officer Commanding the Forces in Ireland. First, the following persons to be placed under arrest :—All members of the *Sinn Fein* National Council, the Central Executive Irish *Sinn Fein* Volunteers, General Council Irish *Sinn Fein* Volunteers, County Board Irish *Sinn Fein* Volunteers, Executive Committee National Volunteers, Coisde Gnota Committee Gaelic League. See list A 3 and 4 and supplementary list A 2 . . . Dublin Metropolitan Police and Royal Irish Constabulary forces in Dublin City will be confined to barracks under the direction of the Competent Military Authority. An order will be issued to inhabi-

tants of city to remain in their houses until such time as the Competent Military Authority may otherwise direct or permit. Pickets chosen from units of Territorial Forces will be placed at all points marked on maps 3 and 4. Accompanying mounted patrols will continuously visit all points and report every hour. The following premises will be occupied by adequate forces, and all necessary measures used without need of reference to headquarters. First, premises known as Liberty Hall, Beresford Place ; No. 6 Harcourt Street, *Sinn Fein* Building ; No. 2 Dawson Street, Headquarters, Volunteers ; No. 12 D'Olier Street, *Nationality* Office ; No. 25 Rutland Square, Gaelic League Office ; 41 Rutland Square, Foresters' Hall ; *Sinn Fein* Volunteer premises in city ; all National Volunteer premises in the city ; Trades Council premises, Capel Street ; Surrey House, Leinster Road, Rathmines. The following premises will be isolated, and all communications to or from prevented :—Premises known as Archbishop's House, Drumcondra ; Mansion House, Dawson Street ; No. 40 Herbert Park ; Larkfield, Kimmage Road ; Woodtown Park, Ballyboden ; Saint Enda's College, Hermitage, Rathfarnham ; and in addition premises in list 5 D, see maps 3 and 4."

Alderman Kelly, in continuing, said that the document was evidently genuine, and that he had done a public service in drawing attention to it, in order to prevent these military operations being carried on in a city which he declared was under God the most peaceable in Europe.

This document was an entire fabrication. Copies of it found since the outbreak are shown by identification of type to have been printed at Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the Citizen Army. It is not known who was the author of this invention, or whether Mr. Little was in any way responsible for it. Many copies of this forged document were printed and distributed, and it was widely considered by the people to be genuine, and no doubt led to the belief by the members of the Irish Volunteers and Citizen Army that they would shortly be disarmed. This undoubtedly became one of the proximate causes of the outbreak.

On the 22nd April, 1916, the news of the capture of the

German ship and of the arrest of a man believed to be Sir Roger Casement was published The *Irish Volunteer* newspaper announced in its issue of that day under the title of Headquarters' Bulletin :—

"Arrangements are now nearing completion in all the more important brigade areas for the holding of a very interesting series of manœuvres at Easter. In some instances the arrangements contemplate a one or two day bivouac. As for Easter, the Dublin programme may well stand as a model for other areas."

Reference was also made to a more elaborate series of manœuvres at Whitsuntide.

It is clear that the leaders of the movement expected the arrival of the ship, since emissaries of the Irish Volunteers were sent to meet it. The vessel, however, and Sir Roger Casement appear to have arrived a little sooner than was expected.

On the news of the capture of the ship orders were given at the Headquarters of the Irish Volunteers cancelling throughout all Ireland the arrangements for the following day—Sunday. The order was signed "McNeill, Chief of Staff." This appeared in the early evening papers of Saturday, the 22nd April.

In the evening of the 22nd it was known to the authorities that the man arrested was Sir Roger Casement. A conference was held at Dublin Castle on the same evening. The abandonment of the parade of the Volunteers for Sunday was then known. No movements of the Volunteers took place on that day. A report was received on Sunday afternoon that there had been a robbery under arms at about 8 o'clock a.m. of 250 lbs. of gelignite from quarries a few miles south-west of Dublin, and that it was believed the stolen material, or part of it, had been taken to Liberty Hall. Conferences held during Sunday, the 23rd April, at the Castle are fully detailed in the evidence of Lord Wimborne, Sir Matthew Nathan and other witnesses. It was eventually decided that the proper course was to arrest all the leaders of the movement, there being by this time clear evidence of their "hostile association," but it was agreed that before this could be safely done military

preparations sufficient to overawe armed opposition should be secured.

Early in the morning of the 24th April the Chief Secretary's concurrence with the proposed arrest and internment in England of the hostile leaders was asked for and obtained, but before any further effective steps could be taken the insurrection had broken out, and by noon many portions of the City of Dublin had been simultaneously occupied by rebellious armed forces.

There is no doubt that the outbreak had been carefully planned beforehand. A pocketbook discovered upon one of the rebels who took part in the rising in Wexford contained a list of the places actually seized in Dublin when the outbreak occurred.

Conclusions.

It is outside the scope of Your Majesty's instructions to us to enquire how far the policy of the Irish Executive was adopted by the Cabinet as a whole, or to attach responsibility to any but the Civil and Military Executive in Ireland ; but the general conclusion that we draw from the evidence before us is that the main cause of the rebellion appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided.

Such a policy is the negation of that cardinal rule of government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency.

We consider that the importation of large quantities of arms into Ireland after the lapse of the Arms Act, and the toleration of drilling by large bodies of men, first in Ulster, and then in other districts of Ireland, created conditions which rendered possible the recent troubles in Dublin and elsewhere.

It appears to us that reluctance was shown by the Irish Government to repress by prosecution written and spoken seditious utterances, and to suppress the drilling and manœuvring of armed forces known to be under the control of men

who were openly declaring their hostility to your Majesty's Government and their readiness to welcome and assist your Majesty's enemies.

This reluctance was largely prompted by the pressure brought to bear by the Parliamentary representatives of the Irish people, and in Ireland itself there developed a widespread belief that no repressive measures would be undertaken by the Government against sedition. This led to a rapid increase of preparations for insurrection and was the immediate cause of the recent outbreak.

We are of opinion that from the commencement of the present War all seditious utterances and publications should have been firmly suppressed at the outset, and if juries or magistrates were found unwilling to enforce this policy further powers should have been invoked under the existing Acts for the Defence of the Realm.

We are also of opinion that on the outbreak of war all drilling and manœuvring by unrecognised bodies of men, whether armed or unarmed, should have been strictly prohibited, and that as soon as it became known to the Irish Government that the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army were under the control of men prepared to assist your Majesty's enemies if the opportunity should be offered to them, all drilling and open carrying of arms by these bodies of men should have been forcibly suppressed.

It does not appear to be disputed that the authorities in the spring of 1916, while believing that the seditious bodies would not venture unaided to break into insurrection, were convinced that they were prepared to assist a German landing.

We are further of opinion that at the risk of a collision early steps should have been taken to arrest and posecute leaders and organisers of sedition.

For the reasons before given, we do not think that any responsibility rests upon the Lord Lieutenant. He was appointed in February, 1915, and was in no way answerable for the policy of the Government.

We are, however, of the opinion that the Chief Secretary as the administrative head of your Majesty's Government in Ireland is primarily responsible for the situation that was allowed to arise and the outbreak that occurred.

Sir Matthew Nathan assumed office as Under Secretary to the Irish Government in September, 1914, only. In our view he carried out with the utmost loyalty the policy of the Government, and of his immediate superior the Chief Secretary, but we consider that he did not sufficiently impress upon the Chief Secretary during the latter's prolonged absences from Dublin the necessity for more active measures to remedy the situation in Ireland, which on December 18th last, in a letter to the Chief Secretary, he described as "most serious and menacing."

We are satisfied that Sir Neville Chamberlain, the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and Colonel Edgeworth-Johnstone, the Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, required their subordinates to furnish, and did receive from their subordinates, full and exact reports as to the nature, progress and aims of the various armed associations in Ireland. From these sources the Government had abundant material on which they could have acted many months before the leaders themselves contemplated any actual rising.

For the conduct, zeal and loyalty of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police we have nothing but praise.

We do not attach any responsibility to the Military authorities in Ireland for the rebellion or its results. As long as Ireland was under civil government those authorities had nothing to do with the suppression of sedition. Their duties were confined to securing efficiency in their own ranks and to the promotion of recruiting, and they could only aid in the suppression of disorder when duly called on by the civil power. By the middle of 1915 it was obvious to the Military authorities that their efforts in favour of recruiting were being frustrated by the hostile activities of the *Sinn Fein* supporters, and they made representations to the Government to that effect. The general danger of the situation was clearly pointed out to the Irish Government by the Military Authorities, on their own initiative, in February last, but the warning fell on unheeding ears.

In conclusion, we desire to place on record our high appreciation of the services rendered with ability and energy by our

Honorary Secretary. For several months Mr. Grimwood Mears gave his services voluntarily to the Government in their investigation into cases of alleged German atrocities, and subsequently served as joint Honorary Secretary to the Committee on alleged German outrages, generally known as Lord Bryce's Committee. The experience thus gained by him has been of great advantage to your Majesty's Commissioners.

We offer our cordial thanks to the Secretary of the Commission for the assistance he has given us in the performance of our task.

All which we humbly submit and report for your Majesty's gracious consideration.

(Signed) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST,
MONTAGUE SHEARMAN,
MACKENZIE DALZELL CHALMERS.

E. GRIMWOOD MEARS,
Secretary.

June 26th, 1916.

APPENDIX B

MILITARY DESPATCHES.

War Office, 21*st July*, 1916.

The following despatches have been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces :—

General Headquarters, Home Forces,
Horse Guards, London, S.W.,
29*th May*, 1916.

My Lord,—I have the honour to forward herewith a report which I have received from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Irish Command, relating to the recent outbreak in Dublin, and the measures taken for its suppression.

2. It will be observed that the Rebellion broke out in Dublin at 12 15 p.m. on April 24th, and that by 5 30 p.m. on the same afternoon a considerable force from the Curragh had arrived in Dublin to reinforce the garrison, and other troops were on their way from Athlone, Belfast, and Templemore. The celerity with which these reinforcements became available says much for the arrangements which had been made to meet such a contingency.

3. I was informed of the outbreak by wire on the afternoon of the 24th ult., and the 59th Division at St. Albans was at once put under order to proceed to Ireland, and arrangements were put in train for their transport. After seeing General Friend I gave orders for the movement of two brigades to commence as soon as their transport could be arranged. I am aware that in doing so I was acting beyond the powers which were delegated to me, but I considered the situation to be so critical that it was necessary to act at once without reference to the Army Council.

4. On the morning of the 28th April, General Sir John Maxwell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., arrived in Ireland to assume command.

5. I beg to bring to your notice the assistance afforded to me by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who met every request made to them for men, guns, and transport with the greatest promptitude, and whose action enabled me to reinforce and maintain the garrison in the South and West of Ireland without unduly drawing upon the troops which it was desirable to retain in England.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

FRENCH, *Field Marshal*,
Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces.

From the General Officer,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The Forces in Ireland,
To the Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The Home Forces.

HEADQUARTERS,
IRISH COMMAND,
DUBLIN, 25*th May*, 1916.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report the operations of the Forces now under my command from Monday, 24th April, when the rising in Dublin began.

(1) On Easter Monday, 24th April, at 12 15 p.m., a telephone message was received from the Dublin Metropolitan Police saying Dublin Castle was being attacked by armed *Sinn Feiners*. This was immediately confirmed by the Dublin Garrison Adjutant, who reported that, in the absence of Colonel Kennard, the Garrison Commander, who had left his office shortly before, and was prevented by the rebels from returning, he had ordered all available troops from Portobello, Richmond and Royal Barracks to proceed to the Castle, and the 6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment towards Sackville Street.

The fighting strength of the troops available in Dublin at this moment were :—

6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment—35 officers, 851 other ranks.
3rd Royal Irish Regiment—18 officers, 385 other ranks.
10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers—37 officers, 430 other ranks.
3rd Royal Irish Rifles—21 officers, 650 other ranks.

Of these troops an inlying picquet of 400 men, which for some days past had been held in readiness, proceeded at once, and the remainder followed shortly afterwards.

At 12 30 p.m. a telephone message was sent to General Officer Commanding, Curragh, to mobilise the mobile column, which had been arranged for to meet any emergency, and to despatch it dismounted to Dublin by trains which were being sent from Kingsbridge.

This column, under the command of Colonel Portal, consisted of 1,600 officers and other ranks from the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade.

Almost immediately after the despatch of this message telephonic communication in Dublin became very interrupted, and from various sources it was reported that the *Sinn Feiners* had seized the General Post Office in Sackville Street, the Magazine in Phœnix Park, the Four Courts, Jacobs' Biscuit Factory, and had occupied many buildings in various parts of the city.

As the occupation of the General Post Office by the *Sinn Feiners* denied the use of the telegraph a message reporting the situation in Dublin was sent at 1 10 p.m. to the Naval centre at Kingstown asking that the information of the rising might be transmitted by wireless through the Admiralty to you. This was done.

First Actions of the Troops.

(2) The first objectives undertaken by the troops were to recover possession of the Magazine in Phœnix Park, where the rebels had set fire to a quantity of ammunition, to relieve the Castle, and to strengthen the guards on Viceregal Lodge and other points of importance.

The Magazine was quickly re-occupied, but the troops moving on the Castle were held up by the rebels, who had

occupied surrounding houses, and had barricaded the streets with carts and other material.

Between 1 40 p.m. and 2 p.m. 50 men of 3rd Royal Irish Rifles and 130 men of the 10th Royal Dublin Fusiliers reached the Castle by the Ship Street entrance.

At 4 45 p.m. the first train from the Curragh arrived at Kingsbridge Station, and by 5 20 p.m. the whole Cavalry Column, 1,600 strong, under the command of Colonel Portal, had arrived, one train being sent on from Kingsbridge to North Wall by the Loop Line to reinforce the guard over the Docks.

(3) During the day the following troops were ordered to Dublin :—

(*a*) A battery of four 18-pounders R. F. A., from the Reserve Artillery Brigade at Athlone.

(*b*) The 4th Dublin Fusiliers from Templemore.

(*c*) A composite battalion from Belfast.

(*d*) An additional 1,000 men from the Curragh. This message being sent by one of the troop trains returning to the Curragh.

During the afternoon and evening small parties of troops were engaged with the rebels.

The 3rd Royal Irish Regiment on their way to the Castle were held up by the rebels in the South Dublin Union, which they attacked and partially occupied ; a detachment of two officers and fifty men from the 6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment, which was conveying some ammunition from the North Wall, was surrounded in Charles Street, but succeeded in parking their convoy, and defended this with great gallantry for three and a half days, when they were relieved ; during this defence the officer in command was killed and the remaining officer wounded.

The rebels in St. Stephen's Green were attacked, and picquets with machine guns were established in the United Service Club and the Shelbourne Hotel with a view to dominating the Square and its exits.

At 9 35 p.m. Colonel Kennard, Officer Commanding Troops, Dublin, reached the Castle with another party of eighty-six men of the 3rd Royal Irish Regiment.

The defence of the Docks at North Wall was undertaken by Major H. F. Somerville, commanding a detachment from

the School of Musketry, Dollymount, reinforced by 330 officers and men of the 9th Reserve Cavalry Regiment.

The occupation of the Custom House, which dominated Liberty Hall, was carried out at night, and was of great assistance in later operations against Liberty Hall.

(4) The situation at midnight was that we held the Magazine, Phœnix Park, the Castle, and the Ship Street entrance to it, the Royal Hospital, all barracks, the Kingsbridge, Amiens Street, and North Wall Railway Stations, the Dublin Telephone Exchange in Crown Alley, the Electric Power Station at Pigeon House Fort, Trinity College, Mountjoy Prison, and Kingstown Harbour. The *Sinn Feiners* held Sackville Street and blocks of buildings on each side of this, including Liberty Hall, with their Headquarters at the General Post Office, the Four Courts, Jacobs' Biscuit Factory, South Dublin Union, St. Stephen's Green, all the approaches to the Castle except the Ship Street entrance, and many houses all over the city, especially about Ballsbridge and Beggar's Bush.

(5) The facility with which the *Sinn Feiners* were able to seize so many important points throughout the city was, in my opinion, due to the fact that armed bodies of civilians have been continually allowed to parade in and march through the streets of Dublin and throughout the country without interference.

The result was that the movement of large forces of armed civilians, particularly on a holiday such as Easter Monday, passed, if not unnoticed, unchecked, and no opposition could be offered to them at the moment when they decided to act.

Further, the Dublin police, being unarmed and powerless to deal with these armed rebels, were withdrawn from the areas occupied by them.

(6) At the time of the rising Major-General Friend, then commanding the troops in Ireland, was on short leave in England, and when visiting your headquarters at the Horse Guards on that day heard the serious news from Dublin. He returned that night, and arrived in Dublin early on the morning of the 25th April.

He has informed me that at a conference with you it was decided to despatch at once two infantry brigades of the 59th Division from England to Ireland, and that the remaining

Infantry Brigade and Artillery of this Division were to be held in readiness to follow if required.

(7) On April 25th, Brigadier-General W. H. M. Lowe, Commanding the Reserve Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, arrived at Kingsbridge Station at 3 45 a.m. with the leading troops from the 25th (Irish) Reserve Infantry Brigade, and assumed command of the forces in the Dublin area, which were roughly 2,300 men of the Dublin Garrison, the Curragh Mobile Column of 1,500 dismounted cavalrymen, and 840 men of the 25th Reserve Infantry Brigade.

(8) In order to relieve and get communication with the Castle, Colonel Portal, Commanding the Curragh Mobile Column, was ordered to establish a line of posts from Kingsbridge Station to Trinity College *via* the Castle. This was completed by 12 noon, 25th April, and with very little loss. It divided the rebel forces into two, gave a safe line of advance for troops extending operations to the north or south, and permitted communication by despatch rider with some of the Commands.

The only means of communication previous to this had been by telephone, which was unquestionably being tapped.

The Dublin University O.T.C., under Captain E. H. Alton, and subsequently Major G. A. Harris, held the College buildings until the troops arrived. The holding of these buildings separated the rebel centre round the General Post Office from that round St. Stephen's Green ; it established a valuable base for the collection of reinforcements as they arrived, and prevented the rebels from entering the Bank of Ireland, which is directly opposite to and commanded by the College buildings.

(9) During the day the 4th Royal Dublin Fusiliers from Templemore, a composite Ulster Battalion from Belfast, and a battery of four 18-pounder guns from the Reserve Artillery Brigade at Athlone arrived, and this allowed a cordon to be established round the northern part of the city from Parkgate, along the North Circular Road to North Wall. Broadstone Railway Station was cleared of rebels, and a barricade near Phibsborough was destroyed by Artillery fire.

As a heavy fire was being kept up on the Castle from the rebels located in the Corporation buildings, *Daily Express* offices, and several houses opposite the City Hall, it was decided to attack these buildings.

The assault on the *Daily Express* office was successfully carried out under very heavy fire by a detachment of the 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers under 2nd Lieutenant F. O'Neill.

The main forces of the rebels now having been located in and around Sackville Street, the Four Courts, and adjoining buildings, it was decided to try to enclose that area north of the Liffey by a cordon of troops so as to localise as far as possible the efforts of the rebels.

(10) Towards evening the 178th Infantry Brigade began to arrive at Kingstown, and in accordance with orders received, the brigade left Kingstown by road in two columns.

The left column, consisting of the 5th and 6th Battalions Sherwood Foresters, by the Stillorgan-Donnybrook Road and South Circular Road to the Royal Hospital, where it arrived without opposition.

The right column, consisting of the 7th and 8th Battalions Sherwood Forresters, by the main tram route through Ballsbridge, and directed on Merrion Square and Trinity College.

This column, with 7th Battalion leading, was held up at the northern corner of Haddington Road and Northumberland Road, which was strongly held by rebels, but with the assistance of bombing parties organised and led by Captain Jeffares, of the Bombing School at Elm Park, the rebels were driven back.

At 3.25 p.m. the 7th Battalion Sherwood Foresters met great opposition from the rebels holding the schools and other houses on the north side of the road close to the bridge at Lower Mount Street, and two officers, one of whom was the Adjutant, Captain Dietrichsen, were killed, and seven wounded, including Lieutenant-Colonel Fane, who, though wounded, remained in action.

At about 5.30 p.m. orders were received that the advance to Trinity College was to be pushed forward at all costs, and therefore, at about 8 p.m., after careful arrangements, the whole column, accompanied by bombing parties, attacked the schools and houses where the chief opposition lay, the battalions charging in successive waves, carried all before them, but, I regret to say, suffered severe casualties in doing so.

Four officers were killed, fourteen wounded, and of other ranks 216 were killed and wounded.

The steadiness shown by these two battalions is deserving of special mention, as I understand the majority of the men have less than three months' service.

In view of the opposition met with, it was not considered advisable to push on to Trinity College that night, so at 11 p.m. the 5th South Staffordshire Regiment, from the 176th Infantry Brigade, reinforced this column, and by occupying the positions gained allowed the two battalions Sherwood Foresters to be concentrated at Ballsbridge.

In connection with this fighting at Mount Street Bridge, where our heaviest casualties occurred, I should like to mention the gallant assistance given by a number of medical men, ladies, nurses and women servants, who at great risk brought in and tended to the wounded, continuing their efforts even when deliberately fired at by the rebels.

(11) Meanwhile severe fighting had taken place in the Sackville Street quarter. At 8 a.m. Liberty Hall, the former headquarters of the *Sinn Feiners*, was attacked by field guns from the south bank of the River Liffey, and by a gun from the patrol ship Helga, with the result that considerable progress was made.

During the night of 26th-27th April several fires broke out in this quarter and threatened to become dangerous, as the fire brigade could not get to work owing to their being fired upon by the rebels.

Throughout the day further troops of the 176th Brigade arrived in the Dublin area.

(12) On 27th April the

5th Leinsters,
2/6th Sherwood Foresters,
3rd Royal Irish Regiment,
The Ulster Composite Battalion,

under the command of Colonel Portal, began and completed by 5 p.m. the forming of a cordon round the rebels in the Sackville Street area, which operation was carried out with small loss.

About 12.45 p.m. Linen Hall Barracks, which were occupied by the Army Pay Office, were reported to have been set on fire by the rebels, and were destroyed.

By night-fall the 177th Infantry Brigade had arrived at Kingstown, where it remained for the night.

(13) At 2 a.m. on the 28th April I arrived at North Wall and found many buildings in Sackville Street burning fiercely, illuminating the whole city, and a fusilade of rifle fire going on in several quarters of the city.

Accompanied by several Staff Officers who had come with me, I proceeded to the Royal Hospital.

After a conference with Major-General Friend and Brigadier-General Lowe, I instructed the latter to close in on Sackville Street from East and West, and to carry out a house to house search in areas gained.

I was able to place the 2/4 Lincolns at his disposal for the purpose of forming a cordon along the Grand Canal, so enclosing the southern part of the city and forming a complete cordon round Dublin.

During the afternoon the 2/5th and 2/6th South Staffords arrived at Trinity College, and this additional force allowed me to begin the task of placing a cordon round the Four Courts area in the same way as the Sackville Street area, which had already been successfully isolated.

During the afternoon the 2/5th and 2/6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment, which had been escorting ammunition and rifles from North Wall, and had been held up in Charles Street, was relieved by armoured motor lorries, which had been roughly armoured with boiler plates by the Inchicore Railway Works and placed at my disposal by Messrs. Guinness.

Throughout the night the process of driving out the rebels in and around Sackville Street continued, though these operations were greatly hampered by the fires in this area and by the fact that some of the burning houses contained rebel stores of explosives which every now and again blew up.

In other quarters of the city the troops had a trying time dealing with the numerous snipers, who became very troublesome during the hours of darkness.

(14) Owing to the considerable opposition at barricades, especially in North King Street, it was not until 9 a.m. on the 29th April that the Four Courts area was completely surrounded.

Throughout the morning the squeezing out of the surrounded areas was vigorously proceeded with, the infantry being greatly assisted by a battery of Field Artillery com-

manded by Major Hill, who used his guns against the buildings held by the rebels with such good effect that a Red Cross Nurse brought in a message from the rebel leader, P. H. Pearse, asking for terms. A reply was sent that only unconditional surrender would be accepted. At 2 p.m. Pearse surrendered himself unconditionally, and was brought before me, when he wrote and signed notices ordering the various " Commandoes " to surrender unconditionally.

During the evening the greater part of the rebels in the Sackville Street and Four Courts area surrendered.

(15) Early on the 30th April two Franciscan Monks informed me that the rebel leader, Macdonagh, declining to accept Pearse's orders, wished to negotiate.

He was informed that only unconditional surrender would be accepted, and at 3 p.m., when all preparation for an attack on Jacobs' Biscuit Factory, which he held, had been made, Macdonagh and his band of rebels surrendered unconditionally.

In the St. Stephen's Green area, Countess Marcievicz and her band surrendered and were taken to the Castle.

These surrenders practically ended the rebellion in the city of Dublin.

(16) Throughout the night of the 30th April/1st May isolated rebels continued to snipe the troops, but during the 1st May these were gradually cleared out, and in conjunction with the police a systematic house-to-house search for rebels and arms was continued

(17) During the severe fighting which took place in Dublin the greatest anxiety was caused by the disquieting reports received from many parts of Ireland, and chiefly from—

(*a*) County Dublin.
(*b*) County Meath.
(*c*) County Louth
(*d*) County Galway.
(*e*) County Wexford.
(*f*) County Clare.
(*g*) County Kerry.

(18) On the 27th April, as soon as the troops became available, a detachment was sent by sea from Kingstown to Arklow to reinforce the garrison at Kynoch's Explosive Works, and a small party was sent to assist the R. I. C. post over the wireless station at Skerries.

On the 28th April a battalion of the Sherwood Foresters were despatched by rail to Athlone to protect the Artillery and Military Stores there, and to hold the communication over the River Shannon.

(19) Brigadier-General Stafford, the Garrison Commander at Queenstown, was directed to use his discretion in the employment of troops under his command, and on 30th April he was reinforced from England by one battalion of the 179th Brigade, 60th Division, a battalion of the Royal Marines, and later by the remainder of the 179th Brigade.

(20) Brigadier-General Hackett-Pain, who assumed command of the troops in Ulster, made effective use of the troops under his command, and it was largely due to the dispositions made by these two Commanders that the *Sinn Feiners* in the South and North of Ireland were restrained from taking a more active part in the rebellion.

I received the greatest assistance from the Inspector-General Royal Irish Constabulary and from all his inspectors and men, and throughout the rebellion I worked in the closest co-operation with them. In many districts small posts of these gallant men were isolated and had to defend themselves against overwhelming numbers, which they successfully did except in very few cases.

It was with great regret I received the report of 28th April that a body of Royal Irish Constabulary, under Inspector Gray, had been ambushed by the rebels at Ashbourne, which resulted in Inspectors Gray and Smith and eight constables being killed and 14 wounded.

It was not until 30th April that I was able to spare a mobile column to deal with this body of rebels, the leaders of which were secured.

In other parts of Ireland similar attacks on police posts had been made by armed bands of *Sinn Feiners*. In order to deal with these, as soon as the Dublin rebels had been crushed, I organised various mobile columns, each consisting of from one to two companies of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, one 18-pounder gun and an armoured car.

Each column was allotted a definite area, which, in close co-operation with the local police, was gone through, and dangerous *Sinn Feiners* and men who were known to have

taken an active part in the rising were arrested ; in addition many arms belonging to *Sinn Feiners* were surrendered or seized.

I am glad to be able to report that the presence of these columns had the best possible effect on the people in country districts, in many of which troops had not been seen for years.

(22) That splendid body of men, the Dublin Metropolitan Police, could give me little or no assistance, because they were unarmed. Had they been armed I doubt if the rising in Dublin would have had the success it did.

(23) I am glad to report that the conduct of the troops was admirable ; their cheerfulness, courage, and good discipline, under the most trying conditions, was excellent.

Although doors and windows of shops and houses had to be broken open, no genuine case of looting has been reported to me, which I consider reflects the greatest credit on all ranks.

(24) I wish to acknowledge the great assistance I received from the Provost of Trinity College ; the clergy of all denominations ; civilian medical men ; Red Cross nurses, who were untiring in their attention do the wounded, often rendered under heavy fire ; ambulances provided by Royal Ambulance Corps ; the Irish Volunteer Training Corps and the members of St. John Ambulance Corps ; the Civilian and Officers' Training Corps motor cyclists, who fearlessly carried despatches through streets infested with snipers ; telegraph operators and engineers ; and from the lady operators of the Telephone Exchange, to whose efforts the only means of rapid communication remained available.

I am glad to be able to record my opinion that the feelings of the bulk of the citizens of Dublin being against the *Sinn Feiners* materially influenced the collapse of the rebellion.

(25) I deplore the serious losses which the troops and the civilian volunteers have suffered during these very disagreeable operations.

I have the honour to be,

Your most obedient servant,

J. G. MAXWELL,
General.

From the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, the Forces in Ireland, to the Secretary of State for War.

HEADQUARTERS, IRISH COMMAND,
DUBLIN, *26th May, 1916.*

MY LORD,—In amplification of the report of the operations undertaken by the troops in Dublin, which I forwarded to Field-Marshal Lord French on 25th May, I think it desirable to bring to your notice the difficult conditions under which the troops had to act.

(1) The rebellion began by *Sinn Feiners*, presumably acting under orders, shooting in cold blood certain soldiers and policemen ; simultaneously they took possession of various important buildings and occupied houses along the routes into the City of Dublin which were likely to be used by troops taking up posts.

(2) Most of the rebels were not in any uniform, and by mixing with peaceful citizens made it almost impossible for the troops to distinguish between friend and foe until fire was opened.

(3) In many cases troops having passed along a street seemingly occupied by harmless people were suddenly fired upon from behind from windows and roof-tops. Such were the conditions when reinforcements commenced to arrive in Dublin.

(4) Whilst fighting continued under conditions at once so confused and so trying, it is possible that some innocent citizens were shot. It must be remembered that the struggle was in many cases of a house-to-house character, that sniping was continuous and very persistent, and that it was often extremely difficult to distinguish between those who were or had been firing upon the troops and those who had for various reasons chosen to remain on the scene of the fighting, instead of leaving the houses and passing through the cordons.

(5) The number of such incidents that has been brought to notice is very insignificant.

(6) Once the rebellion started the members of the Dublin Metropolitan Police—an unarmed uniformed force—had to be withdrawn, or they would have been mercilessly shot down, as, indeed, were all who had the bad luck to meet the rebels. In their absence a number of the worst elements of the city

joined the rebels and were armed by them. The daily record of the Dublin Magistrates' Court proves that such looting as there was was done by such elements.

(7) There have been numerous incidents of deliberate shooting on ambulances, and those courageous people who voluntarily came out to tend to the wounded. The City Fire Brigade, when turned out in consequence of incendiary fires, were fired on and had to retire.

(8) As soon as it was ascertained that the rebels had established themselves in various centres, the first phase of operations was conducted with a view to isolate them by forming a cordon of troops around each.

(9) To carry out this streets were selected, along which the cordon could be drawn. Some of these streets—for instance, North King Street—were found to be strongly held, rebels occupying the roofs of houses, upper windows, and strongly-constructed barricades.

(10) Artillery fire was only used to reduce the barricades, or against a particular house known to be strongly held.

(11) The troops suffered severe losses in establishing these cordons, and, once established, the troops were subjected to a continuous fire from all directions, especially at night time, and invariably from persons concealed in houses.

(12) To give an idea of the opposition offered to His Majesty's troops in the execution of their duty, the following losses occurred :—

	Killed	Wounded
Officers	17	46
Other ranks ...	89	288

(13) I wish to draw attention to the fact that, when it became known that the leaders of the rebellion wished to surrender, the officers used every endeavour to prevent further bloodshed ; emissaries were sent in to the various isolated bands, and time was given them to consider their position.

(14) I cannot imagine a more difficult situation than that in which the troops were placed ; most of those employed were draft-finding battalions or young Territorials from England, who had no knowledge of Dublin.

(15) The surrenders, which began on April 30th, were continued until late on May 1st, during which time there was a considerable amount of isolated sniping.

(16) Under the circumstances related above, I consider the troops as a whole behaved with the greatest restraint, and carried out their disagreeable and distasteful duties in a manner which reflects the greatest credit on their discipline.

(17) Allegations on the behaviour of the troops brought to my notice are being most carefully inquired into. I am glad to say they are few in number, and these are not all borne out by direct evidence.

(18) Numerous cases of unarmed persons killed by rebels during the outbreak have been reported to me. As instances, I may select the following for your information :—

J. Brien, a constable of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, was shot while on duty at Castle Gate on April 24th. On the same day another constable of the same force, named M. Lahiff, was shot while on duty at St. Stephen's Green. On April 25th R. Waters, of Recess, Monkstown, Co. Dublin, was shot at Mount Street Bridge, while being driven into Dublin by Captain Scovell, R.A.M.C.

All these were unarmed, as was Captain Scovell. In the last case, the car was not challenged or asked to stop.

(19) I wish to emphasise that the responsibility for the loss of life, however it occurred, the destruction of property, and other losses, rests entirely with those who engineered this revolt, and who, at a time when the Empire is engaged in a gigantic struggle, invited the assistance and co-operation of the Germans.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. G. MAXWELL,
General.

APPENDIX C.

CASEMENT'S SPEECH FROM THE DOCK.

[CASEMENT *was placed upon his trial for high treason "without the Realm of England," the charge being founded on a statute of King Edward III., before the High Court of Justice in London on June 26th. He was found guilty on June 29th, and, on being asked if he had anything to say why sentence of death should not be passed upon him according to law, read the following statement.*]

MY LORD CHIEF JUSTICE,—As I wish my words to reach a much wider audience than I see before me here, I intend to read all that I propose to say. What I shall read now is something I wrote more than 20 days ago. There is an objection, possibly not good in law, but surely good on moral grounds, against the application to me here of this old English statute, 565 years old, that seeks to deprive an Irishman to-day of life and honour, not for "adhering to the King's enemies," but for adhering to his own people.

When this statute was passed in 1351, what was the state of men's minds on the question of a far higher allegiance—that of man to God and His Kingdom? The law of that day did not permit a man to forsake his Church or deny his God save with his life. The "heretic" then had the same doom as the "traitor." To-day a man may forswear God and His heavenly realm without fear or penalty, all earlier statutes having gone the way of Nero's edicts against the Christians; but that Constitutional phantom, "The King," can still dig up from the dungeons and torture-chambers of the Dark Ages a law that takes a man's life and limb for an exercise of conscience.

If true religion rests on love, it is equally true that loyalty

rests on love. The law I am charged under has no parentage in love and claims the allegiance of to-day on the ignorance and blindness of the past. I am being tried in truth not by my peers of the live present, but by the fears of the dead past ; not by the civilisation of the 20th century, but by the brutality of the 14th ; not even by a statute framed in the language of the land that tries me, but emitted in the language of an enemy land, so antiquated is the law that must be sought to-day to slay an Irishman whose offence is that he puts Ireland first !

Loyalty is a sentiment, not a law. It rests on love, not on restraint. The government of Ireland by England rests on restraint and not on law ; and since it demands no love it can evoke no loyalty.

But this statute is more absurd even than it is antiquated ; and if it be potent to hang one Irishman, it is still more potent to gibbet all Englishmen. Edward III. was King not only of the Realm of England, but also of the Realm of France, and he was not King of Ireland Yet his dead hand to-day may pull the noose around the Irishman's neck whose Sovereign he was not, but it can strain no strand around the Frenchman's throat whose Sovereign he was. For centuries the successors of Edward III. claimed to be Kings of France, and quartered the arms of France on their Royal shield down to the Union with Ireland on January 1, 1801. Throughout these hundreds of years these " Kings of France " were constantly at war with their Realm of France and their French subjects, who should have gone from birth to death with an obvious fear of treason before their eyes. But did they ? Did the " Kings of France," resident here at Windsor, or in the Tower of London, hang, draw, and quarter as a traitor every Frenchman for 400 years who fell into their hands with arms in his hands ? On the contrary, they received Embassies of these traitors, presents from these traitors, even knighthood itself at the hands of these traitors, feasted with them, tilted with them, fought with them—but did not assassinate them by law.

Judicial assassination to-day is reserved only for one race of the King's subjects ; for Irishmen ; for those who cannot forget their allegiance to the Realm of Ireland. The Kings of England, as such, had no rights in Ireland up to the time of Henry VIII., save such as rested on compact and mutual

obligation entered into between them and certain princes, chiefs, and lords of Ireland. This form of legal right, such as it was, gave no King of England lawful power to impeach an Irishman for high treason under this statute of King Edward III. of England until an Irish Act, known as Poyning's Law, the 10th of Henry VII., was passed in 1494, at Drogheda, by the Parliament of the Pale in Ireland, and enacted as law in that part of Ireland. But if by Poyning's Law an Irishman of the Pale could be indicted for high treason under this Act, he could be indicted only in one way and before one tribunal—by the laws of the Realm of Ireland and in Ireland. The very law of Poyning, which, I believe, applies this statute of Edward III. to Ireland, enacted also for the Irishman's defence, " all those laws by which England claims her liberty."

And what is the fundamental charter of an Englishman's liberty ? That he shall be tried by his peers. With all respect I assert this Court is to me, an Irishman, charged with this offence, a foreign Court—this jury is for me, an Irishman, not a jury of my peers to try me in this vital issue, for it is patent to every man of conscience that I have a right, an indefeasible right, if tried at all under this statute of high treason, to be tried in Ireland, before an Irish Court and by an Irish jury. This Court, this jury, the public opinion of this country, England, cannot but be prejudiced in varying degrees against me, most of all in time of war. I did not land in England. I landed in Ireland. It was to Ireland I came ; to Ireland I wanted to come, and the last place I desired to land in was England.

But for the Attorney-General of England there is only " England "—there is no Ireland, there is only the law of England—no right of Ireland ; the liberty of Ireland and of Irishmen is to be judged by the power of England. Yet for me, the Irish outlaw, there is a land of Ireland, a right of Ireland, and a charter for all Irishmen to appeal to, in the last resort, a charter that even the very statutes of England itself cannot deprive us of, nay more, a charter that Englishmen themselves assert as the fundamental bond of law that connects the two kingdoms. This charge of high treason involves a moral responsibility, as the very terms of the indictment against myself recite, inasmuch as I committed the acts I am

charged with to the " evil example of others in the like case." What was this " evil example " I set to others in " the like case," and who were these others ? The " evil example " charge is that I asserted the rights of my own country, and the " others " I appealed to, to aid my endeavour, were my own countrymen. The example was given not to Englishmen, but to Irishmen, and the " like case " can never arise in England, but only in Ireland. To Englishmen I set no evil example, for I made no appeal to them. I asked no Englishman to help me. I asked Irishmen to fight for their rights. The " evil example " was only to other Irishmen who might come after me and in " like case " seek to do as I did. How, then, since neither my example nor my appeal was addressed to Englishmen, can I be righfully tried by them ?

If I did wrong in making that appeal to Irishmen to join with me in an effort to fight for Ireland, it is by Irishmen and by them alone I can be rightfully judged. From this Court and its jurisdiction I appeal to those I am alleged to have wronged, and to those I am alleged to have injured by my " evil example," and claim that they alone are competent to decide my guilt or my innocence. If they find me guilty the statute may affix the penalty, but the statute does not override or annul my right to seek judgment at their hands. This is so fundamental a right, so natural a right, so obvious a right, that it is clear the Crown were aware of it when they brought me by force and by stealth from Ireland to this country. It was not I who landed in England, but the Crown who dragged me here, away from my own country to which I had returned with a price upon my head, away from my own countrymen whose loyalty is not in doubt, and safe from the judgment of my peers whose judgment I do not shrink from. I admit no other judgment but theirs. I accept no verdict save at their hands.

I assert from this dock that I am being tried here not because it is just, but because it is unjust. Place me before a jury of my own countrymen, be it Protestant or Catholic, Unionist or Nationalist, Sinn Feineach or Orangemen, and I shall accept the verdict and bow to the statute and all its penalties. But I shall accept no meaner finding against me than that of those whose loyalty I endangered by my example and to whom

alone I made appeal. If they adjudge me guilty, then guilty I am. It is not I who am afraid of their verdict—it is the Crown. If this be not so, why fear the test? I fear it not. I demand it as my right.

That is the condemnation of English rule, of English-made law, of English government in Ireland, that it dare not rest on the will of the Irish people, but exists in defiance of their will—that it is a rule derived not from right but from conquest.

Conquest, my lord, gives no title—and if it exists over the body it fails over the mind. It can exert no empire over men's reason and judgment and affections; and it is from this law of conquest without title, to the reason, judgment, and affection of my own countrymen, that I appeal.

I would add, the generous expressions of sympathy extended to me from so many quarters, particularly from America, have touched me very much. In that country, as in my own, I am sure my motives are understood, for the achievement of their liberties has been an abiding inspiration to Irishmen and to all elsewhere rightly struggling to be free.

My Lord Chief Justice, I am not called upon, I conceive, to say anything in answer to the inquiry your lordship has addressed to me why sentence should not be passed upon me. Since I do not admit any verdict in this Court I cannot, my lord, admit the fitness of the sentence that of necessity must follow it from this Court. I hope I shall be acquitted of presumption if I say that the Court I see before me now is not this High Court of Justice of England, but a far greater, a far higher, a far older assemblage of justices—that of the people of Ireland. Since in the acts which have led to this trial it was the people of Ireland I sought to serve and them alone—I leave my judgment and my sentence in their hands.

Let me pass from myself and my own fate to a far more pressing, as it is a far more urgent, theme—not the fate of the individual Irishman who may have tried and failed, but the claims and the fate of the country that has not failed. Ireland has outlived the failure of all her hopes—and yet she still hopes. Ireland has seen her sons—aye, and her daughters, too—suffer from generation to generation always for the same cause, meeting always the same fate, and always at the hands of the same power; and always a fresh generation has passed

on to withstand the same oppression. For if English authority be omnipotent—a power, as Mr. Gladstone phrased it, that reaches to the very ends of the earth—Irish hope exceeds the dimensions of that power, excels its authority, and renews with each generation the claims of the last. The cause that begets this indomitable persistency, the faculty of preserving through centuries of misery the remembrance of lost liberty, this surely is the noblest cause men ever strove for, ever lived for, ever died for. If this be the case I stand here to-day indicted for and convicted of sustaining, then I stand in a goodly company and a right noble succession.

My counsel has referred to the Ulster Volunteer movement, and I will not touch at length upon that ground, save only to say this, that neither I nor any of the leaders of the Irish Volunteers, who were founded in Dublin in November 1913, had any quarrel with the Ulster Volunteers as such, who were born a year earlier. Our movement was not directed against them, but against the men who misused and misdirected the courage, the sincerity, and the local patriotism of the men of the North of Ireland. The manifesto of the Irish Volunteers, promulgated at a public meeting in Dublin on November 25, 1913, stated with sincerity the aims of the organisation as I have outlined them.

Since arms were so necessary to make our organisation a reality and to give to the minds of Irishmen menaced with the most outrageous threats a sense of security, it was our bounden duty to get arms before all else. I decided, with this end in view, to go to America, with surely a better right to appeal to Irishmen there for help in an hour of great national trial than those envoys of " Empire " could assert for their week-end descents upon Ireland, or their appeals to Germany.

If, as the right hon. gentleman, the present Attorney-General, asserted in a speech at Manchester, Nationalists would neither fight for Home Rule nor pay for it, it was our duty to show him that we knew how to do both. Within a few weeks of my arrival in the States the fund that had been opened to secure arms for the Volunteers of Ireland amounted to many thousands of pounds. In every case the money subscribed, whether it came from the purse of the wealthy man or the still readier pocket of the poor man, was Irish gold.

Then came the war. As Mr. Birrell said in his evidence recently laid before the Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the late rebellion in Ireland, "the war upset all our calculations." It upset mine no less than Mr. Birrell's, and put an end to my mission of peaceful effort in America. War between Great Britain and Germany meant, as I believed, ruin for all the hopes we had founded on the enrolment of the Irish Volunteers. A constitutional movement in Ireland is never very far from a breach of the Constitution, as the loyalists of Ulster had been so eager to show us.

The difference between us was that the Unionist champions chose a path they felt would lead to the Woolsack, while I went a road I knew must lead to the dock. And the event proves we were both right. The difference between us was that my "treason" was based on a ruthless sincerity that forced me to attempt in time and season to carry out in action what I said in words—whereas their treason lay in verbal incitements that they knew need never be made good in their bodies. And so, I am prouder to stand here to-day in the traitor's dock to answer this impeachment than to fill the place of my right honourable accusers.

We have been told, we have been asked to hope that after this war Ireland will get Home Rule as a reward for the life-blood shed in a cause whoever else its success may benefit, can surely not benefit Ireland. And what will Home Rule be in return for what its vague promise has taken, and still hopes to take, away from Ireland ? Home Rule when it comes, if come it does, will find an Ireland drained of all that is vital to its very existence—unless it be that unquenchable hope we build on the graves of the dead. We are told that if Irishmen go by the thousand to die not for Ireland, but for Flanders, for Belgium, for a patch of sand on the deserts of Mesopotamia, or a rocky trench on the heights of Gallipoli, they are winning self-government for Ireland. But if they dare to lay down their lives on their native soil, if they dare to dream even that freedom can be won only at home by men resolved to fight for it there, then they are traitors to their country, and their dream and their deaths alike are phases of a dishonourable fantasy.

But history is not so recorded in other lands. In Ireland

alone in this 20th century is loyalty held to be a crime. If loyalty be something less than love and more than law, then we have had enough of such loyalty for Ireland or Irishmen. Where all your rights become only an accumulated wrong; where men must beg with bated breath for leave to subsist in their own land, to think their own thoughts, to sing their own songs, to garner the fruit of their own labours—and even while they beg to see these things inexorably withdrawn from them—then surely it is a braver, a saner, and a truer thing to be a rebel in act and deed against such circumstances as this than tamely to accept it as the natural lot of men.

The prisoner, at the conclusion of his statement, addressing the jury, said that he wished to thank them for their verdict, and that his observations did not in any way reflect on their integrity. He maintained that he had a right to be tried in Ireland, and he asked them how any one of them would feel in a converse case if he had landed in England and had been carried over to Ireland by stealth and under a false name to be tried in a country inflamed against him and believing him to be a criminal.

After Casement's execution on August 3rd, the following statement was issued by the Government through the Press Bureau :—

All the circumstances in the case of Roger Casement were carefully and repeatedly considered by the Government before the decision was reached not to interfere with the sentence of the law. He was convicted and punished for treachery of the worst kind to the Empire he had served, and as a willing agent of Germany.

The Irish rebellion resulted in much loss of life, both among soldiers and civilians. Casement invoked and organised German assistance to the insurrection. In addition, though himself for many years a British official, he undertook the task of trying to induce soldiers of the British Army, prisoners in the hands of Germany, to foreswear their oaths of allegiance and join their country's enemies.

Conclusive evidence has come into the hands of the Govern-

ment since the trial that he had entered into an agreement with the German Government, which explicitly provided that the brigade which he was trying to raise from among the Irish soldier prisoners might be employed in Egypt against the British Crown.

Those among the Irish soldiers, prisoners in Germany, who resisted Casement's solicitations of disloyalty were subjected to treatment of exceptional cruelty by the Germans. Some of them have since been exchanged as invalids, and have died in this country, regarding Casement as their murderer.

The suggestion that Casement left Germany for the purpose of trying to stop the Irish rising was not raised at the trial, and is conclusively disproved, not only by the facts there disclosed, but by further evidence which has since become available.

Another suggestion that Casement was out of his mind is equally without foundation. Materials bearing on his mental condition were placed at the disposal of his counsel, who did not raise the plea of insanity. Casement's demeanour since his arrest, and throughout and since his trial, gave no ground for any such defence, and, indeed, was sufficient to disprove it.